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# The Gospel According to St. Paul

AN ATTEMPT TO ELUCIDATE  
St. Paul's Doctrine of Sin and  
Justification

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## PREFACE

THE following little work is the result of an independent investigation to which the author was prompted many years ago by his inability to find satisfaction on the subject of St. Paul's doctrine of justification in any of the works to which he had access. Sometime in the eighties the idea struck him that the key to the problem might lie in the interpretation of St. Paul's genitives after *πίστις* as subjective. This idea was of course not original, nor does the author know how far it may have been worked out by others. But as time went on he became more and more convinced of its truth. Very slowly and intermittently the book attained its present form; and in spite of the fact that he has read nothing more modern on the subject than the commentaries of Ellicott and Lightfoot, and is consequently incapable of judging how far his thesis may have been forestalled, he now ventures to offer it with all its defects to the world, in the hope that a line of thought which has seemed to him to be not altogether unfruitful may possibly bring some light to others also. Readers will find in it neither profound scholarship nor literary grace, but only an honest attempt at sound reasoning.

Two words of apology need to be added.

(1) As to the title of the book. The author only discovered that in the choice of this he had been forestalled by Dr. Du Bose when the work of printing

had gone too far to permit of any alteration. For this he can only express his sincere regret.

(2) At the close of the first paragraph of Chapter I a sense has been attributed to the verb שָׁמַח which is probably at least doubtful. The author was mistaken in imagining that he here had the authority of Gesenius, whom he misinterpreted. As it is he can only claim that of the marginal rendering in the revised version of Prov. xix. 2. The point will be seen, however, to be of no importance.

It only remains for the author to express his cordial thanks to his friend the Rev. J. R. Cohu for his help in correcting proofs, and for valuable practical suggestions.

HUBERT SHEARS.

PEPPARD, HENLEY-ON-THAMES,

*February, 1920.*

#### ERRATUM.

P. 21, line 6, *For* ; these *read* ? These

# The Gospel according to St. Paul.

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## CHAPTER I.

### SIN, LAW, AND TRANSGRESSION.

THE word commonly rendered *sin* in the New Testament (*ἁμαρτία*), like the Hebrew word (*חטא*) of which it is a translation, means literally 'missing the mark.' So far then as language can be taken to indicate the root notion conveyed by the term, the word *sin*, viewed as the equivalent of *ἁμαρτία*, must be taken to mean primarily something absolutely unintentional, something which in its first beginning does not even enter into man's consciousness. The hurler of the spear does not know that his act is faulty until it is irrevocable. Or, to take another and closely allied meaning of the Hebrew verb, he who misses his way only discovers the fact when it is too late.

Supposing for a moment (what is not here postulated) that the meaning thus suggested by language was actually the original signification of the word rendered *sin*, and that this latter word is its real equivalent, it is clear that the common expression 'wilful sin' is strictly speaking a contradiction in terms. In using it we are not merely enlarging the scope of the term *sin*, but we are fastening upon it



a meaning wholly foreign and antagonistic to the original conception. The essential notion of sin being *error* (cf. the word ἀγνοημάτων in Heb. ix. 7), it becomes something else when committed with knowledge and deliberation. We want a new term, not a mere qualifying adjective.

It need hardly be said that the purpose of what is here urged is nothing so chimerical as the correction of our ordinary way of speaking. Whatever *sin* may have meant originally, for us it has become, and for us it must remain, a generic term including what is wilful and deliberate, as well as what is done in absolute ignorance of its real nature. The point here insisted on is that St. Paul's use of the word ἁμαρτία does not correspond to our use of the word *sin* at all, but approaches far more nearly to that use to which language points as the original one. When St. Paul wishes to indicate what we call 'wilful sin' he uses an entirely different word. He does not call it *sin* (ἁμαρτία), but *transgression* (παράβασις), or *trespass* (παράπτωμα), words which he seems to use synonymously (cf. Rom. v. 14, 15, 20; Gal. iii. 19). It is no longer the *error* of one who loses his way, but the conscious overstepping of clearly marked bounds. And until we have firmly grasped the distinction between *sin* and *transgression* as used by him, some at least of his teaching must remain for us enigmatical. Probably most English readers of his epistles fail to see the distinction at all. There are not wanting indications that the revisers of the New Testament translation failed to appreciate its significance, as we shall shortly see.

First of all then let us try to bring out clearly this

distinction between sin and transgression. It can almost be done by the familiar process of 'stringing texts together.' 'Where there is no law neither is there transgression' (Rom. iv. 15). On the other hand 'Until the law sin was in the world' (Rom. v. 13). Sin then was before the law, and therefore before transgression. How then did the law bring *transgression* into existence? 'By the law is the *knowledge* (or *recognition*, ἐπίγνωσις) of sin.' 'I had not known (ἔγνων) sin but by the law' (Rom. iii. 20; vii. 7). Before the law then sin was not known or recognised. It was something unconscious, and therefore unintentional. When brought into knowledge by the law it became something different, *transgression*. And this conversion of sin into transgression by bringing it into knowledge was, according to St. Paul, the very purpose of the law. 'The law came in beside that the trespass (παράπτωμα) might abound' or *multiply* (Rom. v. 20. Previously to the law St. Paul only recognised *one* transgression, that of Adam). 'It was added for the sake of transgressions' (τῶν παραβάσεων χάριν, Gal. iii. 19). Its function was to convert sin into transgression by bringing it into clear knowledge and recognition.

This moral evolution of transgression from sin by the agency of the law is a theory which must be kept steadily in view by those who would follow St. Paul's thought on the subject of justification in its relation to Christ, the law, and faith. It will therefore be well to enlarge upon it a little at this point. And we may consider it in three aspects; (1) as a theory of the history of sin in the race; (2) as it affected St. Paul's view of the status of the heathen in his own



day; (3) in its bearing on the spiritual experience of humanity.

(1) St. Paul's theory of the history of sin in the race.

Let us glance at the first three verses of a very difficult passage in the epistle to the Romans from which a quotation has already been made. 'Therefore, as by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed unto all men for that all sinned;—for until the law sin was in the world, but sin is not reckoned when there is no law. Nevertheless death reigned from Adam to Moses even over them that did not sin after the likeness of the transgression of Adam' (Rom. v. 12-14). Here is St. Paul's application of his theory to history as he understood it, as he believed that he read it in the book of Genesis. He looked upon the period from Adam to Moses as one in which there was no law, and consequently no transgression. Yet there was sin, and there was its physical penalty death in which it reigned; but the sin was not 'reckoned.' Most remarkable are the words, 'those that did not sin after the similitude of Adam's transgression.' In the case of Adam St. Paul recognized *transgression*, the violation of a distinct command, 'Thou shalt not eat of it.' And he held that that one act involved the race in sin and death (v. 12), but not in transgression (v. 14). The transgression ended then and there. Its effect remained as sin, moral disease leading man astray in the absence of any revelation of the right way. And the sin reigned in death even over those who were not involved in the guilt of the transgression. Thus the words, 'those that did not

sin after the similitude of Adam's transgression,' apply to the whole human race in the specified period; their purpose is to shew that sin in its original unconscious, unintentional phase brought death in its train even when it was not 'reckoned' in the sight of God, even when there was no law to make it something more than sin. Mankind were suffering from a deadly disease of which they were wholly ignorant, and were to remain ignorant until the revelation made to Moses first brought man face to face with his true condition and involved him in that guilt of *transgression* from which he had been free hitherto both in God's sight and in his own.

Perhaps it will be said, If this is what is to be found in St. Paul, is it worth while to pay any further attention to his teaching? Certainly not if we come to St. Paul to learn history; but the truth of his spiritual teaching is not to be gauged by that of his historical preconceptions. St. Paul speaks of having treasure in earthen vessels (II. Cor. iv. 7). We must put up with the rudeness of the vessel for the sake of the treasure; and more, we must see to it that we have the right vessel, the real earthen one, and not the more artistic production which translators and commentators would substitute for it, and which may turn out to be utterly devoid of the treasure. It is well here to state plainly that, consciously or unconsciously, our translators both in the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries have shrunk from presenting St. Paul in his native ruggedness to the English reader. The effect has been to obscure his real meaning by bringing his teaching more into agreement with our modern ideas. In illustration of this

tendency we may note the rendering in both versions of a verse which has been already quoted, Gal. iii. 19, 'It was added *because of* transgressions' (τῶν παραβάσεων χάριν). Let the reader compare this verse with Rom. v. 20, remembering that the two epistles are closely connected in subject matter. We there read (in the revised version), 'And the law came in beside that the trespass might abound.' Does not this point at once to the translation, 'It was added *for the sake of* transgressions' as the right one in the epistle to the Galatians? And could the revisers possibly have failed to observe the parallel? The truth seems to be that the revisers shrank from expressing St. Paul's meaning in either case. But while the passage in the epistle to the Romans admitted of no alternative, the Greek of the other passage suggested a way of escape of which they gladly availed themselves.

Now it would be difficult to utter too strong a condemnation of this pernicious method of manipulating St. Paul's writings. The revisers by their retention of a false rendering have actually made St. Paul say that the law was added as a *consequence* of transgressions. They knew well enough that St. Paul elsewhere said, 'Where there is no law neither is there transgression' (Rom. iv. 15). Did it never occur to them to ask, How could the law be a consequence of that which could not exist without it? And what did they expect the English reader to make of the two statements? They have been content to leave the translation of St. Paul's writings unintelligible and self-contradictory, and this apparently in order to gloss over a statement which they did

not understand. For the root of the difficulty appears to have been their failure to grasp St. Paul's strongly marked differentiation between *sin* and *transgression*. 'It was added for the sake of transgressions' seems to have suggested to them 'It was added for the sake of sins,' whereas to St. Paul it only meant 'It was added in order to bring the sins that existed already into clear knowledge, and so make them not merely sins but transgressions,' a change which constituted a real moral advance, though inadequate as a spiritual remedy.

If there are crudities in St. Paul there is no irreverence in facing them. The real sacrilege consists in toning them down and blurring the bold, sharp outlines he has traced. We have seen what is St. Paul's idea of the history of sin in the period from Adam to Moses. For him it originated, it is true, in Adam's *transgression*, in conscious disobedience to a divine precept. For him there was no escape from such a beginning. But the initial transgression ends then and there. What remains for the race is not *transgression* but *sin*, unconscious, unimputed sin, only involving death as its consequence. And sin continued in this dormant state, in a sense 'dead' (Rom. vii. 8), though it was really reigning in death, until the law of Moses came to bring it into clear light and life, thus working wrath (Rom. iv. 15).

Once more it is necessary to be on one's guard against the toning down of this bold presentment of the change wrought by the law. Some people would see in St. Paul a reference not merely to the *law of Moses* as a means of revealing sin, but more vaguely

to the idea of God's law generally, however arrived at. This is certainly not the prevailing idea in St. Paul. True he speaks of gentiles who did by nature the things of the law, and were a law unto themselves, but in the same breath he characterizes them as 'having no law' (*νόμον μὴ ἔχοντες*), not merely as not having *the* law (Rom. ii. 14). However impossible it may seem to us for anyone regarding the book of Genesis as historical to look upon the whole period of which it treats as one in which God never called man to account for sin, and in which man lived in entire ignorance of sin, that was St. Paul's view, and it is most important to grasp it.

And is there not something in this view, crude as it seems, which is worthy of attention, something which is really in advance of much of the theological thought of modern times? For after all St. Paul's crudity was historical, not theological. Leaving out of sight Adam's transgression, which is obviously an unessential part of the scheme, does not the idea of a period in which the race sinned unconsciously, and of a subsequent awaking to the fact when the mischief was already done, perfectly accord with modern knowledge so far as we can yet be said to know? Does it not suggest a theory of original sin which makes sin really original and not adventitious, carrying us back to the time when man was at any rate *nearer* to the brute, before he was troubled with anything like an ideal? Though St. Paul believed in Adam's transgression he can hardly be said to have had a theory of original righteousness. For him the first man was 'of the earth, earthy' (I. Cor. xv. 47), and probably most people in the present day take the

same view. The enigma is not 'original sin,' but the awakening to a sense of it. How did man come to have an idea of right and wrong at all? St. Paul's introduction of the law of Moses as a sort of *Deus ex machina*, suddenly bringing about the crucial change, may seem desperately crude. But it is more profound than any attempt to conjure with the word *evolution*. The crucial fact is that somehow at some time man came to know himself and his own short-coming. If we may enlarge the scope of Browning's words he then became—

‘ A man, for aye removed  
From the developed brute; a God, though in the  
germ,’

and the talk about evolution does not explain the change.

With the history of sin in the race generally subsequently to the giving of the law St. Paul does not directly deal, though the logical outcome of his view of the period from Adam to Moses is obvious. What he may have held on this subject does not concern us except so far as it may have determined his attitude toward his gentile contemporaries. This is the point which now demands our attention.

(2) St. Paul's view of the status of the heathen in his own day.

Unfortunately we have no writings of St. Paul addressed to heathen. For our knowledge of his actual dealings with them we are thrown back on two recorded speeches in the Acts of the Apostles; one to the men of Lystra (Acts xiv. 15-17), the other and more important one to the Athenians (Acts xvii.

22-31). In referring to them it is necessary to make one's position perfectly clear.

It is certainly not here maintained that the speeches recorded by St. Luke in the Acts are an equally authoritative evidence of St. Paul's views with his own genuine writings. Let any one who chooses maintain that St. Luke, like Thucydides, in default of better material set down what he thought the speaker was likely to have said. Even so the speeches have considerable evidential value. A contemporary and intimate friend was far less likely to misrepresent St. Paul's views than are modern translators and commentators who may be imbued with theological and other theories of which St. Paul never dreamed. With the reservation here indicated it will be convenient in discussing the matter of these speeches to treat them as historical.

It has already been remarked that of the two speeches, that to the Athenians is the more important. In the first place it was delivered in answer to a direct appeal, 'May we know what this new doctrine, whereof thou speakest, is'? (Acts xvii. 19). In answer to such an appeal St. Paul would hardly have withheld any important part of his message. On the other hand the speech to the men of Lystra was merely delivered to meet a sudden emergency, and cannot be viewed as a deliberate exposition by St. Paul of his teaching. But there is another, and perhaps a more important, point of difference. The speech to the men of Lystra occurred at the very outset of St. Paul's missionary career as an apostle of the gentiles. That to the Athenians was delivered after a very considerable interval, and an interval



fraught with fresh missionary experience. On the bearing of this latter point a few words may not be out of place.

The question which naturally arises here is, Did St. Paul's missionary experience tend to modify his original conception of the condition of the heathen? And it seems impossible not to answer in the affirmative. Brought up in all the exclusiveness of the pharisee, and suddenly finding himself sent with a message to those from whom he had hitherto religiously held aloof, he *must* have started with preconceptions which subsequent experience would modify or destroy. For be it observed he claims no *revelation* as to the actual spiritual condition of the heathen. What he does claim is to have been entrusted with a *gospel*. The present state of the recipient was no part of the glad tidings, though it may have served by contrast to enhance 'the gospel of the grace of God.' His actual acquaintance with the condition of those to whom he ministered must have been gradually acquired in the course of his missionary experience.

That St. Paul should have started with the notion that the gentiles had no knowledge of sin was not altogether unnatural. For him that knowledge had been bound up with the law of Moses from his earliest childhood. The words, 'I had not known sin but by the law,' might well have been used by him in a personal sense even if they actually were not. How should those who had not that law have attained to a like knowledge? His acquaintance with Greek literature would hardly have sufficed to weaken a pre-conception which had its roots deep in religious

conviction, nor would a mind thus fortified readily admit the corrective teaching of experience.

Now the evidence of St. Paul's recorded speech to the Athenians, so far as it is admissible, seems to shew that at the time of its delivery the theory of a total ignorance of sin on the part of the gentiles, together with that which he appears to have regarded as its natural corollary, the non-imputation of guilt in their case on the part of God, was still absolutely dominant in his mind, and that at a time when he had already a considerable practical acquaintance with different types of heathenism. Very remarkable is what he does *not* say, or at least what St. Luke represents him as not saying. Nothing of a burden of sin, or of the need of forgiveness; on the contrary an assurance that God 'overlooked the times of ignorance,' and this with special reference to that sin of idolatry so strikingly denounced as absolutely inexcusable in the first chapter of the epistle to the Romans (vv. 21-25), and the evidence of which in Athens had so powerfully stirred his spirit (Acts xvii. 16). If he calls upon them *now* to repent, he tells them as plainly that God does not hold them accountable for the past. That past was a time of ignorance as well in the case of the philosophers of Athens as in that of the country people of Lystra. Contrast with this the great speech to Jews in Acts xiii. That speech led up to Christ as to One through Whom they were to receive remission of sins (v. 38), in Whom they were to find that justification which they could not find in the law of Moses (v. 39). The speech to the Athenians also led up to Christ, but not to Christ as the means whereby past

sin is remitted. For them Christ is God's pledge of future judgment and of the consequent need of present repentance.<sup>1</sup>

Of the speech at Lystra nothing further need be said at present than that it is perfectly consistent with the general tenor of that to the Athenians. The two speeches, so far as they can be accepted as evidence, point to the fact that at the time of their delivery St. Paul's view of the spiritual status of the heathen was in logical accordance with his view of the status of mankind in general before the giving of the law as expressed in Rom. v. 13, *seq.*; and they accordingly tend to justify the stress here laid upon that passage. The fact remains, however, that neither the speeches nor the passage in question would seem to have been hitherto determining factors in the interpretation of St. Paul's writings, that passages in those writings have lent themselves to the maintenance of a different standpoint, and that that standpoint once taken up has caused much to be read into St. Paul which it will be difficult to induce the average reader not to see there. It is therefore desirable to endeavour to weigh the sense and importance of certain passages which either really or apparently conflict with that view of the status of the heathen suggested by Rom. v. 13, *seq.*, with a view to determining their real bearing on the question at issue. And that question is not whether St. Paul's language, or even his thought, was always consistent with itself, but whether at the time when

<sup>1</sup> It is hardly necessary to remark that the word *μετανοεῖν* does not correspond to the developed Christian idea of repentance. It does not necessarily imply either contrition or confession, its reference to the past being purely negative.

he wrote controversially on the subject of justification his mind was practically dominated by a certain theory.

It has already been remarked that mature experience was almost certain to modify St. Paul's view of the spiritual condition of the heathen. Accordingly we need not be surprised to find passages in his later epistles which obviously conflict with what would seem to have been his earlier view. Thus in Eph. ii. 3 the expression 'children of wrath' is clearly meant to apply to Jew and gentile alike, the latter having already been described in verse 1 as 'dead in trespasses (*παραπτώμασι*) and sins.' It would be difficult to reconcile this with the thought of Rom. iv. 15: 'For the law worketh wrath, and where there is no law neither is there transgression.' When sin was not reckoned, when there was no transgression and no law to work wrath, 'children of wrath' there could hardly have been. But the view taken by St. Paul at a later period cannot possibly outweigh the positive evidence that at the time when he wrote on the subject of justification he recognised a sharp distinction between the transgression of the Jew under the law and the sin of the gentile who was 'without law.' It is accordingly to his earlier epistles that we must look for any inconsistencies that can serve as valid objections to the view under discussion. And here it is necessary to remark that the change of view wrought by a more mature experience was not the only influence which would naturally tend to a certain inconsistency both of thought and expression in St. Paul's writings. It was almost inevitable that even in those of an earlier date, while the theory

with which he started still held its own in his mind, the almost irresistible tendency to see an *alter ego* in every human being would betray him into inconsistencies of expression if not of thought. Indeed we might well be surprised not so much at the occurrence of such inconsistencies as at their paucity. Of the real or apparent difficulties now to be considered those which occur in the epistle to the Romans itself have *ipso facto* the most serious claim on our attention. And at the very threshold stands a phantom the unreality of which must at once be demonstrated.

People have persistently seen in Rom. i. 18-32 a denunciation of the sins of the heathen world. If this interpretation is true either the two speeches already referred to in the Acts must be absolutely unhistorical or St. Paul must, in a comparatively short time have completely changed his estimate of the state of the heathen in God's sight. The fact would seem to be that the passage has been read rather in the light of certain satires of Juvenal than in that of the sacred history. Accordingly the sins mentioned in vv. 26, 27 have at once suggested the application to gentiles, and vv. 19, 20 have been supposed to refer to a revelation of Himself by God in the natural world. In order to shew the utter falsity of this interpretation it is advisable to begin by approaching the passage from the point of view suggested by Rom. v. 13, 14, and by the St. Paul of the Acts.

Clearly he who, when opposing idolatry in cultivated Athens, assured his hearers that God overlooked the times of ignorance, and whose gospel message (*εὐαγγελιζόμενοι*, Acts xiv. 15) to the men

of Lystra included the *announcement* of 'a living God who made heaven and earth, and the sea, and all things that are therein,' and 'who in times past suffered all nations to walk in their own ways,' could not, at the time when he delivered these speeches, have written of the heathen, 'Because that which may be known of God is manifest in them; for God manifested it unto them (*αὐτοῖς ἐφανερώσε*). For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse' (Rom. i. 19, 20). Even if these words *could* refer to a supposed natural capacity of clearly seeing God's eternal power and Godhead in His works, a supposition which the mention of a definite revelation (*ἐφανερώσε*) seems to exclude, we may be quite sure that such a theory was not the result of missionary experience, and its subsequent adoption by the author of the speeches would be inexplicable. On the other hand the internal evidence of these three verses (18-20), even when taken alone, strongly suggests a reference to Jews. The force of *ἐφανερώσε* in v. 19 has already been indicated. It naturally points to the revelation contained in the law. The 'men who hold the *truth* in unrighteousness' (v. 18) are not the heathen, but those who have 'the shaping (*μόρφωσις*) of knowledge and of the truth in the law' (ii. 20). Those who had this revelation could not plead that ignorance of the meaning of creation which was a valid excuse in the case of the heathen. It should be noted that the word *ἄνθρωπον* in v. 18 has a peculiar force. As in ii. 1 it marks a purpose which the writer has in

view throughout the earlier part of this epistle, the purpose of making untenable the position of privilege which the Jew assumed and forcing him to take his stand on common humanity.

The conclusion so far to be drawn from the consideration of these three verses is that they could not have been applied by the St. Paul of the Acts to the heathen, and that the St. Paul of the epistle most probably applied them to Jews. The words which immediately follow absolutely set the matter at rest, 'Because having known God' (*γνόντες τὸν θεόν*, v. 21). Compare the words addressed to the Galatians, including probably the men of Lystra. 'Howbeit then, when ye knew not God (*οὐκ εἰδότες θεόν*), ye served them that were by nature no gods; but now, having known God (*γνόντες θεόν*), &c.' (Gal. iv. 8, 9). No one who takes St. Paul seriously can possibly imagine that after speaking of the Galatians in their heathen state as without even an intellectual apprehension of God, and strongly contrasting their present experiential knowledge of Him, he could shortly afterwards turn round on the heathen generally in the epistle to the Romans, and declare that they were without excuse for their idolatry because they had had an experiential knowledge of God. On the three words *γνόντες τὸν θεόν* the whole case against the application of this passage to the heathen might safely be rested.

All reference to gentiles being thus excluded in the first four verses of the passage it is quite impossible to bring them within its scope at all. For the sequence of thought is logically continuous and is nothing but the shewing forth of God's retributive



dealings with those who had thus inexcusably *lapsed* into idolatry. And the expression in v. 32, 'Who, knowing the judgment (δικαίωμα) of God, that they which commit such things are worthy of death,' is a final and unmistakeable reference to the law. To suppose that the heathen could attain by the light of nature to the knowledge not only that certain acts were sinful, but that a definite ordinance of God visited them with the death penalty, would surely be impossible even to the St. Paul of the commentators.

Doubtless the indictment of the Jews in this passage is not precisely what we should have expected, whether as regards idolatry or sins *contra naturam*, and it may be open to question how far St. Paul meant his description to apply in detail to the present as well as the past, though its *general* applicability to the present is required by the subsequent argument. But we should probably have as little expected him to lay to their charge such acts as stealing, adultery, and robbing of temples, and that to such an extent as to cause scandal among the gentiles. Yet the reference to Jews is explicit in this case (ii. 21-24); and were any further argument needed to prove that the whole passage under discussion was similarly directed it would be supplied by the reasoning which St. Paul immediately bases upon it. 'Therefore thou art inexcusable, O man whosoever thou art that judgest (ὁ ἄνθρωπε πᾶς ὁ κρίνων): for wherein thou judgest another thou condemnest thyself; for thou that judgest doest the same things' (ii. 1). The 'therefore' (διὸ) clearly shows that the individual addressed comes under the description immediately preceding; and the words 'thou that judgest doest

the same things' would otherwise be a groundless assertion. But in this very epistle judging is represented as the special fault of the Jew, just as contempt of the Jew's scruples is that of the gentile. Those addressed were necessarily alive to this fact, though in the Christian community it took a comparatively trivial form. The words 'Why dost thou (σὺ) judge thy brother, or why dost thou (σὺ) again set at naught thy brother' (Rom. xiv. 10)? would have been perfectly correctly applied by those to whom they were addressed, even if they had not read almost immediately before, 'Let not him that eateth despise him that eateth not; and let not him which eateth not judge him that eateth' (v. 3). And though the expression *ὁ ἄνθρωπε πᾶς ὁ κρένων* accidentally includes the gentile its intention is exactly the same as that of *ἄνθρώπων* in i. 18. Its implication is that the Jew is after all nothing more than a man, and it prepares the way for the more open attack on his fancied superiority in v. 17, 'But if thou (σὺ) bearest the name of Jew.' Here at last St. Paul abandons all covert allusion. He begins by implying that *Jew* in itself is merely a name; he ends by asserting that the reality is totally different from the mere surface distinction (v. 29); and in the course of the paragraph he openly attacks the bearer of the name on just the same lines as those of his former attack on the *man* that judged.

Thus the whole argumentative portion of the first two chapters is uniformly directed against the false position taken up by the Jew. And this is what one would naturally have expected. It would have been strange indeed if the great apostle of the gentiles

had ushered in his levelling doctrine with the most tremendous assault on the sins of the gentiles to be found in the pages of the New Testament, especially as such an assault in no way prepared the ground for the attack on those who judged which immediately follows, but rather served to furnish them with an excuse.

The whole trend of the argument of the second chapter should especially be borne in mind in considering the force of the expression 'of the Jew first, and also of the Greek' in v. 9. What St. Paul is here enforcing is clearly indicated in the question of v. 3, 'Thinkest thou this, O man, that judgest them which do such things, and doest the same, that thou shalt escape the judgment of God?' It is this 'judgment of God' which takes the form 'indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish' in vv. 8, 9. Accordingly what St. Paul is primarily insisting on is that the *Jew* will not escape this judgment. The fact remains that the words 'upon every soul of man that doeth evil, of the Jew first, and also of the Greek' distinctly include the gentile, and would seem at first sight to include *every* gentile evil-doer. But the following points should be noticed.

(1) The words 'upon every soul of man that doeth evil' are distinctly limited by the preceding expression, (God will render) 'unto them that are actuated by party spirit and do not obey the truth (*τοῖς δὲ ἐξ ἐριθείας, καὶ ἀπειθοῦσι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ*).'

The first part of this limitation points emphatically to the disputes caused by the Judaizing party in the Roman church, a keenly proselytizing party which would naturally include a certain number of gentile adherents; the

second excludes by implication the heathen Greek to whom the truth had not been preached. With the words 'them that . . . do not obey the truth' should be compared those of Gal. v. 7, 'Who did hinder you that ye should not obey the truth (τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μὴ πείθεσθαι); these words were addressed to those *Judaizing gentiles* in the Galatian church the thought of whom was at this time a burden on the apostle's mind. Probably there were such in the Roman church also, if not in every Christian community of that period, though the success of the Judaizers may have been greater in Galatia than elsewhere. And this fact is quite sufficient to account for the inclusion of 'the Greek' who did not obey the truth in that 'judgment of God' the amenability to which it is St. Paul's special aim to fasten upon the Jew and upon those who adopted the Jewish standpoint.

(2) The words of v. 12 shew very plainly that St. Paul *did* make a distinction between the Jew and the Greek *generally* in this very matter of amenability to God's judgment. 'For as many as sinned without law shall also perish without law; and as many as sinned in the law shall be judged by the law.' Probably the first part of this verse has a harsher sound to many ears than the last. In reality it is merely an assertion of that reign of death over all that sinned which is represented elsewhere (Rom. v. 13, 14) as *not* involving the imputation of sin. With the word ἀπολοῦνται may be compared I. Cor. xv. 18, 'Then they also which fell asleep in Christ perished (ἀπώλοντο).' If Christ were not risen they were 'yet in their sins' (v. 17), and perishing is the natural doom of sin. The assertion of *judgment* in the case

of those who 'sinned in the law' is of a far sterner character, and the virtual exclusion from its scope of those who 'sinned without law' is very remarkable.

(3) In dealing with the unequivocal case of 'gentiles which have no law' (vv. 14-16) St. Paul speaks only of the final approval of those who do well, and is silent about the case of others. Both the authorised and revised versions have made nonsense of the passage, the former by placing vv. 13-15 in a long parenthesis, the latter by failing to see the really parenthetical character of the words *καὶ μεταξύ ἀλλήλων τῶν λογισμῶν κατηγορούντων ἢ καὶ ἀπολογουμένων* in v. 15. What St. Paul clearly asserts is that in the case of gentiles who do by nature the things of the law conscience will be found witnessing on their side (*συμμαρτυρούσης*) in the day of judgment, whatever their reasonings betwixt one another may do. The words *ἢ καὶ ἀπολογουμένων* appear to be a sort of afterthought, and the meaning of the whole parenthesis would seem to be 'even though their mutual reasonings accuse them, or, for that matter, if they excuse them.' Here, as in I. Cor. iv. 3-5, St. Paul is insisting on the fact that the final judgment will override the judgments of men; and as in the latter passage he only speaks of 'praise from God,' so here there is not a word about judgment in the sterner sense. Rather we have a glimpse of a doctrine which may be legitimately gathered from St. Paul's writings, however paradoxical the statement may appear. It is that while God does not always impute human sin He never fails to impute human righteousness.

Before leaving the consideration of this whole

passage it is necessary to notice the statement in iii. 9, 'We before laid to the charge of both Jews and Greeks that they are all under sin.' As a matter of fact St. Paul had not yet explicitly made any such statement, though he brings out the point afterwards. But he apparently refers to ii. 9, 10, and the context, as with the exception of i. 16, which is irrelevant, the present passage is the only one in which he had mentioned Jew and Greek together. Yet so marked is the distinction here drawn between the good and evil doer whether Jew or Greek that anyone unacquainted with St. Paul's writings might very well conclude from the passage as it stands that the author did *not* believe either Jews or Greeks to be *all* under sin. Unquestionably, however, the universal reign of sin was in St. Paul's mind when he wrote it, and anyone who has struggled with the difficulty of writing lucidly will probably understand how easily he may have imagined that his words conveyed a great deal more of his thought than they actually did. Now, however difficult it may be to explain St. Paul's use of the word *προεχόμεθα* in iii. 9, it is fairly obvious from what follows that the rendering in the text of the revised version makes nonsense of the passage. In spite of the apparent inconsistency with iii. 1, 2, St. Paul's purpose here is clearly to shew that the Jew occupied *no* position of advantage with respect to the gentile. The expression 'under sin' prepares the way for that deeper view of sin as a power reigning in death, and not merely a general term denoting an infinite variety of *transgressions*, which St. Paul had in his mind all along, and to which he gives clearer expression afterwards; and his mistaken

assertion as to what he had already written seems to furnish an additional indication that his object throughout had been not to involve the gentile in the guilt of transgression, but to compel the Jew to face the more fundamental fact of sin, which, in spite of the superior knowledge which the law gave him of its meaning, placed him on the same level as the man whose ignorance he despised.

If this purpose of St. Paul be kept steadily in view the words in iii. 19, 'That every mouth may be stopped, and all the world become subject to the judgment of God (ὑπόδικος γένηται τῷ θεῷ)' will present no difficulty. The penalty of those who sin 'without law' is simply death; the judgment of God has no further menace except to those who 'sinned in the law,' and particularly those who set up a false legal plea of righteousness. The whole passage will demand further attention later.

Coming now to the passage in which this whole discussion centres (Rom. v. 12-21) we are met with an apparent difficulty in the use of the word *condemnation* (κατάκριμα) in vv. 16, 18. But this difficulty vanishes when we remember that the words of v. 18, 'Therefore, as by the offence of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation,' merely take up the thought of v. 12 after a long and difficult parenthesis. They convey exactly the same sense as the words, 'and so death passed unto all men, for that all sinned' (v. 12). The *condemnation* referred to is thus the sentence of Gen. ii. 17, 'Thou shalt surely die,' or that of Gen. iii. 19, 'Dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return'; and accordingly the expression antithetical to this condemnation is 'justifi-



cation of *life* ' (v. 18). The sense of the word in v. 16 is the same, as is clear from the explanation in the following verse. It is noteworthy that in the three passages where this word (*κατάκριμα*) occurs in the New Testament, *viz.* in these two verses and in viii. 1, it is always followed by an antithetical reference to life (*cf.* vv. 17, 18, viii. 2). With this use of *κατάκριμα* may be compared II. Cor. iii. 7, 9, where *ἡ διακονία τοῦ θανάτου* in the former verse corresponds to *ἡ διακονία τῆς κατακρίσεως* in the latter. As will be shewn hereafter, the emphasis here laid on the universal condemnation to death involved in the reign of *sin as distinguished from transgression* is the key to the interpretation of the whole passage.

The last passage in the epistle to the Romans to which it is necessary here to refer is xi. 30-32, 'For as ye once disobeyed (*ἡπειθήσατε*) God, but now obtained mercy through their disobedience (*ἀπειθείᾳ*), so also these now disobeyed, in order that through your mercy they also might obtain mercy. For God shut up all unto disobedience, that he might have mercy upon all.' No attempt will be made to explain away this passage or to reconcile it with the former part of the epistle. If the natural translation of *ἀπειθεῖν*, *ἀπειθεία* be correct it imputes to the gentiles a definite act of disobedience in the past which it seems impossible to explain except on the supposition that the writer for the moment regarded them as responsible for Adam's *transgression*. Moreover this disobedience on their part is quite inconsistent with the metaphor of the olive tree *wild by nature* (vv. 17-24). This made a sharp distinction between the case of the Jew and that of the gentile. The

branches broken off the good olive tree had *lapsed*; those cut out of the olive tree wild *by nature* (ἐκ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἀγριελαίου, v. 24) had been incapable of lapse. Yet the attributing the same disobedience to both Jew and gentile surely involves the same sort of fall on the part of both.

Doubtless something may be said for the old translation of ἀπειθεία, ἀπειθεῖν, by *unbelief*, not *believe*. The words ἀπειθεῖν, ἀπιστεῖν, and the corresponding substantives were certainly much nearer in meaning than are our words *unbelief* and *disobedience*. To this witness is borne by the classical use of ἀπιστεῖν in the sense *disobey*, while it would appear that there was a corresponding later use of ἀπειθεῖν in the sense *disbelieve*. A comparison of Heb. iii. 18, 19, iv. 6, seems to shew that the writer of that epistle used ἀπιστία and ἀπειθεία as synonymous, and the word πιστεύσαντες in iv. 3 favours the meaning *unbelief* in both cases. Similarly the use of ἀπιστία in Rom. xi. 20, where it is pointedly contrasted with τῇ πίστει, makes it not improbable that St. Paul used ἀπειθεία later on in the same sense of *unbelief*. And if the aorist ἠπειθήσατε (v. 30) could be taken as a sort of summing up of mere want of faith on the part of the gentiles the difficulty of interpretation would be much lessened, especially as the reference in v. 17 to the gentiles' participation in 'the fatness of the olive' seems to shew that the *mercy* spoken of later (vv. 30-32) signified a more *positive* grace than the mere non-imputation of sin. Still it cannot safely be maintained that there is no inconsistency here. What may be much more confidently urged is that this is precisely the place where we should naturally

expect it. In the former part of the epistle St. Paul was attacking a false affectation on the part of the Jew of superiority to the gentile. Here he is remonstrating with the gentile on his tendency to despise the Jew. The position being thus reversed St. Paul would naturally put things in a different way. But the fact that in this practical exhortation he appears to lose sight of a distinction which his previous theological reasoning had tended to emphasize, and to which the allusion to the wild olive tree still bears some witness, hardly furnishes a sufficient reason for calling in question the conclusion to which that theological reasoning itself points, *viz.* that the prevailing view of the writer of the epistle as to gentile responsibility for sin coincides with that which is apparent in the St. Paul of the Acts.

There remain to be considered a very few passages in St. Paul's earlier epistles which might seem to conflict with this view. Here the first, and perhaps the most formidable, task which confronts us is the explanation of II. Thess. i. 8, which apparently speaks of Christ 'taking vengeance on them that know not God (*τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσι θεὸν*) and on them that obey not (*τοῖς μὴ ὑπακούουσιν*) the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ.' The repetition of the article *τοῖς* here seems to point to two different *classes* of people, and according to Ellicott this interpretation, in which the whole difficulty lies, is '*all but certain*' (the italics are mine). Yet this is not the view universally taken by scholars, and the difficulties in the way of accepting it would seem to be great enough to outweigh anything short of absolute grammatical certainty. According to Ellicott the two different classes indi-

cated respectively by 'them that know not God,' and 'them that obey not the Gospel of Our Lord Jesus Christ,' are the heathen and the unbelieving Jews. But in the first place there is no mention of Jews in the whole epistle, and if St. Paul had meant them he would hardly have made so covert an allusion. In the second place those that troubled the Thessalonian Christians are clearly included in the vengeance (*cf.* v. 6). But according to I. Thess. ii. 14 these were not Jews, but their own countrymen (*τῶν ἰδίων συμφυλετῶν*). And this, the only passage in the two epistles which mentions Jews at all, merely speaks of them as acting the same part of persecutors in Judæa as the fellow-tribesmen of those addressed were acting in Thessalonica. It has already been remarked that St. Paul's *gospel* to the men of Lystra, as recorded in the Acts, included an invitation 'to turn from these vanities to a living God.' It was just such a gospel that had been accepted by the Thessalonians whom St. Paul addressed, whom he describes as having 'turned to God from idols to serve a living and true God' (I. Thess. i. 9), and had been rejected by those who 'troubled' them. These latter, therefore, must necessarily be included in 'them that obey not the gospel,' and St. Paul may well also have spoken of them as 'not knowing God,' since they wilfully persisted in their ignorance of Him. If those who knew not God were another class by themselves they must have been those heathen who had never come into contact with the gospel at all. But the special mention of such a class here would seem to be utterly irrelevant, while the giving them the first place in the divine vengeance would be something

approaching bathos. The fact that those that obey not the gospel almost necessarily include primarily the Thessalonians' heathen countrymen would thus seem to make any rational distinction into two classes impossible, and even the author of the speech at Athens might well have denounced the divine vengeance on those who deliberately rejected the divine call to 'all men everywhere to repent.'<sup>2</sup>

And this last consideration is sufficient to remove any difficulty which may occur in connection with that condemnation of the world which is spoken of in I. Cor. xi. 32. If St. Paul believed that God was calling 'all men everywhere to repent' he must also have believed that the world to be condemned was a world that had heard that call.

The statement in I. Cor. v. 13, 'Them that are without God judgeth,' does not necessarily imply *condemnation* at all. Its obvious intention is merely that those without are to be *left* to God's judgment even though they may be fornicators, covetous, extortioners, &c. The fact that the whole world is subject to God's judgment (ὕποδικος τῷ θεῷ, Rom. iii. 19) is perfectly consistent with the non-imputation of sin where there is no law.

Only one other passage remains to be considered. In II. Cor. v. 19 St. Paul declares that 'God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself; not imputing

<sup>2</sup> The above reasoning rests on the assumption that the second epistle to the Thessalonians is genuine. This assumption is merely made for the sake of argument, and of course if the second epistle is not by the same author as the first the argument utterly fails and Ellicott's grammatical criticism holds the field. But in this case the passage does not fall to be discussed here. The only hypothesis that could create a real difficulty would be that of the genuineness of the second epistle and the spuriousness of the first.

their trespasses (παράπτώματα) unto them.' In accordance with the principle, 'Where there is no law neither is there transgression' (Rom. iv. 15) the word παράπτωμα, which is practically synonymous with παράβασις, should not have been applied to the whole world. But the subject did not call for special accuracy. The world spoken of included the Jews, and St. Paul's object being to magnify the divine mercy he naturally speaks of that non-imputation of *trespass* which was from his point of view a far more striking fact than the non-imputation of *sin*. The latter, in the case of those 'without law,' appears to have been regarded by him as axiomatic.

To sum up the results of this investigation, there would seem to be only one passage (Rom. xi. 30-32) which at all forcibly militates against accepting the sentence, 'sin is not reckoned when there is no law' (Rom. v. 13) as expressing the dominant conception in St. Paul's mind of the spiritual status of gentiles in his own day. In this one passage St. Paul is treating the controversy between Jew and gentile from a totally different, almost an opposite, point of view to that taken in the earlier part of the epistle, and whatever weight may be attributed to it, it cannot possibly affect the interpretation of the latter part of the fifth chapter (vv. 12-21), which must rest upon its own internal evidence. And the extreme importance of this latter passage will shortly be pointed out.

It may perhaps be asked, Even if it be true that St. Paul started with a false view of the condition of the heathen, and one which he could not consistently maintain, how can this fact prove anything but the

inadequacy of his teaching? What it does prove is that in applying a clearly grasped distinction to concrete facts St. Paul drew his lines too sharply. But the distinction in his mind remains vital, and his wrong application only serves to emphasize it. What he clearly saw was that sin is the fundamental fact of which transgression is only an accidental aspect. He saw the fundamental fact in man; he pictured to himself the accident supervening with the sidling in (*παρεισῆλθεν*, Rom. v. 20) of the law of Moses. Hence the difference between gentile and Jew was for him the concrete exhibition of that between sin and transgression. If St. Paul drew *this* distinction wrongly he only did it in order to shew its accidental character. The line was drawn sharply only to bring into relief the frailty of the partition.

But this association of an all-important distinction with an inaccurate classification of mankind, involving as it did the linking of all *transgression* to the law of Moses as its necessary condition, seems to lie at the root of St. Paul's controversy with the Jews on the subject of justification. For him the law was not merely that on which the Jew based a false exclusiveness. It was also the direct cause of an inadequate conception of sin. True, without it sin would have remained unrecognised and unknown. But the character in which it first revealed sin was that of *transgression*, and it was on this aspect of sin that the Jew, like mankind generally in after ages, was dwelling too exclusively. And this merely legal standpoint, which left out of sight the more fundamental character of sin as a power reigning in death, tended toward a view of justification which saw in it



only the squaring of an account with God. Destructive criticism of this view merely shews that the account can never be squared. But for St. Paul this sort of justification was essentially inadequate, and he would have regarded it as equally inadequate whether the debtor sought to pay off the debt himself or to get it paid off for him. If sin were only transgression remission of guilt would supply man's need. But the primary fact being the power that reigned in *death*, and transgression and guilt being merely adventitious, man's real and fundamental need is 'justification of *life*' (Rom. v. 18). It cannot be too strongly urged that this expression is not merely a sort of *obiter dictum*. A comparison of Gal. iii. 21, 'For if there had been a law given that could have given life, verily the righteousness should have been of the law,' would suffice to shew that St. Paul regarded *life* as an essential element of justification. This section may be fitly closed by shewing that this is also the leading idea in the whole passage (Rom. v. 12-21) which has so far principally occupied our attention.

Omitting the difficult parenthesis contained in vv. 13-17, which has already received some attention and which tends to obscure the main argument, the sense of the passage may be conveyed as follows.

'Therefore, as by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed unto all men for that all sinned,—as thus by one trespass all were involved in the doom of death, so one act of righteousness passed unto all men with contrary effect, bringing a justification whose essential character was *life*. For as by the disobedience of the one

man the many were constituted sinners, so also by the obedience of the one shall the many be constituted righteous. Now the law came in beside that the *trespass* might abound; but it was where *sin* abounded that grace did superabound, that the reign of grace through righteousness might correspond not merely to the reign of *transgression* in the sphere of the law, but to the universal reign of *sin* in death, the end being not merely remission of guilt, but eternal *life* through Jesus Christ our Lord.'

Probably ninety-nine people out of a hundred miss the strongly marked opposition between *trespass* and *sin* in v. 20, and in so doing they miss the force of the whole passage. What St. Paul is insisting on is that the grace that came by Christ took a wider range than that of the law and met a deeper need than that of mere remission of guilt. It is perfectly clear that he had this contrast in mind when he began the passage with the reference to the entry of sin into the world and the consequent universal death in v. 12. It was this that caused him immediately to introduce the parenthesis in vv. 13-17 which starts with emphasizing the fact that this universal reign of sin in death was prior to, and independent of, the *guilt* of trespass introduced by the law. If that had not been the point intended in v. 12 this parenthesis would be utterly irrelevant. Accordingly when the thread is resumed in v. 18 a double correspondence is asserted between the disease and the remedy. In the first place the justification was as universal in its *range* as the condemnation introduced by *sin* and was not limited to the sphere of *trespass* in the law. In the second place by being 'justification of *life*' it

met the universal doom of *death* introduced by sin, and not merely the adventitious *guilt* introduced by the law. It was not unnatural that before his final and triumphant asseveration of the same truth in vv. 20, 21 St. Paul should make a brief allusion to this adventitious character of the law and the trespass in the first part of v. 20. His object is to turn men's eyes finally away from this narrow sphere that they may see the true character of man's need and God's remedy.

(3) The bearing of St. Paul's doctrine on the spiritual experience of humanity.

This part of our subject practically resolves itself into an examination of one very difficult passage, Rom. vii. 7 *ad fin.*, and our first endeavour must be to discuss the nature of the passage generally.

Is St. Paul here giving an account of his own personal experience, as he seems to be doing at first sight? The ninth verse seems to render such an interpretation impossible. 'A Hebrew of Hebrews,' 'brought up at the feet of Gamaliel,' could never have said, 'I was alive without the law once, but when the commandment came sin revived and I died.' A Hebrew child could hardly recall a time when he was first brought face to face with the law as with something hitherto unknown. The law had been bound up with his life long before he learnt to say 'I' at all. What St. Paul is here doing is rather to express in the strongest possible way the universal effect of law supervening on unconscious sin. There is something dramatic in his use of the first person. No other form of speech could have served equally well, for his subject was the relation of sin and law to *person-*

*ality*, to the 'I.' The extraordinary emphasis which he constantly throws on this word (ἐγὼ) is unfortunately lost in the English translation. Doubtless St. Paul's own deep spiritual experience was what rendered this intensely dramatic passage possible, but its intense truth lies in the fact that it transcends and idealizes all individual experience. The struggle and the contradiction here set forth are a universal fact revealing itself in varying degrees in different human lives, but no single experience ever embodied the conflict in all its intensity as here portrayed.

One more preliminary remark seems necessary. Probably every reader of this passage is familiar with an explanation of it which most surely never satisfied anyone. This explanation represents the commandment 'Thou shalt not' as having some mysterious power to prompt sinful action. It supposes that a man who had not the slightest inclination, say, to steal before he knew of the eighth commandment would immediately on hearing it experience a desire to possess himself wrongly of his neighbour's goods. The mere prohibition is supposed to create a desire for the prohibited thing. Without denying that some natures may exhibit a vestige of such a perverse tendency it may be pointed out that the application of this principle to the present passage must lead rather farther than anyone will be willing to go. If the explanation applies to such a statement as 'sin by the commandment wrought in me all coveting (ἐπιθυμίας),' it must also apply to the accompanying statements 'I had not known coveting except the law had said, 'Thou shalt not covet'; 'without the law sin was dead.' The theory required is that prohibition not

merely engenders a desire for the prohibited thing, but is the *sole* awakener of sinful inclination. Without prohibition man would have been sinless. The very absurdity of such an explanation must surely drive us to seek another, and the reader will probably have already divined the lines on which this will be attempted.

The passage begins, 'What shall we say then? Is the law sin? God forbid! Yet I had not known sin except by the law. For I had not known coveting,<sup>3</sup> except the law had said, Thou shalt not covet.' St. Paul's statement here exactly corresponds to the more impersonal one in iii. 20, 'By the law is the recognition (*ἐπίγνωσις*) of sin.' Though the law is not sin, yet it is the means by which sin enters into consciousness, and as such it has a share in bringing about all the effects of that momentous awakening. It is to be noted that St. Paul here uses two different words for knowledge.<sup>4</sup> When he says 'I had not known (*ἔγνων*) sin but by the law' he asserts that sin

<sup>3</sup> It seems almost impossible to give a translation of *ἐπιθυμία* which shall be both consistent and adequate.

<sup>4</sup> The nature of the argument here must not be mistaken. It would be hazardous indeed to build on any supposed strict correctness of language in St. Paul. Yet one who quotes Menander, and perhaps also Aratus and Epimenides, may be supposed to have been at least *capable* of using Greek words correctly, and if St. Paul actually wished to draw the distinction here noted he could hardly have done so better than by a discriminating use of these two words. Exactly the same change occurs in a passage which has already been quoted, Gal. iv. 8, 9, *τότε μὲν οὐκ εἰδότες θεὸν ἐδουλεύσατε τοῖς φύσει μὴ ὁδοῖς θεοῖς· νῦν δὲ γνόντες θεόν, κ.τ.λ.* In neither case could the variation well fail to strike a reader of the original, and in both passages the strict interpretation of the words adds force to the meaning. But the sole defence put forward for that strict interpretation in the present case is the fact that it is the one interpretation which makes the passage intelligible.

as such was a fact that could never have entered into human experience without the law; man would never have known of its existence. It is otherwise with *ἐπιθυμία*. 'I had not known (*ἤδειν*) coveting except the law had said, Thou shalt not covet.' Here the word *ἔγνω* was not applicable at all. Coveting would have been just as much a fact of human experience without the law. But it would never have been known in its true bearings as a sin, a contravention of the divine law, and so from henceforth not merely sin, but transgression.

'Without the law,' then, 'sin was,' in a sense, 'dead,' though it was actually reigning in death. As far as man's experience went it was dead. He lived a free life in utter unconsciousness of the death that was in him, like

'the beast that takes  
His license in the field of time,  
Unfettered by the sense of crime,  
To whom a conscience never wakes.'

Only, unlike the beast, St. Paul represents him as an 'I.' Whether human personality ever really existed without any sense of responsibility is at least open to question. Most people will admit that man's knowledge of himself as a responsible being has been gradually growing, though its beginning is shrouded in mystery. But St. Paul here represents man as a fully developed free personality suddenly coming face to face with the knowledge of sin in himself previously unknown. He concentrates the experience of ages into a moment. Thus forcibly and dramatically he represents the change wrought by the

recognition of moral requirements on the part of one previously swayed by brute instinct, a change never fully experienced in any actual case, certainly not in his own. 'Sin, taking occasion,'<sup>5</sup> seizing its opportunity, 'by the commandment wrought once for all in me (*κατειργάσατο ἐν ἐμοί*)'<sup>6</sup> all coveting' (v. 8). Had not this coveting, this *ἐπιθυμία*, been present all along? Yes, but only as the law of sin in the members, not as conscious transgression in the central personality, the 'I.' What had never been felt before is suddenly revealed as a crushing burden. The free personality suddenly finds itself in the thrall of a power the nature of which it had never suspected. That power has already established itself in his flesh and wrought its deeds there. He has no means of effectually resisting it; and he suddenly finds that it has been waging war with the divine law and that it is too late for him to choose his side in the conflict. And now begins the war between the newly revealed sin and the free personality. 'Without the law sin

<sup>5</sup> The translation of *ἀφορμὴν λαβοῦσα* in the A.V. has not here been called in question, as I am not aware of any occurrence of the *phrase* in any other sense. It may be pointed out, however, that so far as the *words* go they will bear a military significance which supplies a strikingly apposite metaphor. They might be rendered, 'having seized a vantage-ground or base of operations,' emphasizing the fact, certainly present to St. Paul's mind, that sin was already *in possession* at the coming of the law, and was thus in a position to turn that coming to its own account. According to this interpretation sin would have its *ἀφορμὴ* or base of operations in 'the flesh' or 'the members.'

<sup>6</sup> It may be well to point out that what is here described cannot possibly be the same as what is spoken of in v. 5, where the verb is *ἐνηργεῖτο*. It will hardly be maintained that even in N.T. Greek the aorist can have the force of the imperfect, though neither the authorised nor the revised version brings out the distinction. On the extraordinary enigma presented by the translations of v. 5 see the note at the end of this chapter.



was dead. And *I* (ἐγὼ) was alive without the law once; but when the commandment came sin revived and *I* (ἐγὼ) died.' (vv. 8, 9). A thoroughly dramatic picture, where Sin personified suddenly rises in its might before the ἐγὼ and uses the revelation of itself by the commandment to crush out all hope of deliverance from its thralldom. St. Paul immediately goes on to insist that this evil effect is to be attributed not to the coming of the commandment, but to the use which the still personified Sin makes of the occasion. 'And the commandment that was unto life, this was found to be unto death for me; for sin, taking occasion, by the commandment deceived me, and by it slew me.' (vv. 10, 11). What is especially to be noted here is the expression, 'sin . . . by the commandment *deceived* me (ἐξηπάτησέ με).' In what did this *deceit* consist? In saddling the personality, the ἐγὼ, with what were really only 'the deeds of the body' (viii. 13) or of Sin itself working in the members. St. Paul says plainly that 'sin is not imputed when there is no law' (v. 13). In the present passage he seems to go farther, and twice declares (vv. 17, 20) even of the sins done after the revelation, 'It is no longer I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me.' But in the sudden revelation here supposed to be turned to its own account by Sin the free personality sinks under the idea suddenly flashed upon it that it is 'I' who have been *guilty* all along of these things which I in my ignorance did, and that the responsibility for all rests on *me*. Thus sin suddenly and once for all wrought in *me* all ἐπιθυμία (κατειργάσατο ἐν ἐμοὶ πᾶσαν ἐπιθυμίαν v. 8). By means of the revelation of ἐπιθυμία in its true character

which came with the commandment, sin suddenly lays on me, the moral agent, the *guilt* of all the acts of ἐπιθυμία which I committed in utter ignorance of their nature, acts which God does not impute, acts done in those 'times of ignorance' which He overlooks. So by an act of deceit Sin seizes the opportunity to complete its work of death in the newly awakened moral personality. Henceforth the man is at war with himself. He has an inner self which delights in the law of God (v. 22), but sin has beguiled him into identifying himself with the outer and lower nature. 'The law is spiritual, but I (ἐγὼ) am a thing of flesh (σάρκινος) sold under sin' (v. 14). So in the latter part of this passage there seems to be a certain conscious inconsistency in the language. The deceit of sin is alternately allowed and exposed. In v. 18 we have the expression 'in me, that is in my flesh (ἐν ἐμοὶ, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ σαρκί μου).' But in v. 20 the ἐγὼ refuses to identify itself with the flesh. 'It is no longer I that do it, but sin dwelling in me.' And this ambiguity culminates in what looks almost like an assertion of dual personality in the utterly untranslatable twenty-first verse. 'εὐρίσκω ἄρα τὸν νόμον τῷ θέλοντι ἐμοὶ ποιεῖν τὸ καλόν, ὅτι ἐμοὶ τὸ κακὸν παράκειται.'

It is not necessary to comment further on this passage beyond pointing out its inevitable conclusion. It ends with the cry, 'Who shall deliver me from the body of this *death*?' and the answer in viii. 1, 'The law of the Spirit of *life* in Christ Jesus.' According to St. Paul the true cry of humanity, the cry answered by the gift of God in Christ, is a cry for life rather than pardon.

And here it may not be out of place to attempt to deal with a difficulty which may be expected in the case of some to stand in the way of accepting as St. Paul's teaching what is here maintained to be such. If the death which is 'the wages of sin,' and in which sin reigns, must be viewed as something altogether apart from judgment, something which does not involve sin being *reckoned* at all in the sight of God, then those who have been accustomed to read into that death the terrible spiritual significance commonly attached to the expression 'everlasting death' will probably be disposed to see here a great diminution of force in much that St. Paul wrote. And this would undoubtedly be so if we were compelled to see in 'the wages of sin' nothing but mere physical death. But a study of the passage under discussion would seem to suggest that the evil which had such terrors for St. Paul was not so much the death itself as the identification of the enlightened  $\epsilon\gamma\omega$  with that 'body of death' which was also 'the flesh of sin.' The enlightening commandment which was 'unto life' made death a degradation by revealing a higher life which seemed for ever unattainable. By revealing sin it brought into operation 'the *sting* of death' which had before been unfelt, and which made the revealing law its strength. The expression 'I ( $\epsilon\gamma\omega$ ) was alive without the law once' implies that so long as the flesh was not revealed as 'the flesh of sin' (Rom. viii. 3) the  $\epsilon\gamma\omega$  could freely identify itself with it even in the face of physical death. What gave the sting to that death and caused the mysterious death of the  $\epsilon\gamma\omega$  was the revival of sin caused by the law bringing it into knowledge. However purely ideal may be the

state portrayed in the verse just quoted (vii. 9), the fact that St. Paul pictured such a state to himself shews conclusively that the death which he associated with sin revived and recognised was something more than physical death, though it is hard to conjecture exactly how he conceived the destiny of the *ἐγὼ* which had not been freed from its law. What seems to be absolutely clear in his teaching is that the Spirit of life Whose law effects this freedom furnishes a new vantage-ground for the *ἐγὼ* enabling it to dissociate itself from the old vantage-ground of sin, the flesh, and so effectually to carry on war against it. Hence that intense antagonism between flesh and spirit which renders the life of either the death of the other, an antagonism which culminates in that death 'unto sin once for all' (Rom. vi. 10) which was as it were the reverse side of the life 'unto God,' and to which are applicable the words of St. Peter, 'being put to death in the flesh, but quickened in the Spirit' (I. Pet. iii. 18). So far as the *ἐγὼ* avails itself of the new power given it to share in that death, and so to dissociate itself from 'the flesh of sin' and to live in the new sphere of the Spirit of life, so far death has lost its sting. It is no longer a terror, but a thing to be accepted and even anticipated. 'If ye are living after the flesh ye have to die (*μέλλετε ἀποθνήσκειν*), but if by the Spirit ye are mortifying (*θανατοῦτε*) the deeds of the body, ye shall live' (Rom. viii. 13). So far as your life is still in the flesh death is *before* you, hangs over you like the sword of Damocles. So far as you are anticipating that death and placing it behind you, all before is life. Hence the great gift of God is not the abolition of physical death, but its

annulling (*καταργείται*), its swallowing up (*κατεπόθη*, I. Cor. xv. 26, 54).

This conception of a new vantage ground by entering upon which the personality can free itself from the thralldom of sin in the flesh is all important for the understanding of St. Paul's doctrine of justification. For St. Paul men lived in one of two spheres; that of the flesh, which included the smaller sphere of the law, where alone the tyranny of sin's reign was *felt*; and that of the Spirit. Those in the former are said to be in the flesh (*ἐν σαρκί*, Rom. viii. 8, 9); those in the latter in the Spirit (*ἐν πνεύματι*, Rom. viii. 9), or in Christ. But it is absolutely essential to observe that St. Paul has an exactly similar use of the expression 'in the law' (*ἐν νόμῳ* or *ἐν τῷ νόμῳ*). We read of people *being* in the law (Rom. iii. 19), *sinning* in the law (Rom. ii. 12), *being justified* in the law (Gal. iii. 11, v. 4). And for St. Paul the chief distinction between the true justification and the false was the difference of the sphere in which it was sought. The grand opposition is between justification in Christ or in the Spirit (I. Cor. vi. 11, *cf.* I. Tim. iii. 16), and justification in the law; that between justification by faith and justification by works, intensely important as it is, is an expression of the opposite character which justification assumes in the two rival spheres. But of this more hereafter.

In what has just been said we have doubtless travelled beyond the limits of the subject of this section, but it seemed desirable thus early to accentuate an aspect of St. Paul's teaching naturally suggested by the passage with which it principally deals. That passage has been chosen as exemplify-

ing in the most striking form the bearing of St. Paul's doctrine of sin on the spiritual experience of humanity. If the conflict which it portrays here assumes a form transcending individual experience, by its very exaggeration it serves to emphasize, and thus tends to clear up, a confusion of thought to which all are liable. A few words as to that confusion must close this section.

The awakened self-consciousness probably identifies itself vaguely with the body before it has any notion of right and wrong at all; certainly it does so completely long before it is conscious of anything to be repudiated in 'the flesh.' The fact that this body with which it has identified itself is really older than the conscious 'I' comes into knowledge, if it comes at all, only at a much later stage of development. Meanwhile there has arisen, and more or less deepened, a sense of sin. Probably at first this amounts to very little more than the knowledge that certain acts entail unpleasant consequences. Gradually this becomes a knowledge of *transgression*, and this is invariably the first definite form assumed by the knowledge of sin. But this knowledge, though it brings with it a sense of responsibility, is still only a surface knowledge. The full sense of sin as a power working in 'the flesh' comes later. And the fact that this power had begun to set up its machinery there before the 'I' had become a responsible being at all commonly eludes observation altogether, especially as that machinery has been strengthened and supplemented by conscious acts of transgression on the part of a subject who has long learned to identify him or herself with that flesh which is the



seat of the power. For how much of this state of things is the individual really responsible?

What we are commonly given to understand is that we are responsible before God for it all; but there always remains the vague consciousness that the knowledge of sin came too late, and that there is something in its powerful reign which no one can help. And the doctrine which makes the individual responsible for all, while it is commonly accepted by the more religious minds, serves by its latent error to furnish an excuse to those who deny responsibility altogether. It is here that St. Paul's doctrine comes to our aid. That doctrine distinctly asserts the fundamental fact that what we call original sin had already enslaved man before he was held accountable for his acts by God, and it also seems to imply that this original condition of unfettered licence has caused a certain confusion when it has come to be confronted with a moral ideal. In the passage which has principally occupied our attention in this section, and which contracts into a *moment* that race-history of the acquisition of the knowledge of sin which actually repeats itself during a more or less extended *period* in the life of the individual, this confronting takes place with dramatic suddenness. Instead of that gradual growth of the knowledge of sin which is the normal accompaniment of the equally gradual growth of the human conscience the full truth is represented as suddenly flashed on the fully developed conscience, which is thus overwhelmed and bewildered and sinks under the delusion that it has been responsible *from the first*. If this *deceit* of sin is less prominent in actual experience it is none the less



there. The burden of sin still hides the fact that however aggravated it may have been by acts for which the bearer cannot escape responsibility it yet began, and in part continues, as that 'burden of the flesh' which was laid upon him from the first, and for which he never has been, and never will be, held responsible by a just God.

Impossible it certainly is to lay too much stress on the fact of human responsibility; but it is quite possible to exaggerate the extent of the field covered by it. To saddle man with a supposed accountability for original sin tends to weaken rather than strengthen that sense of responsibility which he ought to cherish for his attitude toward sin in the present. What he is responsible for is not original sin, but the sort of fight he has made and is making against it, and more especially his attitude toward the remedy provided, whether he be a seeker or a possessor of that remedy. St. Paul appears to carry this limitation of responsibility to its logical conclusion by implying that even in his present struggle with evil man is not wholly responsible for his defeats. Such at least would seem to be the force of the words, 'It is no longer I that do it, but sin dwelling in me.' Such a doctrine may seem dangerous, and no doubt is dangerous, like many truths, if wrongly applied or dwelt on too exclusively. But he who applies it to his neighbour rather than himself will not wrongly apply it. Rather he may find in it a help toward the observance of a hard precept which has a higher sanction than any teaching of St. Paul's, 'Judge not.'

## NOTE ON ROM. VII. 5.

It has been pointed out that the word ἐνηργεῖτο in this verse cannot possibly have the same reference as κατεργάσατο in the eighth verse. It is desirable to attempt to determine the true meaning of the verse in which it occurs.

The difficulty centres in the expression τὰ παθήματα τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν τὰ διὰ τοῦ νόμου, which the revisers translate, 'the sinful passions which were through the law.' What may probably have induced them to give this rendering is its apparent agreement with v. 8, where sin is described as working ἐπιθυμία by means of the commandment. And the use of παθήματα in the strikingly parallel passage, Gal. v. 24, 'They that are Christ's crucified the flesh with the affections (παθήμασι, AVR *passions*) and lusts (ἐπιθυμίαις),' would tend to support their interpretation. On the other hand if St. Paul really meant to speak of sinful passions it is difficult to understand why he should have used such a strange periphrasis as τὰ παθήματα τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν. Moreover with the exception of this passage and the verse in Galatians above quoted the word παθήματα, which occurs in fourteen other places, always in the New Testament has its primary meaning of *sufferings*, and unless its use in Gal. v. 24 is merely tautological it must be there used in a sense which is *nearer* to this primary meaning than ἐπιθυμίαι. These considerations would seem to suggest the possibility of a totally different interpretation.

The law according to St. Paul was in conflict with sin in the members (*cf.* v. 23). It was therefore a *force* operating against sin, though an ineffectual one, and the operation of this check was *painful*. What the law was really, then, the means of effecting was not the sinful *passions*, but the pains which accompanied their restraint, and these pains were as goads in the members prompting to transgression. Those who had effected that escape from the sphere of the flesh mentioned in the next verse and in Gal. v. 24 were dead both to the pains and to the ἐπιθυμίαι or ἁμαρτίαι whose partial restraint by the law was their cause.

A homely metaphor may serve to make clear the interpretation here suggested. Suppose a gentle stream obstructed by a high but weak dam. The pressure gradually accumulates till the dam is broken and a destructive torrent let loose. The stream is sin and the dam is the law, bringing into evidence the destructive power that lay hid before it was erected, and that shews itself in breaking through it. The παθήματα τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν correspond to the gradually accumulating *pressure* on the dam, which it is itself the means of bringing about. The theory that prohibition is a cause of sinful desire would make the dam the *source* of the destructive energy which it is the means of revealing, while the revisers' rendering of Rom. vii. 5 would make the dam the instrumental cause of the current.

Whatever may be thought of this illustration thus much at least may be confidently affirmed. In Rom. vii. 5 St. Paul is referring to an actual normal experience which those whom he is addressing shared

with him in the past, and which the imperfect *ἐνηργεῖτο* shews to have been a continuous process. In Rom. vii. 8, on the other hand, whether the experience referred to be actual and normal or otherwise (and there would seem to be considerable difficulty in regarding it as either actual or normal), the aorist *κατεργάσατο* shews it to have been not a continuous process, but a definite event.

## CHAPTER II.

## THE JUSTIFICATION OF MAN.

IN dealing with such a subject as St. Paul's doctrine of justification it is obviously impossible to avoid controversy altogether. But the main object of the present chapter being to state clearly what is here held to be the theory underlying St. Paul's statements destructive criticism will be employed as sparingly as possible.

Whether any theory of justification was ever thought out logically by the apostle himself may be open to question; certainly it is not claimed that all the thoughts on the subject the expression of which is here attempted were ever distinctly present to St. Paul's mind. All his statements had an immediate practical bearing on the spiritual life of those to whom he wrote, and he was merely applying the spiritual truth which he *saw* to their spiritual needs, leaving the task of working up his various utterances into a system to students of a later age. And though the intuitions of inspiration are always capable of being presented in logical order they are rarely, if ever, so presented in the first instance; on the contrary their original expression may leave much to be desired in point of clearness, and may lend itself only too easily to misapprehension. Certainly the history of attempts to extract an intelligible doctrine of justi-

fication from St. Paul's writings is not encouraging; and it may be a little difficult in the present day to persuade people that there is anything intelligible to be really found there. But the white heat of spiritual fervour cannot really be linked to mere theological imbecility; and this consideration alone ought to convince us that the writer of such a passage as Gal. ii. 19-21 had something in his mind which theologians generally have failed to grasp, or at least adequately to express.

In endeavouring to arrive at a clearer apprehension of that living truth to which witness is thus borne by St. Paul with power it would be a mistake to examine his statements in their chronological order. For here as elsewhere the historical and the didactic order are totally distinct. Just as the preaching of Christ began not with His birth and life on earth, but with His resurrection, and with the consequent presentment of Him as a living Person standing in a living present relation to man, so St. Paul's teaching on justification began with the spiritual fact in its highest development in the Christian community, not with the fact in its universal human aspect. He began with the justification of the Christian, and the expression of that fact in its fulness was justification 'in the name of the Lord Jesus and in the Spirit of our God' (I. Cor. vi. 11). The full significance of this, the earliest reference to justification in his writings, will engage our attention later. All that need be said here is that this first teaching may be summed up in the expression 'justification in Christ.' This was St. Paul's doctrine at the outset, and this it continued to be to the end. Only in his later



development of that doctrine do we catch sight of a more fundamental, more general truth underlying it. This is the truth expressed in the phrase 'justification by faith.' It is a doctrine not merely of the justification of the *Christian*, but of the justification of *man*. It is a primeval human truth which the newer Christian doctrine has assimilated but not abrogated. Thus while St. Paul's doctrine began by being a doctrine of justification in Christ and became later also a doctrine of justification by faith, the actual spiritual fact in its historical development began as justification by faith and ended by becoming justification in Christ. Its full and mature expression is 'justification in Christ by faith.' Unfortunately theologians have substituted for this a doctrine of 'justification by faith in Christ,' making Christ the *Object* of the justifying faith. Translators have thought they saw this doctrine in St. Paul's writings, and have actually placed it there. Their renderings are grammatically possible and convey a sense which St. Paul would doubtless not altogether have repudiated. But he would not have recognised them as an adequate expression of his doctrine. The tendency of this substitution of a doctrine of 'justification by faith in Christ' for St. Paul's doctrine of 'justification in Christ by faith' has been to render his doctrine of justification in Christ nugatory and his doctrine of justification by faith unintelligible.

It is the latter doctrine, that of justification by faith, which, as being the more fundamental, first demands our attention; and the passage which seems to throw the clearest light on it is the fourth chapter of the epistle to the Romans. This chapter is a dis-

course on the text, 'Abraham believed God, and it was counted unto him for righteousness' (Gen. xv. 6); and it may be as well to state at the outset that we are not concerned either with the true interpretation of this text or with the historical character of the narrative in which it occurs, but only with what St. Paul read into both. And here it is important to remember that for St. Paul Abraham belonged to that period 'from Adam to Moses' when sin was neither reckoned by God nor recognised by man (Rom. v. 13, 14; iii. 20; vii. 7). Accordingly he does not introduce the slightest hint of any consciousness of sin into his psychological study of the faith which justified Abraham (iv. 18-21), and the word *sin* (*ἁμαρτία*) does not occur in the whole chapter except in the quotation from the thirty-second Psalm (iv. 7, 8). This quotation, with the immediately preceding context (vv. 4, 5, 6), deserves very careful consideration. Apparently to it alone is to be traced the origin of the belief that St. Paul conceived of justification simply as the non-imputation of sin. The language of II. Cor. v. 19, 'God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them,' may have tended to strengthen this belief once formed, but could hardly have originated it; for *reconciliation* and *justification* are entirely different conceptions, and God is never spoken of as *justifying* the world. St. Paul's own language gives no countenance whatever to this belief, and it is remarkable that he even introduces the quotation in question as David's description of the blessedness, not of 'the man to whom the Lord will not impute sin,' but 'of the man to whom God

*imputeth righteousness without works.*' It is this latter and much fuller thought which he read into the Psalm, and it is *this* blessedness (*μακαρισμός*, v. 6), and not merely that implied in the *μακάριος* of the quotation (v. 8) which is the subject of the question in v. 9, 'Cometh *this* blessedness (*μακαρισμός*) then upon the circumcision? or upon the uncircumcision also?' The answer to this question immediately takes St. Paul back to Abraham as the man to whom *faith was reckoned for righteousness*, and until the mention of '*our* trespasses' in the concluding verse of the chapter the only further approach to the thought of *sin* is that statement about *transgression* in v. 15 which serves so emphatically to dissociate it from Abraham. All that need be said further as to this quotation is that both it and what immediately precedes are little more than parenthetical. St. Paul's eagerness to apply the doctrine of justification by faith to the case of those who lived in totally different spiritual conditions leads him to generalize (v. 4), and to introduce that thought of justifying the *ungodly* (v. 5) which is wholly absent from his treatment of the justification of *Abraham*.

Thus both in the choice of Abraham as the typical instance of justification by faith and in his whole treatment of the subject St. Paul seems to exclude the idea that justification has an *essential* relation to *sin*. Doubtless for those labouring under the burden of guilt it *involved* the non-imputation of sin, and this in the period in which St. Paul wrote had become so exceedingly important an aspect of it as fully to account for the passing reference in vv. 5-8; but in its essence justification is not merely that non-

imputation of sin which Abraham shared with all his contemporaries, but that imputation of positive righteousness which distinguished him among them; and in order to understand St. Paul's doctrine of justification by faith it is necessary first to study it in that simple form which it took when uncomplicated by any reference to sin at all. This brings us to the closer consideration of St. Paul's glowing description of the faith that justified.

'Who against hope believed in hope, that he might become the father of many nations according to that which is spoken, So shall thy seed be. And not being weak in faith he considered [not] his own body already dead (being about an hundred years old), and the deadness of Sarah's womb; but looking to the promise of God he doubted not through unbelief, but was strengthened through faith, giving glory to God, and being fully persuaded that what he hath promised he is able also to perform. Wherefore also it was reckoned unto him for righteousness' (vv. 18-22).

It is hardly necessary to point out that the faith here described is that of one who represented to himself its Object not as 'Him that justifieth the ungodly,' but rather as 'Him who quickeneth the dead' (v. 17), Who could bring life out of apparently hopeless death. The significance of the fact that the *quest* of justifying faith in its typical instance was *life* and not *pardon* will not escape those who have followed the reasoning of the preceding chapter of this book, and its importance is enhanced by St. Paul's closing assertion of the identity of this faith in character and in the conception of its Object with that of those who 'believe on him that raised up Jesus our Lord from

the dead' (v. 24). It may be remarked in passing that the verse just quoted contains the only *unequivocal* statement to be found in St. Paul's writings of the *Object* of the faith which justifies Christians.

A further point to be observed with regard to St. Paul's description of Abraham's faith is that he obviously considered that description itself as a sufficient explanation of the fact that the faith was reckoned as righteousness. The 'wherefore' (*διὸ*) of v. 22 is otherwise inexplicable. Yet beyond the fact that the quest of the faith was life the only characteristic that the description seems to bring out is its intensity. The mere fact of that intensity is given as a sufficient explanation of its imputation as righteousness. This is unintelligible unless the faith so reckoned was *intrinsically* righteous; and that this was actually St. Paul's view is borne out by the expression in v. 11, 'the righteousness of the faith which he had in uncircumcision' (*cf.* v. 13). The righteousness of a faith which had no real righteousness but was only reckoned as such in virtue of something extrinsic may or may not be intelligible to a modern theologian, but in view of St. Paul's silence it is hardly legitimate to suppose that those whom he addressed could have read such a meaning into his words without the theologian's help. The conclusion of the chapter (vv. 23-25) clearly shows that St. Paul meant to explain the justification of Christians by that of Abraham. The opposite procedure, which tries to make the case of Abraham square with a theory of justification which does not naturally grow out of it, and which St. Paul would certainly not have recognised as his own doctrine of 'justification of

life,' can only involve the whole subject in inextricable confusion.

Starting then with the fact, for fact it is, that St. Paul's doctrine of justification by faith, as explained by the typical instance of Abraham, involves the intrinsic righteousness of faith, we are at once faced with the question, What is faith? And here let us bear in mind that we are dealing with a spiritual fact and not with a word, and that mere etymological considerations will not carry us far towards an adequate conception of the reality. To the New Testament writers faith was practically a new spiritual power in the world, new in its intensity and in the width of its range. It really called for a new name, but it was an old name (*πίστις*) that had to bear the burden. The word must be made to fit the fact, and not the fact the word.

St. Paul has given us no definition of faith, and that in the epistle to the Hebrews (xi. 1) is not clear enough for our purpose. Perhaps any definition we might frame would be found to break down at some point when applied to acknowledged facts. Thus *trust* (*fiducia*) has been suggested as an equivalent. But can we substitute *trust* for *faith* throughout the description in Heb. xi.? Would anyone say that 'by trust Noah prepared an ark'? One statement there is however in this great chapter which is of especial value as throwing light on the nature of faith. I refer to the words in v. 6, 'He that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that to them that diligently seek him he proves a rewarder (*μισθαποδότης γίνεταί*).' Here we seem to have laid down the minimum of what is involved in that moral attitude



toward God which goes by the name of faith. It suggests a belief in God as One in Whom are summed up the 'things hoped for' and the 'things not seen' of v. 1. It involves a belief in Him as One standing in a definite relation to us which can be modified by our own action, One to be approached and diligently sought. It is thus essentially a principle of action; it does not merely *trust*, but is constrained to *seek*; and this conception of faith as an active principle certainly underlies St. Paul's expression in Rom. iv. 12, 'Who also walk in the steps of the faith of our father Abraham.' Moreover it is exactly the attitude described by St. Paul in II. Cor. iv. 18, 'While we look (*σκοπούντων ἡμῶν*) not to the things that are seen, but to the things that are not seen.' If it is 'the eye of the soul' it sees with a purpose. It is in fact the attitude of one who seeks his true good in the invisible things that are summed up in God, not in the temporal things that are seen. It is thus the true human *aim* (*cf.* *σκοπός*, Phil. iii. 14), and stands in direct contrast to *sin* (*ἁμαρτία*) which is *missing the mark*. Accordingly we find St. Paul making the sweeping statement, 'Whatsoever is not of faith is sin' (Rom. xiv. 23). Is not the converse equally true, 'Whatsoever is of faith is righteousness'? For just as the very root of sin is a wrong aim, so the very root and spring of righteousness is a right one; and this right aim, which believes all good to be in God and seeks it there, is of the very essence of that faith of which St. Paul, and the New Testament writers generally, treat. That such a faith should be imputed as righteousness presents no difficulty. It is righteousness in the germ, and is there-

fore reckoned as such by Him Who 'calleth those things that are not as though they were' (Rom. iv. 17).

A doctrine of justification by faith thus based on the fact that faith is the active principle of all human righteousness, and as such intrinsically righteous, may at least claim to be intelligible, and there is no reason to suppose that when first enunciated it presented any intellectual difficulty. That it cannot be reconciled with a widely prevailing conception of the Atonement does not concern us unless that conception can be shown to be that of St. Paul, and the present is not the time for discussing that question. All that is asked of the reader is a provisional acceptance of such a doctrine of justification by faith as satisfying St. Paul's statements pending further investigation.

For St. Paul, then, on this hypothesis, even in that primitive age when sin was unknown and unimputed, there was still a principle of differentiation between the righteous and the unrighteous, a principle recognised by God Himself. But that differentiation took effect on lines exactly opposite to those on which God's judgment has been commonly conceived as acting. It was not that God imputed sin to the unbelieving sinner and refrained from imputing it to the believing one, but that He imputed a righteousness to the man of faith which He did not impute to the other. And this positive imputation cannot by any theological subtlety be explained away. It involved the divine recognition of human righteousness as a fact.

The belief that St. Paul did not recognise any

human righteousness apart from that of Christ, however widely held, would seem to rest on a very insecure foundation. The quotation in Rom. iii. 10, 'There is none righteous, no not one,' proves just as much as, and no more than, the other quotations which accompany it. If it proves that there is no such thing as human righteousness *they* also prove that there is no such thing as seeking after God and that everyone's mouth 'is full of cursing and bitterness.' The whole passage is in fact an *argumentum ad hominem* addressed to those 'in the law' (v. 19) in order to show that they are not as such exempt from the universal human disability, the being 'under sin' (v. 9). That disability was to stop their mouths and force them to take their place with the rest of the world as subject to God's judgment and unable to contend in judgment with Him. What the whole passage does establish as Pauline doctrine is not that there is no such thing as human righteousness, but that there is no human righteousness that can challenge God's scrutiny, because there is none unmarred by sin. It is the attitude of *challenging*, the setting up of a legal *claim* against God, that St. Paul is opposing throughout the whole controversy, and the 'works of the law' spoken of in iii. 20 as those by which no flesh shall be justified are the works that are supposed to set up this claim. They are works *of the law* not merely as being prescribed by the law, but as being the works of those mentioned in the preceding verse (19) as being 'in the law' (ἐν τῷ νόμῳ). They are the works characteristic of the spiritual sphere of the law referred to in the last chapter, the sphere in which Jews and Judaizers were seeking justification *cf.* Gal.

v. 4). And wherever St. Paul speaks of justification by works he means works of this *character*, works supposed to establish a claim against God.

That this last assertion is not too sweeping will probably be clear to anyone who attentively studies the opening passage of the chapter on which our present reasoning is principally based (Rom. iv.). St. Paul argues that if Abraham had been justified by works he would have had a ground for boasting (καύχημα, v. 2), but that in his relation to God he had no such ground because according to the scripture it was his faith in God that was imputed for righteousness. This reasoning is supported by the general statement in vv. 4, 5. 'To him that worketh the reward is not reckoned by way of grace but by way of debt. But to him that not worketh but believeth on him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is reckoned for righteousness.' Clearly in St. Paul's mind the antithesis of faith and works had as its counterpart that of grace and debt (*cf.* v. 16, ἐκ πίστεως ἵνα κατὰ χάριν), and the generality of the statement in vv. 4, 5 warrants its application wherever the former antithesis occurs in his writings.<sup>7</sup> But the works that spring from faith as an active principle 'working by love' (Gal. v. 6) are obviously excluded from this antithesis. The faith that seeks its good *in* God necessarily recognises all its good as *from* God, and its

<sup>7</sup> The same conception of works as opposed to faith meets us in St. John vi. 27-29, where the exhortation 'Work not for the meat that perisheth' provokes the question 'What must we do that we may work the works of God?' The idea of the questioners that God's gift was to be won by working for hire is met by the correction, 'This is the work of God that ye believe on him whom he sent.'

good works lay it and not God under an obligation. Whatever good it has it holds on the tenure of grace, and anything like a legal claim on God is out of the question. Thus St. Paul, while asserting that man is debarred by sin from pleading his own righteousness before God or basing a claim on his own works, denies neither the efficacy of the works that necessarily spring from faith nor the reality of the righteousness which is by grace.

The radical error which has done so much to obscure St. Paul's teaching on this subject lies in regarding the being 'under sin' as involving the negation of righteousness, whereas it really only involves its imperfection. The statement in Rom. iii. 23, 'All sinned and come short of (*ὑστεροῦνται*) the glory of God' is certainly more rationally interpreted in the latter sense than in the former, and the universal shortcoming is consistent with varying degrees of attainment. If sin and righteousness are in themselves mutually exclusive they can and do co-exist in varying degrees in relatively righteous or unrighteous sinners. If we can pronounce none to be absolutely righteous, neither can we affirm that any is absolutely unrighteous.

Closely connected with the radical error just mentioned is that unreal and exaggerated shrinking from the idea of human merit which has largely prevailed among protestants. It is worthy of remark that while the apostle excludes in the case of Abraham all 'ground of glorying (*καύχημα*)' in respect of works which could be urged before God (*πρὸς τὸν θεόν*, Rom. iv. 2) he elsewhere expressly admits such ground in a more general sense. In Gal. vi. 4, 5 we

read, 'Let every man prove his own work, and then shall he have the ground of glorying (τὸ καύχημα) with regard to himself alone and not to his neighbour (τὸν ἑτερον); for each will be carrying his own freight<sup>8</sup> (φορτίον).' Such a passage, while perfectly consistent with the rejection of all glorying before God, seems to imply something more than a merit which merely 'lives from man to man.' The solid gain that a man carries in himself is surely recognised as such by the God Whose grace wrought it; and the doctrine that God imputes a faith that lives and works as righteousness is worse than unintelligible if such a faith with its fruits be not meritorious in His sight. If the righteousness of faith is the only righteousness reckoned as such by Him, and if it be true notwithstanding that faith has no merit in His sight, then the distinction between human righteousness and human unrighteousness rests on a purely arbitrary decree of God,—a doctrine as derogatory to the divine nature as to the human.

Thus far we have been considering the justification of man in its most fundamental aspect as a fact apart from sin and standing in no necessary relation to it. Such a view is greatly aided by St. Paul's conception of a period in the history of the race in which sin did not enter into human consciousness. But the chief

<sup>8</sup> This translation is doubtless inelegant; but some such word as *freight* is necessary in order to bring out the obvious meaning of φορτίον, which, as the context shews, here conveys the notion of solid value. The fact that the revisers have retained *burden*, involving as it does a most unnecessary appearance of conflict with v. 2, where the word βάρος has a totally different meaning, is a melancholy instance of their ineptitude. The luminous alternative *load*, given in the margin, is hardly sufficient to enable the English reader to extricate himself from the maze.



value of such a conception lies not so much in the picture thus afforded of primeval man as in what may be described as its theological background, the underlying thought of the great Creator and Judge noting and imputing the germs of righteousness which He designed to bring to perfection, overlooking and ignoring the sin which He purposed to bring to naught. Still endeavouring to place ourselves at St. Paul's standpoint we may now pass on to consider what would be the necessary spiritual development when man passed out of this primitive stage and came to realise the fact of sin through the giving of the law of Moses.

We have already seen how St. Paul in Rom. vii. depicts what he conceives as the attitude of an almost personified Sin towards the new revelation. 'Sin . . . by the commandment deceived me, and by it slew me.' Our present investigation leads us naturally to ask the further question, what would be the attitude toward the same revelation of that other equally real factor which we are now compelled to recognise as co-existent with sin, the faith which is the root of human righteousness? Taking that view of faith already suggested to us by Heb. xi. 6 as the principle which recognises and seeks its highest good in God we have no difficulty in supplying the answer. The law revealed a deeper need than man had known before, the need of pardon for guilt, of healing for moral disease. We may accordingly picture to ourselves faith making *its* use of the new revelation in opposition to sin. While the one sought to deceive, to overwhelm and to kill with its exaggeration of human guilt, the other raised and comforted by point-

ing to pardon and healing in God. 'To the Lord our God belong mercies and forgivenesses though we have rebelled against him.' 'With thee is the well of life.' 'O quicken me in thy righteousness.' And still the need of life was felt, as St. Paul felt it, as deeply as the need of pardon. Thus the spiritual Israel came to look for a righteousness of God to be revealed hereafter. And the faith which thus looked for righteousness as its highest good *was* righteousness in the sight of God, and the higher righteousness which that faith sought was, whether it realised it or not, the righteousness of a higher faith.

Such was the revolution wrought by that law which 'was added for the sake of transgressions,' which came in parenthetically, as it were, 'that the trespass might abound,' that sin might come into clear knowledge. The primal faith which sought at God's hand that length of days and that continuance of a name in posterity which then seemed the highest good passed into a faith which sought, and still sought in God, life of a higher order; and with the recognition of sin as a taint in the life of the flesh came the yearning after the spiritual life of righteousness. Though the law was not 'of faith,' and though what St. Paul called 'the righteousness of the law' was not the true righteousness, yet by means of the law that 'righteousness of faith' which existed before the law, which was essentially independent of the law, and which continued to exist under the law, reached a far higher development than would have been possible had man continued ignorant of his own shortcoming and consequently of his possible spiritual attainment.

The thought of man thus advanced to a fuller spiritual consciousness naturally leads to the somewhat fuller consideration of a point which St. Paul's quotation of the opening words of the thirty-second Psalm seemed to bring into relief rather prematurely, the relation of that imputation of righteousness which is of the essence of justification to that non-imputation of sin which came to be more or less identified with it. The ease with which St. Paul passes from the one conception to the other shews that both co-existed in his mind, though he has not worked out for us their logical connection. As the more negative conception arose through the advance of the human consciousness into more perfect conformity with the Divine it will be well here to raise the question what the imputation of faith as positive righteousness involved from the latter point of view.

The explanation already suggested of this imputation is that faith is righteousness in the germ and is accordingly reckoned as such by Him Who purposed to bring the germ to perfection. And if the sole defect in the germ were its immaturity this explanation might be sufficient. We might conceive man as having never come under the dominion of sin, as having from the first and consistently sought his true good at the hand of God; yet as gradually rising to higher and higher knowledge of God and of the true good to be found in Him. Thus the germ of faith would gradually develop into perfect righteousness, and in man so conceived God's righteousness would be 'revealed from faith to faith' (Rom. i. 17). Here the imputation of the infantile faith as righteousness presents no difficulty.

It is otherwise when we come to consider the shortcoming in human righteousness which is due not to immaturity, but to sin. Here we have a disturbing influence which mars and annuls the promise of perfection; and though we can understand such an imperfect righteousness being imputed as real so far as it goes, we cannot understand the stunted and limited promise of such a righteousness satisfying the divine requirement.

If God's design looked to a perfect human righteousness, then the righteousness of sinful man as exemplified in Abraham could only be regarded as a step in the carrying out of that design in view of some future purging of sin which should supplement and complete that imperfect spiritual progress to which man seemed irrevocably doomed. If we look upon primitive man merely in his personal relation to God, the non-imputation of sin in the days when he was an unconscious prey to it is an obvious principle of divine justice, and is apparently reckoned as such by St. Paul (Rom. v. 13). But from the divine point of view, embracing not merely the present relation of primitive man to God, but the whole design in which primitive man had his appointed place, the non-imputation of sin requires an explanation. Impossible as it is to find in St. Paul's treatment of Abraham's justification the slightest hint of any consciousness of the need of an atonement on the part of the justified person we yet do find the need of such an atonement apparently postulated by him in 'the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God.'

This brings us to the partial consideration of a passage which will shortly occupy our attention more

fully. What more especially concerns us in that passage at present is the expression 'on account of the passing over of sins done before' (διὰ τὴν πάρεσιν τῶν προγεγονότων ἁμαρτημάτων, Rom. iii. 25). The words quoted are given by St. Paul as a reason for the revelation of God's righteousness, but neither the authorised nor the revised version seems to give the full force of the immediate context. Both these versions treat the two clauses εἰς ἔνδειξιν τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ (v. 25) and πρὸς τὴν ἔνδειξιν τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ (v. 26) as co-ordinate, inserting 'I say' in the latter, and ignoring the difference of the prepositions employed. It seems more natural to make each clause depend on the words immediately preceding. So taken the first expresses simply the *result* of the setting forth of Christ as a propitiation; the second rather expresses the *design* toward which God's act of 'passing over' looked, and thus brings out more fully the force of the preceding διὰ. The following translation is accordingly suggested of the words in their context. 'Whom God set forth as a propitiation through faith, in his blood, unto the shewing forth of his righteousness, on account of the passing over of the sins done before in the forbearance of God with a view to the shewing forth of his righteousness in the present time' (Rom. iii. 25, 26). The 'shewing forth' necessitated by the act of 'passing over' is thus represented as distinctly contemplated in that act. Now if we go back to St. Paul's introduction of the subject of the manifestation of God's righteousness we find that he describes it as coming 'unto all [and upon all] that believe: for there is no difference: for all sinned, and come short of the

glory of God' (vv. 22, 23). The natural inference seems to be that it was the *shortcoming* caused by sin rather than its guilt which was in the divine mind in the act of 'passing over' and which necessitated the universal redemption; and even if ὑστεροῦνται be not taken to imply a degree of attainment, it is still failure rather than guilt that is represented as the antecedent of that redemption.

Here we begin to pass beyond that simple and fundamental conception of justification which meets us in St. Paul's treatment of the case of Abraham and which lies at the root of his doctrine. Before advancing further it may be well briefly to sum up the results that have been arrived at in this chapter.

Faith being the root and principle of human righteousness the justification of man by faith is the logical starting point of St. Paul's teaching, and this involves an imputation of faith by God to man as positive righteousness. Had man's faith been free to grow up without hindrance to full maturity this imputation of germ as fruit would have presented no difficulty. But the shortcoming caused by sin as distinguished from mere immaturity made such an imputation inexplicable in the absence of some rectifying influence. God's design being nothing short of perfect righteousness His overlooking what seemed an absolute bar to such perfection could only be explained by the fact that that design also embraced the necessary rectification of the taint in human nature. But in the days when, according to St. Paul, man knew nothing of sin God's plan was necessarily as yet absolutely inscrutable. Only after the revelation of sin by the law could man begin to realise the

essential limitation of his own righteousness and his need of a higher and better life. Thus human faith attained a higher aim and the law and the prophets began to bear witness to a 'righteousness of God' yet to be revealed. The physical life which Abraham sought from a living and life-giving God gave place as an object of desire among the more spiritual of his descendants to a quickening in God's righteousness by Him Who was both 'just and justifying.' Thus God's design, once hidden, gradually became man's hope, and the faith that recognised the hopelessness of its own unaided efforts after perfection discerned in the future, with more or less clearness of vision, the revelation of a righteousness of God which was to come to its aid and supply its defects. It is to the consideration of that revelation that our thoughts must now be turned.



## CHAPTER III.

## THE RIGHTEOUSNESS OF GOD IN CHRIST.

THE subject of the present chapter can hardly be better approached than by a closer examination of the whole passage a portion of which has recently claimed our attention, Rom. iii. 21-26, of which the following is offered as a translation. 'But now apart from the law a righteousness of God has been manifested, being witnessed by the law and the prophets; a righteousness, I say, of God through the faith of Jesus Christ unto all [and upon all] that believe; (for there is no distinction; for all sinned and come short of the glory of God); being justified freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus; whom God set forth in His blood<sup>9</sup> as a propitiation through faith, unto the shewing forth of his righteousness, because of the passing over of sins done before in the forbearance of God with a view to the shewing forth of his righteousness in the present time, unto the end that he is just<sup>10</sup> and the justifier of him that is of the faith of Jesus.'

It seems clear from the concluding words of this passage that the revelation of the righteousness of God has a twofold meaning. It is in the first place

<sup>9</sup> The presumption against taking the clause *ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ αἵματι* as dependent on *διὰ τῆς πίστεως* would seem to be strong enough to render a discussion of the question superfluous.

<sup>10</sup> The final clause seems rather to express the actual outcome of the revelation than its purpose.

a revelation that God Himself is righteous; its outcome was to 'justify the ways of God to men.' In this aspect it has already come before us in the last chapter. But it is its other aspect which more especially concerns us now, as a revelation of God justifying, of a righteousness of God which is His gift rather than His attribute, a righteousness to which men must submit themselves rather than try to establish a righteousness of their own (Rom. x. 3; *cf.* Phil. iii. 9). In this latter aspect it is the revelation of a righteousness which is essentially human as well as divine, and which must therefore be identified with the righteousness of Christ.

The first point now to be determined is the meaning of God setting forth Christ 'in his blood' (v. 25). Probably this setting forth is commonly regarded as having taken place at the crucifixion. But this is not what we should expect from St. Paul, nor is it really the natural interpretation. It was in the resurrection, not in the passion, that God proclaimed Christ to men (*cf.* Rom. i. 4). It was the resurrection that pointed to Him as the source of justification to the Jew (Acts xiii. 37-39), and as the pledge of God's call to the gentile to repent (Acts xvii. 30, 31). The crucifixion, had it stood alone, would have proclaimed no gift of righteousness to men, and would have left the righteousness of God more enigmatical than ever. True it has ever been the Crucified in Whom men have sought and found the righteousness of God, but it has been the Crucified with the Easter glory resting on Him.

How then are we to explain the words 'ἐν τῷ αἵματι αὐτοῦ', in His blood,' in connection with the setting

forth by God of the risen Christ as a propitiation? We naturally turn to three passages in which a similar phrase occurs in the epistle to the Hebrews. In ix. 25 we read of the High Priest entering yearly into the holy place 'with the blood of others (*ἐν αἵματι ἁλλοτρίῳ*),' with a strongly implied contrast to the great antitype, Who may thus be said to have entered into Heaven itself 'in his own blood' (*ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ αἵματι*, cf. v. 12, where the actual preposition used is *διὰ*). Again in x. 19 we, in like manner, are spoken of as having 'boldness to enter into the holiest in the blood of Jesus (*ἐν τῷ αἵματι Ἰησοῦ*).' And once more in xiii. 20 we read of God bringing again from the dead 'the great shepherd of the sheep, our Lord Jesus, in the blood of an eternal covenant (*ἐν αἵματι διαθήκης αἰωνίου*).' Now in the first two of these passages the preposition *ἐν* might be taken as equivalent to *διὰ*. But in the last, which is much more strikingly parallel to the verse we are considering, such an interpretation seems impossible. The blood of others may have been the means by which the High Priest was emboldened to enter into the holy of holies, and our own entrance 'in the blood of Jesus' may be similarly explained. But how can we speak of God using 'the blood of an eternal covenant' as a means whereby He brings again from the dead 'the great shepherd of the sheep'? The revisers' translation of *ἐν* by *with* in this verse gives an intelligible sense, and may be supported by a comparison of St. Paul's words in I. Cor. iv. 21, 'Shall I come unto you with a rod (*ἐν ῥάβδῳ*)?' This latter verse seems to recall the lxx. translation of Gen. xxxii. 10, *ἐν γὰρ τῇ ῥάβδῳ μου ταυτῇ διέβην τὸν Ἰορδάνην τοῦτον. ἐν*

is here a servile rendering of the Hebrew כ, and St. Paul's use of the preposition may be a similar Hebraism. Like the English *with* it seems to suggest something more than mere physical conjunction. Jacob's words imply that when he passed over Jordan his staff was his sole possession, his sole material resource. Thus there is a sort of latent instrumental force in the preposition, and this comes out far more strongly in St. Paul's use of the expression ἐν ῥάβδῳ. The expressed alternative 'or in love and in the spirit of meekness (ἢ ἐν ἀγάπῃ πνεύματι τε πραότητος),' where ἐν again has the force of the Hebrew כ, seems to imply that the preposition in the first question pointed to a rod in the mind as well as in the hand, to a rod borne with full consciousness and intention. 'With a rod' thus means 'armed with a rod' as an instrument of power. And this meaning, implicit in the English *with*, is perhaps rather more explicit in this peculiar use of ἐν.

So in Heb. xiii. 20 the great shepherd of the sheep is brought again from the dead not merely *with* the blood of an eternal covenant, but *endued with* that blood as a power and a means by which He enters into the holiest. And the other two passages in this epistle already referred to, Heb. ix. 25, x. 19, may be explained as instances of a similar use of ἐν. The High Priest entered into the Holy of Holies not merely *with* the blood of others, but *furnished with* that blood as the means by which alone he had access there, and similarly the entry into the holiest ἐν τῷ αἵματι Ἰησοῦ is not merely an entry *with* the blood of Jesus, but an entry made boldly *in its power*.

Taking this use of ἐν, which the passage already

quoted (I. Cor. iv. 21) appears to vindicate as Pauline, as the key to the interpretation of the preposition in Rom. iii. 25, we have now to consider what is the meaning of God setting forth the risen Christ, endued with the power of His blood, as a propitiation through faith.

It may be well to refer in the first place to what may be called the *locus classicus* on the subject of sacrificial blood, Lev. xvii. 11. 'For the life of the flesh is in the blood: and I have given it to you upon the altar to make atonement for your souls: for it is the blood that maketh atonement by reason of the life' (revised translation). The idea underlying the blood carried by the High Priest into the Holy of Holies was that of a *life* that had passed through death and paid the penalty of sin. So the risen Christ is set forth 'in his blood' as the propitiation for sin, set forth, that is, in the power of His risen life, the life that had 'died unto sin once for all' (Rom. vi. 10) and paid its penalty, the life that held for ever in itself the indefeasible virtue of that death.

This conception of the blood of Christ, as involving not merely His death, but the life in which the eternal virtue of that death persists, would seem to be distinctly present in another passage in St. Paul's writings. In Eph. ii. 13-18 we read, 'But now in Christ Jesus you that were once far off were made nigh in the blood of Christ. For he is our peace, who made both one, and broke down the middle wall of partition, annulling the enmity in his flesh, the law of commandments in ordinances, that he might create the two in himself to be one new man, making peace, and might reconcile both in one body to God

by the cross, having slain the enmity thereby. And he came and preached glad tidings of peace to you that were far off and to them that were nigh; for by him we both have access in one Spirit unto the Father.' It should be observed here that the words 'ye were made nigh in the blood of Christ' in v. 13 do not receive their complete elucidation in the following explanation until the mention of the access to the Father in v. 18. Thus the words 'in the blood of Christ' of v. 13 correspond to the words 'in one Spirit' of v. 18. Vv. 14-16 contain an account of the reconciliation effected on the cross viewed objectively as a divine transaction, but that reconciliation was only the first step. The actual bringing nigh 'in the blood of Christ' was not accomplished till the risen Christ *came* and preached the gospel of peace, till the virtue of the death was spiritually applied in the life that embodied it. Then Jew and gentile alike were brought nigh in the one Spirit of Him Who was their peace, 'the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus' (Rom. viii. 2), and nothing less than this was involved in their being made near 'in Christ Jesus' and in His blood.

It is hardly necessary to point out the parallelism of this last passage with Heb. x. 19. The entry 'into the holiest' of the one passage is the same as the 'access to the Father,' the sharing of which brought the gentile nigh, of the other; and both are accomplished 'in the blood of Christ.' All that is here contended, however, is that these passages (Eph. ii. 13-18, Heb. x. 19) justify the significance here attributed to the *word blood* in Rom. iii. 25. Though they both contain the words *ἐν τῷ αἵματι* they do not

sufficiently explain the use of the same *phrase* in the latter verse. There is an objectivity, if the word may be permitted, about the use of the phrase in Rom. iii. 25 which is lacking in the other instances. Our being justified and brought near to God 'in the blood of Christ' presents no complete analogy to God setting forth Christ 'in his blood' as a propitiation. For a parallel to this act of God wrought in Christ prior to, and independently of, the church's participation in its virtue, we must go to the passage already referred to at the close of the epistle to the Hebrews. (xiii. 20). Here is the real key to the setting forth of Christ 'in his blood.' The bringing again of 'the great shepherd of the sheep' from the dead, armed and endued with that blood which was the living virtue of His death, and in the power of which He actually, and man in Him potentially, had access with boldness and confidence to the Father, really corresponds to the setting forth of Christ, armed and endued with the same atoning blood as a propitiation for sin in Rom. iii. 25; and the very word used by St. Paul for *propitiation* (ἱλαστήριον), with its suggestion of the mercy-seat, strongly supports the view that the thought underlying the word *blood* is the power of entry 'into the holiest.'

In this conception of Christ 'in his blood,' the life that has passed through the death 'unto sin once for all' and eternally bears the stamp of that death and wields its power, we seem to have the key not only to the passage which we are more especially considering, but to the whole of St. Paul's christology. The 'Christ crucified' Whom he proclaimed to the Corinthians as 'the power of God and the



wisdom of God' (I. Cor. i. 23, 24) was Christ 'in his blood.' Therefore it was that he determined to know nothing else among them, in order that their faith might have its being in that *power* and not in the wisdom of men (I. Cor. ii. 2-5).

It is this 'power of an indissoluble life' (Heb. vii. 16) with which the risen and living Crucified is for ever endued in virtue of His death that is meant to be conveyed to our minds by the expression 'the blood of Christ.'

It is therefore of supreme importance that we should grasp as far as possible what for St. Paul was the full import of that death 'unto sin once for all' that bears eternal fruit in the risen life 'unto God.'

The question which faces us at once, and to which an answer must be attempted at all hazards, is this. In what relation did Our Lord 'in the days of his flesh' stand to human sin?

We commonly speak of the *sinlessness* of Christ, and the expression conveys a truth which must never be surrendered. At the same time it is well to remember that this expression is not apostolic or scriptural, and that it is quite possible to use it in a sense which the apostles would have repudiated. When St. Peter says of Christ that He 'did no sin (*ἁμαρτίαν οὐκ ἐποίησεν*,' I. Pet. ii. 22) he utters a truth which no New Testament writer calls in question. When he goes on to say that He 'himself bare our sins in his own body' (v. 24) he utters another to which St. Paul has given far stronger expression, though the words which St. Peter adds, 'that we being dead to sin might live unto righteousness' shew the perfect unanimity with which the two apostles apprehended

the fact. This verse (I. Pet. ii. 24) strongly recalls the words of St. Paul in Rom. viii. 3, 4, 'God, sending his own son in the likeness of the flesh of sin (ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας) and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh, that the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh but after the Spirit.' And it is necessary to insist on the full force of these words. For St. Paul the sphere in which sin had established itself, and in which it worked, was the flesh (σάρξ, cf. Rom. vii. 14, 18, viii. 7, 8) or sometimes the body (σῶμα, cf. Rom. vi. 12, vii. 24, viii. 13). It was this actual 'flesh of sin,' *our* flesh, fraught with the *disease* of sin, with the *tendency* to actual sin, that Our Lord took, thus rendering Himself liable to be 'tempted in all points like as we are.' It is perhaps hardly necessary to insist that the words ἐν ὁμοιώματι in Rom. viii. 3 do not in the very least attenuate the assertion. The same expression occurring in Phil. ii. 7, 'ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων γενόμενος, made in the likeness of men,' certainly implies no contrast between likeness and reality, and to introduce the idea of such a contrast into Rom. viii. 3 would be to render the divine condemnation of 'sin in the flesh' there spoken of a nugatory transaction. His bearing of our sins 'in his own body on the tree,' of which St. Peter speaks, was only the culmination of that lifelong bearing of the disease of sin in His body which is implied in His taking 'the flesh of sin.' This intimate association of the Incarnate Son with the power of sin in our flesh, albeit a power to which He never yielded, was essential to God's design as conceived by St. Paul. It was in *His* flesh that God condemned sin, and in

His death 'unto sin once for all' He joined in that condemnation. Here was the baptism in which He finally washed away the taint in our nature that had never reached His will. Here is that 'circumcision of Christ' which we share in Him, and which involves nothing less than the putting off (*ἀπέκδυσις*, Col. ii. 11) of 'the body of the flesh.' Here he stripped off (*ἀπεκδυσάμενος*, Col. ii. 15) the 'principalities and powers' that had clogged His earthly steps, and annulled for ever that 'sin in the flesh' that had 'straitened' without perverting Him.

In II. Cor. v. 21 St. Paul expresses even more strongly this intimate association of Our Lord with 'the flesh of sin.' We there read, 'He made him to be sin for us who knew no sin, that we might be made the righteousness of God in him.' The latter clause of the verse not only absolutely precludes the nugatory suggestion that *ἁμαρτίαν* in the first part should be taken as a Hebraism for *sin-offering*, but it clearly shows how essential to St. Paul's conception of the work of redemption was the actual bearing of human sin in His body by the Redeemer. Just as He was 'made under the law, that he might redeem them that were under the law' (Gal. iv. 5), so in a sense He was made under sin that He might redeem them that were under sin. The strength of the expression, 'he made him sin for us' may be explained by a reference to that in Rom. vii. 18, 'in me, that is in my flesh.' The fact that the Son of God took 'the flesh of sin' in a sense identified Him with sin, though that sin never reached His true Personality. It was the fact of His having borne that sin, with the consequent liability to temptation,

through His whole life, and having only finally cast off its power in the culminating act of death, that rendered His risen life not merely holy in the sight of God, but a *conquering* power among men. If that 'righteousness of God' which was man's consummate need could have been effectually shewn forth in, and imparted by, One Who 'knew no sin' the Incarnation would have been superfluous. What was needed was a righteousness that had conquered sin for ever in personal conflict and could go forth 'conquering and to conquer.' It is because He 'suffered being tempted' that 'he is able to succour them that are tempted.'

And this quotation from the epistle to the Hebrews leads us naturally to consider the teaching of that epistle on the point we are considering. Here it is necessary to notice in the first place a passage which has been tampered with both in the authorized and revised versions, Heb. iv. 15. 'For we have not an high priest that cannot be touched with the feeling of our infirmities, but one that has been tempted in all points like as we are, apart from sin (*χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας*).' Both English versions insert the word *yet* before *χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας*, thus disguising the real sense. What the writer is insisting on is the *present* condition of the high priest. The high priest that we *have* is One in Whom temptation has had its perfect work and in Whom the result of that work remains (*πεπειρασμένον*), and its present outcome is that he is now 'apart from sin.' Similarly we read in vii. 26, 'Such an high priest became us, who is holy, harmless, undefiled, separated (*κεχωρισμένος*) from sinners, and made higher than the heavens,'

where the separation from sinners is certainly no more predicable of Him in His earthly life than the being made higher than the heavens. And in ix. 28 the very phrase *χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας* is used of the Christ Who will appear the second time with a strongly implied *contrast* to His condition when on earth. He Who was 'once offered to bear the sins of many' will the second time appear 'apart from sin.' In speaking of His bearing the sins of many the writer uses the same word (*ἀνενεγχεῖν*) as St. Peter does in the passage already quoted, 'who himself bare (*ἀνήνεγκεν*) our sins in his own body.' One Who was thus bearing sin could not be spoken of as 'apart from sin.' Thus in iv. 15, the contrast, if contrast there be, implied in *χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας*, is not between temptation and sin, as implied in the *yet* of the English versions, but rather between that close association with sin which the time of temptation involved and the absolute freedom won by the death 'unto sin once for all.' But the words really belong to the verb *ἔχομεν* understood from the preceding clause. We have Him in His present condition, that condition of complete separation from sin and sinners which became our high priest. Very similar is the thought in I. John ii. 1, 'If any man sin we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ, righteous' (*Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν δίκαιον*), *i.e.* we have Him as our advocate in His righteousness, the righteousness bound up with the 'indissoluble life,' the vantage ground and refuge eternally won for the sinner.

If the author of the epistle to the Hebrews does not expressly state that Christ took 'the flesh of sin' there is no other New Testament writer more entirely

in accord with the spirit of St. Paul's assertion. He is the one writer who insists on Our Lord's *perfection* as having been definitely accomplished at the resurrection, and consequently involving imperfection 'in the days of his flesh' (v. 7-9). That imperfection so far as His *will* was concerned was only the imperfection of immaturity, and necessitated the *learning* of obedience through suffering (v. 8). But so far as His actual flesh was concerned the imperfection was of a different order. There was something here which needed not to be perfected but to be annulled, to be stripped off and cast away for ever (Col. ii. 15). Had not His flesh brought Him into direct conflict with the power of sin the description of His death in the flesh as a death 'unto sin once for all' (Rom. vi. 10) would be meaningless. Through that death the central Personality passed for ever out of the sphere and beyond the reach of the power that had been vainly besieging it, carrying with it the trophies of the final victory in an indefeasible human righteousness, a righteousness that had known 'sin in the flesh,' and had met and conquered and condemned it there.

Enough, it is hoped, has now been said to make clear the meaning here attached to that setting forth of Christ 'in his blood' spoken of by St. Paul in Rom. iii. 25. It is taken to mean the setting Him forth at His resurrection in 'the power of an indissoluble life' (Heb. vii. 16), a life that was not merely free from sin, but had freed itself, a life of perfect human righteousness that had conquered sin in its flesh and eternally triumphed over it, a life that had become an almighty human power and an eternal

source to man of 'justification of life.' Our next task is to consider the meaning of the equally important words, 'a propitiation through faith (*ἱλαστήριον διὰ τῆς πίστεως*).'

That the life of the risen Christ in its perfected human righteousness, the life that had once for all conquered and annulled in itself the sin that seemed an absolute bar to perfection and had thus established an eternal and impregnable vantage-ground whence the warfare against sin in the whole race could be waged with the certainty of final triumph, that this life in its redeeming power should be set forth by God as a propitiation, will hardly present a difficulty to those who accept the argument of the last chapter. The second Adam had become a quickening Spirit, and the redemption of the race was *in* Him (v. 24), and the earnest of the Spirit bestowed on man was the pledge of the completion of that redemption (Eph. i. 14), when His body the church shall have attained to the measure of the stature of His fulness (Eph. iv. 13). In Him was accomplished God's design of a perfect human righteousness, and in the gift of His Spirit that righteousness descended on those whom He was not ashamed to call His brethren. That 'passing over of sins that had been done before' which the imputation of righteousness to sinful man in the past left unexplained was now itself justified. In the light of that redeeming power of righteousness which God had provided He stood revealed as both righteous and making righteous (*δίκαιον καὶ δικαιοῦντα*), as satisfied with no less than perfect righteousness, and in the gift of that perfect righteousness reconciling men to Himself. If the



faith of Abraham was a germ of righteousness that seemed debarred by sin from ever attaining perfection the righteousness of Christ was a fruit whose seed was in itself. In its infinite power of growth and assimilation it was able to subdue all things to itself, even sin, and thus it confirmed to man that promise of perfect righteousness to which his faith had borne witness though sin had seemed to render it void.

Thus God set forth Christ as a propitiation, and as a propitiation *through faith*. We have now to consider the meaning of these two last words. Whose is the faith here spoken of? Most assuredly it is that 'faith of Jesus Christ' (v. 22) or 'faith of Jesus' (v. 26) which are mentioned in such close connection with it both before and after; the faith of Jesus Christ, not *our* faith *in* Him. To bring in the latter conception is to miss the essentially objective character of the whole passage. The description is of God's action and of His alone. The righteousness declared is His righteousness; the propitiation set forth is His work; the means used are His means. To bring in *our* faith as the means of that propitiation is to make us joint-authors with God of the scheme of salvation. The propitiation set forth remains eternally valid in itself though all men refuse to believe in it, and it is still a 'propitiation through faith.' 'God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself' (II. Cor. v. 19), and the human faith that was the means of the propitiation was the faith of the Christ in Whom God wrought.

We here begin to touch on a question which we shall have to face again and again in the sequel.

Wherever the word *πίστις* occurs in St. Paul in conjunction with the genitives *Ἰησοῦ* or *Χριστοῦ* or both combined, the English translators generally favour the interpretation of the genitive as objective, and in this respect the revisers have made greater havoc of the sense than the translators of 1611. The question in its entirety will come before us more naturally at a later stage. Here we are only concerned with the two instances in the passage under consideration.

And first as to the meaning of *διὰ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ* in v. 22. If these words really mean 'by our faith in Jesus Christ' there can be only one way of taking them. They obviously cannot depend on the foregoing *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* in the same way that *διὰ τῆς πίστεως* depends on *ἰλαστήριον* in v. 25. To make *our* faith the instrumental cause of God's revealed righteousness would be even more preposterous than to make it the cause of the propitiation He set forth. If therefore the words have this sense they *must* be taken to indicate the means by which that righteousness passes 'unto all that believe.' In order to see what this construction involves it is necessary to examine more minutely the structure of vv. 22-24. The words 'for there is no difference; for all sinned and come short of the glory of God' are obviously a parenthesis explaining the preceding *πάντας*. The righteousness of God did not come to the believers because of the faith which they *had*, but it came to *all* of them because of that in which they were universally *lacking*. Their imperfect faith was a predisposition which was theirs already; the accession of the righteousness of God was not through *its* instrumentality, but through that of the

perfect faith that wrought out that righteousness to supply what was lacking in it. The *δικαιούμενοι* of v. 24 agrees grammatically with the *πάντες* of the parenthesis, but really takes up the thought of the preceding *πιστεύοντας*, and the whole of the 24th verse thus describes exactly the same thing as the first portion of v. 22. The passing of God's righteousness 'unto all that believe' is precisely the same as their 'being justified freely by his grace,' and the two *διὰ* clauses *διὰ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ* and *διὰ τῆς ἀπολυτρώσεως τῆς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ* accordingly answer to one another. But 'the redemption that is in Christ Jesus' is prior to, and independent of the faith of the redeemed; it is *in* Him in a totally different sense from that in which their faith can be said to be *in* Him; and therefore the only way in which the two *διὰ* clauses can be harmonised is to take the *πίστις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ* spoken of in the former as a faith *belonging* to Jesus Christ, the faith in fact that wrought the redemption that is in Him by working out the perfect righteousness of God *in* man and so bringing it to bear *on* man. Thus the faith by which the christian is justified is not, according to St. Paul, the faith which he brings to Christ, but rather the faith which Christ brings to him, the faith described by St. Peter as 'the faith which is by him' (Acts iii. 16; *cf.* I. Pet. i. 21).

It is accordingly claimed here that a right exegesis distinctly favours the taking the words *Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ* in v. 22 as the subjective genitive. To take them otherwise is in fact to introduce an incongruous element into the description of an act which is essentially and wholly divine. The reasons for

similarly taking the word Ἰησοῦ in v. 26 are perhaps still stronger. The expression τὸν ἐκ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ is exactly parallel to τῷ ἐκ πίστεως Ἀβραὰμ in the next chapter (iv. 16), and the parallelism extends much farther than to the mere form. The whole verse in which the latter expression occurs runs as follows. 'Therefore it is of faith, that it might be by grace; to the end the promise might be sure to all the seed; not to that only which is of the law, but to that also which is of the faith of Abraham; who is the father of us all.' With this should be compared Gal. iii. 21, 22. 'For if there had been a law given which could have given life, verily the righteousness (ἡ δικαιοσύνη) should have been of the law (ἐκ νόμου). But the scripture shut up all under sin, that the promise by faith of Jesus Christ might be given to them that believe.' It is clear from this latter passage that 'the righteousness' which could not be 'of the law' is the same as 'the promise' which is given to them that believe 'by,' or by derivation 'from,' 'the faith of Jesus Christ (ἐκ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ).'<sup>11</sup> Accordingly the conferring of that righteousness by God on 'him that is of the faith of Jesus' (Rom. iii. 26) is the same thing as the conferring the promise on the seed 'which is of the faith of Abraham' (Rom. iv. 16). That seed κατ' ἐξοχὴν is Christ, the original recipient (Gal. iii. 16), Who is therefore pre-eminent in that faith which is its spiritual characteristic (Gal. iii. 7), and has now become, what Abraham himself was formerly, the

<sup>11</sup> The fact that this latter faith is spoken of in the next verse (23) as *coming* and *being revealed* shows that it is not *our* faith in Jesus Christ, but the faith which *came* and *was revealed* in Him.

great example of faith, and also, what Abraham was only figuratively, the spiritual generator of faith in others. 'The faith of Jesus' is in fact that triumphant 'faith of the son of God' (Gal. ii. 20) whereby the baptized are made sons of God *in* Him (Gal. iii. 26, 27), and he 'that is of the faith of Jesus' is he that derives his spiritual status *from* that faith, just as the true seed of Abraham derived its spiritual status from *his* faith.

Theological preconceptions apart there would appear to be absolutely no reason for interpreting the two expressions τὸν ἐκ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ and τῷ ἐκ πίστεως Ἀβραὰμ on different principles, and it is unlikely that those who first read the epistle would read into them two totally different meanings. Nothing that has gone before in any way leads up to Jesus as the *Object* of faith. As has been already remarked, the only passage in St. Paul's writings which states unequivocally the Object of justifying faith is Rom. iv. 24, and that Object is He 'that raised up Jesus our Lord from the dead.'<sup>12</sup>

That the perfect righteousness of Christ was actually the righteousness of a perfect faith is a truth which it has been the tendency of religious thought to bury in obscurity. It would almost seem as if it were believed by some that the true righteousness wrought out by Christ alone lay in that perfect keeping of the law of God to which no one else ever attained, while the righteousness of faith is a sort of makeshift accepted by God as the only possible

<sup>12</sup> This subject will be more fully dealt with in a later chapter in connection with the passages above quoted from the epistle to the Galatians.

achievement of mere sinners. For St. Paul on the other hand the righteousness of faith is the only true human righteousness, and the doctrine which ignores Christ's own faith and makes man's righteousness practically consist in faith *in* Him as the Object, necessarily makes the righteousness of Christ absolutely different in kind from the righteousness of man. And if faith is to be the spring of all our conduct, so that 'whatsoever is not of faith is sin' (Rom. xiv. 23), then a life that was not lived on this principle at all can never serve as our example. Yet 'the faith of Christ' in this sense is a conception from which the translators of 1611 evidently shrank, and which the revisers have persistently endeavoured to banish from the English New Testament.

That Our Lord's own faith should never be mentioned in the accounts of His life will hardly suggest a difficulty to anyone who thinks. The business of the evangelist was to record rather than to analyse, and the secret springs of action are accordingly as a rule left to be inferred. Yet on one occasion at least His words are so suggestive as to force the subject on our attention. When the disciples asked Him privately after the healing of the demoniac boy, 'Why could not we (ἡμεῖς) cast him out?' (St. Mat. xvii. 19) He replied, 'Because of your unbelief' or 'little faith' (ἀπιστίαν or ὀλιγοπιστίαν). This explanation of *their* failure thus contrasted with *His* achievement surely implies the presence in Himself of that which was wanting in them. The reply given in the parallel passage in St. Mark (ix. 29), 'This kind can come out by nothing but by prayer [and fasting],' practically emphasizes the same point. That Our Lord prayed

is certain. We are compelled to ask the question, Was His prayer 'the prayer of faith,' or was it not?

A similar inference can obviously be drawn from Our Lord's comment on the withering of the fig-tree (St. Mat. xxi. 21, 22; St. Mark xi. 22 *seq.*). 'The prayer of faith' would seem to be His explanation of His own mighty works, just as the unbelief of others proved the great hindrance to them (St. Mark vi. 5, 6).

The account of the temptation in the wilderness also bears its witness to the human faith of Christ. The full force of the words, 'If thou be the son of God, command this stone that it be made bread' (St. Luke iv. 3), must be measured by the recorded circumstances and by the mind of the tempted Person. Following immediately on the voice from heaven, 'Thou art my beloved son in whom I am well pleased,' and addressed to Him Whose teaching was, 'If a son shall ask bread of any of you that is a father, will he give him a stone?' (St. Luke xi. 11) they must be taken as an unmistakeable suggestion of doubt. If the voice was true, why these stones instead of bread? The words are an incentive to put the fact of sonship to the test and so call it in question. They thus imply the real human faith of the Person tempted as the central point of attack.

And the thought of the temptation in the wilderness naturally leads us on to 'the last and fiercest strife.' Here in the very central fact of our religion one New Testament writer at any rate saw the crowning instance of human faith, and that one a writer thoroughly imbued with St. Paul's thought. The whole description of faith in Heb. xi., with the



many examples of those who by it 'endured as seeing him who is invisible' and 'looked to the recompense of' His 'reward,' leads up to the contemplation of Him Who is 'the author and perfecter of faith' (τὸν τῆς πίστεως ἀρχηγὸν καὶ τελειωτήν, Heb. xii. 2),<sup>13</sup> and Who stood forth as that author and perfecter in the crowning act of enduring the cross and despising the shame 'for the joy that was set before him.' The passage naturally raises the great question, If this was the view entertained by the author of the epistle to the Hebrews of the spirit of the passion, may he not have derived it, as he derived so much else, from St. Paul himself? Did St. Paul see, as this writer evidently saw, in Our Lord's death the culminating act of human faith, and in His resurrection its complete triumph?

The passage which perhaps more than any other seems to give St. Paul's view of the passion as a *spiritual act* is one to which reference has already been made, 'the death that he died he died unto sin once for all' (Rom. vi. 10). Considering the way in which he sets forth *faith* as the opposite principle to *sin* (Rom. xiv. 23) this is at least perfectly consistent with his apprehension of that death as a great act of faith. A consideration of the whole passage in which the words occur (Rom. vi. 3-11) tends, as we shall see, to make such an apprehension on his part appear still more probable; and the reader will eventually be asked to consider whether this conception may not

<sup>13</sup> The insertion of the word *our* before *faith* in the authorised version, a corruption shamefully retained by the revisers, is a glaring instance of the length to which translators will go in order to exclude what they do not wish to be seen either by themselves or others.

underlie at least one other great passage in St. Paul's writings. Meanwhile its bearing on the phrase 'a propitiation through faith,' which is the subject of our present investigation, is sufficiently obvious. If St. Paul regarded the crucifixion as the culminating act of human faith and the resurrection as its triumph the expression presents no difficulty. God set forth Christ as a propitiation 'in his blood,' in that risen life which was the seal and fruit of the final triumph of human faith over sin in His death, and thus the propitiation was 'through faith.'

And if this, which certainly seems the natural explanation of the words, be not accepted, the question has still to be answered, What then was it that made Christ 'in his blood' a propitiation? The spirit of reverent enquiry which will not be satisfied with the mere presentment of the external fact of Christ's death as a propitiation, but demands to know what rendered it such, is surely perfectly legitimate. We ought not to be content with a view that stops short of 'inwardness.' Now it will be agreed that it is of the essence of a propitiation that it should be well pleasing to God, and no one in the present day will regard the mere endurance of torture as satisfying this condition. What then was it that rendered the propitiation well-pleasing? The writer who clearly saw in it the act by which human faith was brought to perfection is the same who also wrote, 'Without faith it is impossible to please him' (Heb. xi. 6). If we reject the explanation which he thus suggests it behoves us at least to proffer another.

And the explanation must cover a wider field than the single expression, 'a propitiation through faith.'

The fact is that St. Paul's allusions to Our Lord's death do not always carry with them their own explanation. Sometimes they rest on some unrecorded previous teaching without which they would be barely intelligible to those who first read them. The modern reader is apt not sufficiently to appreciate this fact. Our Lord's death is something on which the thought of christendom has been concentrated for ages, and that thought has more or less prepared the minds of all who now approach it. Everyone comes to it with some sort of pre-supposition, it may be the result of long and deep thought, it may be some elementary teaching which he has imbibed and never questioned. He sees it through a theological medium, more or less crude perhaps, but more or less true; and it does not always occur to him to ask what it could have suggested to those who first read St. Paul's epistles. When the Galatians found themselves reproached with the fact that Christ crucified had been as it were placarded before their eyes, and that in connection with their abandonment of St. Paul's teaching on faith, what gave the allusion point? Clearly there is a reference to some previous teaching connecting the two subjects, and the modern reader who has been accustomed to regard Christ's death on the cross as the great fact on which Christian faith ought to rest finds no difficulty in supplying an explanation. But without calling in question the substantial truth of the view thus read into the passage it is open to us to raise the question whether this was precisely the connection which St. Paul's previous teaching had established between the crucifixion of Christ and the faith which justifies. What

if the Galatians had been taught to regard Christ crucified not so much as the Object of Christian faith, but rather as its Subject and Embodiment?

Reference has already been made to Rom. vi. 10 as one of St. Paul's most forcible statements as to Our Lord's death in its inner and spiritual aspect. The whole passage in which the verse occurs shows that the death 'unto sin once for all' here spoken of, as well as the living 'unto God' which is bound up with it, are something which St. Paul represented Christians as sharing 'in Christ Jesus' (v. 11) in virtue of their baptism 'into' Him (v. 3). And in the middle of it occurs the remarkable statement, 'He that died hath been justified from sin' (ὁ . . . ἀποθανὼν δεδικαίωται ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας, v. 7). It matters very little whether we regard these words as applying *in the first instance* to Christ Himself or to the baptized Christian *in* Him; the words necessarily involve *both* references, and neither can possibly be excluded without running counter to the whole train of thought. If the words were meant primarily to be a general statement as to the Christian's justification they trace that justification to the death 'unto sin once for all' which he *shares with Christ*; and if that death justifies him who shares it, it must in the first instance have justified Him Who accomplished it. In an epistle attributed to St. Paul the assertion is actually made that Our Lord was 'justified in Spirit' (ἐδικαιώθη ἐν πνεύματι, I. Tim. iii. 16), and in I. Cor. vi. 11 St. Paul uses a similar expression of Christians; 'ye were justified . . . in the Spirit of our God (ἐδικαιώθητε ἐν τῷ πνεύματι τοῦ θεοῦ ἡμῶν). Whatever may be thought of the

argumentative force of this parallel, it surely tends to compel attention to that view of Christian justification which is the natural inference from any doctrine of justification *in* Christ; that the justification which is only to be found *in* Him is also a justification shared *with* Him; and that the justification which is ours by sharing His death was in the first place His Who took our actual 'flesh of sin' and in it accomplished the great death 'unto sin once for all.' Thus when He is said to have been 'delivered because of our trespasses (*διὰ τὰ παραπτώματα ἡμῶν*) and raised again because of our justification (*διὰ τὴν δικαίωσιν ἡμῶν*, Rom. iv. 25) both trespasses and justification were His as well as ours, the trespasses *virtually* through His taking that 'flesh of sin' which was their root, the justification *actually* by His death unto sin in it.

But we can hardly go so far without going farther. If our justification *in* Christ is a sharing of His justification, the terms which characterise our justification must also characterise His. If we are justified *by faith*, so was He. And more than that, this justification by faith which was His in the first instance is the same as that justification *by death* to which the statement in Rom. vi. 7 clearly points as the characteristic of justification *in* Him; and thus His death 'unto sin once for all' stands out clearly as the supreme act of justifying faith.

The identification of that dying unto sin and living unto God in Christ which is required of those who have been 'baptized into his death' with the faith which seeks its good in God and renounces all false appearance of good that is not in Him presents no

difficulty. On the contrary, to make anything else than faith the principle of that mystic life and death would have been absolutely impossible for him who wrote, 'Whatsoever is not of faith is sin' (Rom. xiv. 23). Even in its most rudimentary form faith energizes by renouncing the seen for the unseen, and this renunciation has found its highest expression in Him Who 'died unto sin once for all' that He might eternally live unto God. The conception of that death as the great achievement of human faith, and of the resurrection that followed as its great triumph, thus seems to bind together and harmonize all St. Paul's varying statements on justification and link them firmly to his practical teaching. Justification by that faith which died unto sin once for all is justification 'in Christ' and 'by the faith of Christ' (Gal. ii. 16, 17; Rom. iii. 22; Phil. iii. 9). It is 'justification of life' (Rom. v. 18), for the death unto sin is inseparably bound up with the life unto God won by His triumphant faith and through Him bestowed by God on man; and for the same reason it is justification 'in his blood' (Rom. v. 9), for the blood is the life that has passed through death and eternally embodies its virtue. So He Who in His death was the 'author (*ἀρχηγός*) of life' (Acts iii. 15) and salvation (Heb. ii. 10), was also by the same death 'the author (*ἀρχηγὸν*) and perfecter of faith' (Heb. xii. 2).

And this justification in Christ and by the faith of Christ is still the same in principle with that simple justification by faith which comes before us in the typical case of Abraham. In his case the faith that had in it a promise of righteousness was reckoned

as righteousness, and still the faith that justifies in Christ is similarly reckoned. Still that faith bears the stamp of promise, for though it has triumphed in the Head it has not yet triumphed in the members. But the promise of this faith, the faith that is *by Christ* (Acts iii. 16) is of a different order. It is that 'promise of the Spirit' which, having been received through the faith of Christ (Gal. iii. 14),<sup>14</sup> is now nothing less than 'the Spirit of the promise' (Eph. i. 13) actually bestowed. That Spirit is the Spirit of the Son (Gal. iv. 6) conveying the grace of sonship, which is *faith*; or, to put it the other way, it is 'the Spirit of faith' (II. Cor. iv. 13) communicating the triumphant 'faith of the son of God' (Gal. ii. 20) and making us sons of God in Him (Gal. iii. 26). Thus while the faith that won life in Isaac had only figuratively a spiritual generative power (Rom. iv. 11, Gal. iii. 7), the faith of the greater Seed of Abraham which laid hold on 'the life indeed' actually communicates that life eternally. But the life thus communicated has still to pass through its spiritual stages. It is 'the earnest (*ἀρραβὼν*) of the inheritance' (Eph. i. 14), an instalment, as it were, of God's perfect gift. 'As a grain of mustard seed' it lives and grows 'from faith to faith' with the promise of the complete annulling of sin and the absolute triumph of righteousness. Thus the faith that was, so to speak, sporadic in the old time has given place to a quickening Spirit of faith that has gone forth 'unto all that believe' to abide with them for ever, giving them a portion of its fulness, working toward a final

<sup>14</sup> διὰ τῆς πίστεως. Observe the article and compare vv. 22, 23.



triumph with a power that can and will subdue all things to itself.

It is this conception of 'the Spirit of the promise' as the Spirit of faith triumphant going forth 'conquering and to conquer,' descending from the Head to the members, reproducing itself there in its militant stage with its own assurance of final victory;—it is this conception that is here suggested as the underlying thought that carries in itself the explanation of St. Paul's doctrine of justification in Christ by faith. Here from the divine point of view is the vindication of God's righteousness in the overlooking of sin in the past. Not that the non-punishment of sin required vindication. The insuperable obstacle which sin seemed to set in the way of the perfection of human righteousness called for the condemnation and annulling of 'sin in the flesh' (Rom. viii. 3) rather than the punishment of its victims. The perfect 'faith of the Son of God' Who bore that sin in the flesh and conquered it there justified the whole scheme of creation as that of a righteous God Who designed nothing short of perfect human righteousness, would be satisfied with nothing less, and would in the fulness of time bestow nothing less on His children. On the other hand from the human point of view the Spirit of faith triumphant is an eternal human possession, eternally won from the Father by 'the faith of the Son of God,' eternally bestowed by the Father on the 'many sons' whom He is bringing to glory through the perfection of the Author of their salvation (Heb. ii. 10). As a quickening Spirit, raising 'from the death of sin unto the life of righteousness,' it is the pledge of the final annulling of sin in 'the church

which is his body.' Here potentially is that filling up of man's shortcoming which had seemed beyond human reach. Here man's weak faith can lay hold on a faith that is mighty. Here the faith that seems hardly to maintain the struggle against sin can link itself to 'the power of an indissoluble life' that has conquered sin for ever. Here is that 'anchor of the soul' which is the living bond uniting us to the great Forerunner. Thus that justification by faith which had ever been the law of God's dealings with man stood vindicated and completed in the perfect righteousness of a perfect faith that had laid hold on humanity in its weakness and would raise it in the fulness of time to the level of its own power. Thus the long looked for 'righteousness of God' came 'by the faith of Jesus Christ unto all that believe.' As a faith that had triumphed for ever over human sin it drew to itself the struggling faith of men everywhere. Here was a new vantage ground eternally won for them, on which they could take their stand and claim in Christ the full justification won by the faith which was His and theirs in Him.

It may be well at this point to sum up briefly the conclusions which we have so far reached.

(1) As to *Sin*. St. Paul strongly emphasises the view of sin as a power in the flesh essentially prior to transgression. The consequences of this view are in the main threefold.

(a) Sin in its primary stage as ignorant error is not *reckoned*. Man is not responsible for it and is not so held by God.

(b) Sin having its stronghold in the flesh and reigning there in death man's fundamental need

is not so much *pardon* as *life* in a new sphere independent of the life of the flesh.

(c) The shallower view which confounds sin with *transgression* tends both to a distorted and exaggerated view of human guilt, and to an imperfect view of justification as consisting merely in remission of that guilt.

(2) As to *Justification*. St. Paul regarded this as essentially the imputation of positive righteousness rather than the mere non-imputation of sin. The principle of that righteousness being faith God's universal law is that man is justified by faith. Accordingly the righteousness of faith has always been recognised and imputed by God. What rendered necessary the salvation wrought by Christ was the imperfection of the righteousness of faith due to the ineradicable taint of sin in the flesh. Accordingly that salvation was wrought by taking the flesh of sin and conquering sin in it, thus working out the perfection of the righteousness of faith through that death unto sin in which the conflict culminated, and laying hold on that absolute and complete justification by faith which was beyond man's unaided reach. That justification eternally abides in the life that has passed through death and communicates itself as the Spirit of faith triumphant going forth from the Head to the members. So what man's unaided faith could not do is accomplished by the grafting of that imperfect faith on the perfect 'faith of the Son of God,' and man finds his complete justification in Christ and by the faith of Christ.

The work that remains to be done is to examine and interpret on these principles certain passages in

St. Paul's writings which have so far been unnoticed or merely referred to, notably the great passage on justification in the epistle to the Galatians. Before dealing with the latter it will be desirable to devote a few pages to the consideration of those earlier statements on justification which do not as yet explicitly connect it with faith at all.

## CHAPTER IV.

## ST. PAUL'S EARLIER TEACHING ON JUSTIFICATION.

The earliest statement on the subject of justification attributed to St. Paul occurs in the great speech at Antioch in Pisidia recorded in Acts xiii. It runs thus, 'Be it known unto you, therefore, men and brethren, that through this man is preached unto you the forgiveness of sins, and in him (*ἐν τούτῳ*) every one that believeth is justified from all things from which ye could not be justified in (*ἐν*) the law of Moses' (Acts xiii. 38, 39). It is hardly necessary to justify the translation here given of the preposition *ἐν* in v. 39, but a word must be said as to the retention of the rendering *by* in the revised version. The point of view here taken with regard to the speeches of St. Paul recorded in the Acts has already been made clear. It is not claimed that the statements contained in them have the same evidential value in regard to St. Paul's mind as those in his genuine epistles. At the same time they have a value of their own as being *at least* what a contemporary thoroughly imbued with his teaching thought fit to attribute to him. Now it was perfectly open to the revisers to reject the Pauline authorship of the speech in Acts xiii. What they were *not* entitled to do was so to manipulate the translation of it as to conceal

the identity of its teaching with that which is undoubtedly St. Paul's. And this is what they have done by their rendering of the preposition *ἐν* in v. 39. This point can be made perfectly clear.

St. Paul in the epistle to the Galatians speaks both of being justified 'in the law' (*ἐν νόμῳ*, Gal. iii. 11, v. 4), and of being justified 'in Christ' (*ἐν Χριστῷ*, Gal. ii. 17). Not only so, but just as the *being* 'in Christ' is a familiar Pauline conception, so he speaks of men as being 'in the law' (*ἐν τῷ νόμῳ*, Rom. iii. 19). The thought underlying these expressions is surely obvious. For St. Paul 'the law' and 'Christ' were two opposed spiritual spheres *in* which men might live and seek and find, or fail to find, their justification. Now the revisers practically refuse to recognize this use of *ἐν* with *νόμος*. In Rom. iii. 19 they retain the translation of *ἐν* by *under*. In the two passages above referred to in the epistle to the Galatians (iii. 11, v. 4) they similarly retain the translation *by*, though in the former they insert in the margin 'Gr. in,' a note which with characteristic inconsistency they omit in the latter. Consequently in translating *ἐν τῷ νόμῳ* 'by the law' in Acts xiii. 39, whatever may be thought of the rendering on exegetical grounds, at least they are not flagrantly inconsistent. It is the translation they give twice out of three times elsewhere. It is otherwise with their rendering of *ἐν τούτῳ* 'by this man.' In Gal. ii. 17 they not only translate *δικαιωθῆναι ἐν Χριστῷ* 'to be justified *in* Christ,' but they recognize no other rendering, though the authorized version has 'by.' What right had they to disguise the parallelism of this passage with Acts xiii. 39 by translating *ἐν*

by *by* in the one case and by *in* in the other? Whether this inconsistency be deliberate, or whether it be merely an instance of the slipshod character of the revisers' work, it should certainly serve as a warning to the English reader, here at what is chronologically the beginning of St. Paul's recorded teaching on justification, of the sort of help he may expect to derive from this noted 'galaxy of scholars.'

A speech recorded by a contemporary as the utterance of St. Paul certainly deserves to be interpreted if possible in accordance with St. Paul's known views. And the meaning of the sentence under discussion when translated with due regard to this principle is obvious. (1) It is an assertion that through the risen Christ (*cf.* vv. 34-37) is preached the forgiveness of sins. It has already been pointed out in connection with Rom. iii. 21-26 that it was the resurrection which according to St. Paul constituted the Divine pledge of forgiveness. It was 'because of our justification' that He was raised (Rom. iv. 25). It was the risen Christ Himself Who 'came and preached the gospel of peace' (Eph. ii. 17). (2) It is an assertion that *in* the risen Christ and not in the law of Moses is to be found full justification. This is precisely the teaching of the Epistle to the Galatians. (3) While not expressly affirming justification *by* faith it distinctly lays down faith as a *condition* of justification.

Here then at the outset we have a statement purporting to be St. Paul's which, while perfectly consistent with his later teaching on justification *by faith*, sets forth the primary and essential character of his doctrine as one of 'justification *in Christ*';



and not only so, but presents it in the same marked contrast with justification 'in the law' which was a prominent feature in St. Paul's undoubted teaching. Such a statement, from the chronological position assigned to it by an intimate companion of St. Paul, surely deserves considerable weight in any appreciation of the character of St. Paul's earlier teaching on justification.

So far as St. Paul's actual writings are concerned the whole of his earlier teaching on justification is contained in two verses of the first epistle to the Corinthians,<sup>15</sup> the first of which is as follows. 'Of him are ye in Christ Jesus, who was made to us wisdom from God and righteousness and sanctification and redemption' (I. Cor. i. 30). This statement, which need not detain us long, at once suggests comparison with another that has already come under our notice,—'He made him to be sin for us who knew no sin that we might be made the righteousness of God in him' (II. Cor. v. 21). The very diversity of the expressions used, those *in* Christ being in the one case said to be made the righteousness of God in Him, while in the other He is said to be made righteousness from God *to* them, serves to emphasize the fact that the foundation of St. Paul's teaching on justification was his apprehension of the close spiritual relation actually subsisting between the Person of Christ and those *in* Him, involving a real communication to them of the righteousness won by Him. The same thought certainly underlies the other verse which concerns us in this chapter, and which will

<sup>15</sup> The personal allusion in I. Cor. iv. 4 is obviously not to the point.

require a more lengthy consideration. It runs, 'Ye were washed, ye were sanctified, ye were justified in the name of the Lord Jesus (Christ) and in the Spirit of our God' (I. Cor. vi. 11).

This being the only passage in the New Testament in which justification is described as being 'in the name of the Lord Jesus,' it is desirable, even at the risk of seeming to insist on the obvious, to offer one or two general observations on the meaning of this latter expression.

No one can read attentively the third and fourth chapters of the Acts without seeing that to the first Christians 'the name of Jesus Christ' carried with it the thought of a spiritual presence and power. It involved the conception of the living Christ Himself spiritually present and energizing. So much is this the case that we cannot always determine with certainty whether a pronoun refers to the name or to the Person; *e.g.* in Acts iv. 10, where *ἐν τούτῳ* may refer equally well either to *ὀνόματι* or to *Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*.

Some light is thrown on this use of the word *ὄνομα* by the words with which the fourth gospel seems originally to have been brought to a close; 'These are written that ye may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that believing ye may have life in his name' (St. John xx. 31). The life which is in the name of Jesus Christ is here associated with the belief of two facts concerning Him; that He is the Christ, and that He is the Son of God. Now it is to be observed that these are not merely titles of Jesus, but they are also names which He bestows on His members and shares with them.

From Him Christians are said to have an unction (*χρίσμα*, I. St. John ii. 20, 27), and in their corporate capacity they are even called *ὁ Χριστός* (I. Cor. xii. 12). Similarly, 'As many as received him, to them gave He power to become children of God, even to them that believe on his name' (St. John i. 12), just as St. Paul declares that 'in Him' we 'are all sons of God by faith' (Gal. iii. 26). The name is thus something which He bestows, and which carries the reality with it.

Accordingly we have in the New Testament two pairs of expressions which practically mean the same thing;

- (1) To believe on Jesus Christ, and to believe on His *name*.
- (2) To be baptized into Jesus Christ (Rom. vi. 3), and to be baptized into His *name*.

To believe on the name of Jesus Christ is to believe on Him as bestowing that name in the fulness of its power. Similarly to be baptized into that name is to enter into spiritual fellowship with Him Who as Head of the church bestows it on His members. Now it is worthy of remark that in the verse at present under discussion, containing as it does a unique description of justification, there is also an unmistakeable reference to baptism which stands equally by itself. The word *ἀπελούσασθε*, literally 'ye washed,' indicating a single act on the part of those addressed, can have only one reference. 'Ye washed, and in that washing ye were justified.' The washing was baptism 'into the name of the Lord Jesus,' and the justification involved was justification *in* that name.

To sum up what has been said; the name of Christ carries with it the thought of Christ as a Life imparted and shared in common, a spiritual Power in Whom 'we live and move and have our being.' And this spiritual Power is none other than that Power from on High with which the first believers were endued at Pentecost. Thus our study of the expression 'justified in the name of the Lord Jesus' leads us to the conclusion that the added words 'and in the Spirit of our God' only serve to give fuller expression to the same truth. The whole statement is a statement of 'justification in Christ' as that sphere of spiritual life and power into which men enter by faith and baptism, and in which their life as Christians is lived. So believing they 'have life in his name,' and their justification is 'justification of life' (Rom. v. 18).

With this early presentment of St. Paul's doctrine as a doctrine of justification 'in the name of the Lord Jesus' it will be instructive to compare the earliest recorded apostolic teaching on the subject of *faith* in Acts iii. 16. As the interpretation of this verse presents considerable difficulty it will be well to quote it at length in the original.

Καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ πίστει τοῦ ὀνόματος αὐτοῦ τοῦτον δυν θεωρεῖτε καὶ οἴδατε ἐστερέωσε τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ· καὶ ἡ πίστις ἣ δι' αὐτοῦ ἔδωκεν αὐτῷ τὴν ὁλοκληρίαν ταύτην ἀπέναντι πάντων ὑμῶν.

The authorized version runs 'And his name through faith in his name hath made this man strong, whom ye see and know; yea, the faith which is by him hath given him this perfect soundness in the presence of you all.' The mess which the revisers

have made of this dignified English without making the slightest appreciable change in the sense is instructive. The words occur, as the reader will remember, in St. Peter's speech immediately after the healing of the lame man at the Beautiful gate of the temple, the first recorded apostolic miracle after Pentecost.

Of the extreme awkwardness of the first part of this verse as it stands there can be no question, and the preposition *ἐπὶ* seems almost enigmatical. The version of 1611, following Luther's valiant lead, has dared to translate it by *through*, a rendering which the majority of the revisers, who can always alter if they cannot correct, have wisely changed to *by*. It would be interesting to know how they justified this extraordinary rendering of *ἐπὶ* with the dative, a rendering repeated in Phil. iii. 9, where there was even less excuse for such a drastic cutting of the knot. Can they possibly have had in mind the quotation in St. Mat. iv. 4 and St. Luke iv. 4, 'Man shall not live by bread alone' ? (*οὐκ ἐπ' ἄρτω μόνῳ ζήσεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος*). The brilliant substitution of *by* for *through* perhaps points in this direction; but as the phrase *ζῆν ἐπὶ* with the dative is only an excessively servile Septuagint translation of a phrase (*עַל חִיָּה*) which occurs only three times in the Hebrew bible, it cannot possibly be cited as evidence of such a use of the preposition in New Testament Greek. The rendering in the margin of the revised version, 'on the ground of,' is of course grammatically possible, and were the choice between that and the one in the text it would be necessary to adopt it. Yet the exegetical difficulties of such a rendering would seem

to be insuperable, and in order to make this clear it will be well, before suggesting a possible solution of the difficulty, to endeavour to answer two closely connected questions.

(I) Does *τῇ πίστει* refer to the faith of the lame man, or to that of the workers of the miracle?

If it were possible to refer the words to the faith of the lame man himself, the translation of *ἐπὶ* by *on the ground of* might very well stand. But what does this supposition involve? In the first place if *ἐπὶ τῇ πίστει* means 'on the ground of the lame man's own faith,' St. Peter is necessarily drawing a sharp distinction between that faith and his own. For the words that follow, *ἡ πίστις ἣ δι' αὐτοῦ*, refer to a faith which was the active agent in the miracle, and that faith cannot be said to have given the man perfect soundness *on the ground of itself*. If the faith which was the ground was the lame man's, then 'the faith that is by him' must have been that of the workers of the miracle. But what is the point of this emphatic contrast? It will probably be generally admitted that an interpretation which refuses to identify the faith mentioned in the second half of the verse with that mentioned in the first is to say the least exceedingly strained.

Then further, how can the lame man's faith be described as in any sense *πίστις τοῦ ὀνόματος αὐτοῦ*; There is not the slightest hint in the narrative that the man already believed in the name of Jesus Christ; indeed nothing is said about his faith at all. All that he appears to have looked for was 'an alms.' It may doubtless be argued that as in the case of the lame man at Lystra (Acts xiv. 9) there really was faith of



a certain kind and degree present, and that without such faith the miracle would have been impossible; but more than this is required to justify the expression *πίστει τοῦ ὀνόματος αὐτοῦ*.

These considerations seem to point to the conclusion that the faith mentioned in both parts of the verse is that of the workers of the miracle, and that consequently the translation of *ἐπὶ* by *on the ground of* will not stand. The consideration of a second question may serve to strengthen this conclusion.

(2) Is the genitive *τοῦ ὀνόματος* objective or subjective? Does *τῇ πίστει τοῦ ὀνόματος αὐτοῦ* mean 'faith in his name,' or 'the faith which belongs to his name,' the faith which is characteristic of that present spiritual power among men which *the name* clearly indicates?

As will be noticed hereafter Dr. Ellicott cites this verse as an instance of the objective genitive after *πίστις*. Yet a comparison of the two statements in the text strongly suggests the other interpretation. For the miracle is distinctly ascribed to the agency of (1) 'his name,' and (2) 'the faith which is by him,' or 'by *it*.' The faith and the name are therefore in some sense identical. This agrees much better with the supposition that 'the faith of his name' is the form or character which the spiritual power called 'the name' takes when working through human agency than with that which makes it a faith exercised toward that spiritual power as its object.

A closer examination of the expression 'the faith which is by him' leads us in the same direction. The words forcibly recall those of St. Peter elsewhere, 'who by him do believe in God, that raised him up



from the dead, and gave him glory; that your faith and hope might be in God' (I. St. Peter i. 21). Both passages alike expressly speak of the risen Christ (*cf.* Acts iii. 15); and the object of 'the faith which is by him' is expressly stated in the epistle to be 'God that raised him up from the dead.' Such a faith is not so much faith *in* his name as a faith *that belongs to* his name, to that name which implies the communicated grace of sonship, the name bestowed on Him in its fulness for us at His resurrection, in the power of which He spoke the Easter message, 'Go, tell my brethren, I ascend unto my Father and your Father.' For the spirit of sonship is none other than the spirit of faith (*cf.* Gal. iii. 26, Heb. ii. 13), and thus 'the faith of his name,' the faith that came 'by him,' is faith in that Father Whom He came to reveal.

The conclusions to which this investigation would so far seem to point may be briefly stated as follows:

(1) The *name* of the risen Christ, and 'the faith that is by him,' are closely identified as the actual agent in the miracle.

(2) This identification seems to involve the taking *τοῦ ὀνόματος* as the *subjective* genitive after *τῇ πίστει*, so that the whole expression means 'the faith that belongs to his name' rather than 'faith *in* his name.'

(3) The three expressions, 'his name,' 'the faith of his name,' and 'the faith that is by him,' thus standing alike for the active power that worked the miracle, the translation of *ἐπὶ* by *on the ground of* is impossible.

It remains to suggest an interpretation of the passage which will not do violence to the Greek, and the following is offered for the reader's consideration.

To the three different ways of describing the agency in the miracle which have already been enumerated there remains to be added a fourth, not expressly stated, but strongly suggested by the opening words of St. Peter's speech, 'Why look ye so earnestly on us, as though by our own power or holiness we had made this man to walk?' (v. 12). Though not by their own power or holiness, yet it *was* the apostles themselves who did the miracle in the power of another. Now it is exactly to this way of putting the matter that St. Peter's speech had led up as far as the word ἐστερεώσε. Having arrived at the fact of the resurrection he emphatically points to himself and his brother apostles (ἡμεῖς, v. 15) as witnesses of the fact. May not the original intention have been to set forth this witness in its true light as a witness with power? Thus beginning with an expression which excluded all thought of personal power or holiness, ἐπὶ τῇ πίστει τοῦ ὀνόματος αὐτοῦ, 'in the faith of his name,' leaning on the power of that faith which comes by Him and His spiritual presence, the sentence would naturally have gone on τοῦτον δὲ θεωρεῖτε καὶ οἴδατε ἐστερεώσαμεν, 'we made this man strong whom ye see and know.' This would have been perfectly natural and what the context would have led us to expect. There would be no awkwardness in the sentence, and the use of ἐπὶ would present no more difficulty than in the expression ἐπὶ τῷ ὀνόματι αὐτοῦ in St. Luke xxiv. 47 ('That repentance and remission of sins should be preached in his

*name*'). But the spiritual instinct which caused St. Paul to say 'yet not I, but the grace of God which was with me,' rejected ἐστερεώσαμεν when it came to the point in spite of the safeguards with which it had been hedged. After all it was not they, but the name that was with them. And so regardless of the previous construction ἐστερεώσαμεν was altered into ἐστερέωσε τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ, and we have the almost impossibly awkward sentence in our text.

This solution of the difficulty is offered for the reader's consideration in the hope that those who are not prepared to admit the anacoluthon will at least see the necessity of some better substitute than a solecism. Such passages as this are a somewhat stern test of the faithfulness of translators, and it is only fair to recognize that in the present case it is the Vulgate which bears the palm. By translating ἐπὶ τῇ πίστει τοῦ ὀνόματος αὐτοῦ by 'in fide nominis ejus' it has shewn a truer courage than Luther and his followers, who have not dared to admit their inability to see the sense.<sup>16</sup> Thus we have the edifying spectacle of the Church of Rome jealously guarding the scripture which protestants have corrupted.

The point, however, which has chiefly to be insisted on here is the close connection suggested by this verse between *faith* and *the name of Jesus Christ*. It is this alone which can furnish the excuse for devoting so much of the present chapter to the consideration of a statement with which St. Paul had

<sup>16</sup> One independent modern version deserves honourable mention in this connection. The Spanish of Cipriano de Valera has 'en la fe de su nombre.'

nothing to do. Surely in this conception of 'the faith of his name' we have the key to the true connection between St. Paul's earlier and later statements on justification. If justification 'in the name of the Lord Jesus' is the same thing as what is afterwards described as justification 'by the faith of Christ' (Gal. ii. 16),—and its identification with justification 'in Christ' in the next verse shews that it *is* the same,—then that 'faith of Christ' which justifies is the same as that 'faith of his name' which shewed itself as a new power in the healing of the lame man. And this 'faith of his name' is 'the faith which is *by* him.' It is not so much a faith that *looks up* from the believer to Christ as a faith that *comes down* from Christ to the believer. It is not so much the hand by which men lay hold on Christ as the hand by which Christ lays hold on them, enduing them with His power and making them sons of God in Himself. It is a faith which is 'in Christ' not so much because Christ is its Object as because He is its source, and the sphere of spiritual life in which it energizes; just as both faith *and* love are said to be 'in Christ' because 'the grace of our Lord' abounded with them (I. Tim. i. 14). What was new in the justification of the Christian as compared with that of Abraham was not the newness of the Object of faith, but of the faith itself, the energizing power of the new creation. So that which avails in Christ Jesus is described indifferently as 'a new creation' and as 'faith that worketh by love' (Gal. v. 6, vi. 15).

What really marks off this early statement of St. Paul's doctrine as justification 'in the name of the Lord Jesus' from his later statement of it as 'justifi-

cation by faith' in the epistles to the Galatians and Romans is not any real difference in his way of presenting the doctrine to himself, but merely the fact that the later statements are controversial while the earlier one is not. To the Corinthians he merely recalls their justification as a spiritual fact. To the Galatians and Romans he has to enlarge on the *character* of the true justification as opposed to the false. To this latter phase of his teaching belongs the insistence on justification *by faith*. Probably the great majority of the Christians of Corinth had never grasped the doctrine in this form at all. Yet who can doubt the *sufficiency* of the teaching conveyed in the statement, 'Ye were justified in the name of the Lord Jesus, and in the Spirit of our God'? On the other hand, if we substitute for the verse as it stands the words, 'Ye washed, ye were sanctified, ye were justified by faith,' who does not see that the force of the sentence is gone? Clearly what is essential to a true view of Christian justification is not the distinct apprehension of its character as justification by faith, though doubtless without such a distinct apprehension the view is *incomplete*; but what is *essential* is that view of it as a *grace in Christ* which brings it into close relation with the washing and the sanctification with which St. Paul associates it.

For St. Paul 'justification in Christ' was the primary and essential truth; his teaching on 'justification by faith' was supplementary. The evil of much modern teaching is that it practically substitutes a travesty of the latter teaching for the former. To teach men in the first instance that they can only be saved by their faith in Christ is practically to teach

them to look for salvation in themselves. It is to make their faith in Christ a substitute for Christ Himself. Man's primary and essential need is to *be* in Christ rather than to *believe* in Him. Get him to stand on the right spiritual ground, and he will find the faith that justifies *there*, and not in himself. He needs to be taught that justification is *in Christ* that he may know where to lay hold on it. Doubtless it is good for him afterwards to learn the truth about 'justification by faith.' But the idea that it is *necessary* for him to understand this latter point is simply appalling.

## CHAPTER V.

## ST. PAUL'S LATER TEACHING ON JUSTIFICATION.

St. Paul's later teaching on justification is contained almost entirely in the two epistles to the Galatians and Romans. Most of the passages bearing on the subject in the latter epistle have already come under consideration, and but little needs to be added here. The purpose of this chapter will therefore be best served by a somewhat detailed study of the main argument of the epistle to the Galatians (Gal. ii. 15—iv. 9), in connection with which the short reference to the same subject in Phil. iii. 9-11 will naturally claim attention.

The first two verses which have now to be dealt with (Gal. ii. 15, 16) are perhaps, in their bearing on the line of interpretation here advocated, the most crucial passage in St. Paul's writings. For it must be freely admitted that at first sight the translation of these verses given in the revised version will commend itself to the great majority of readers; and if that version is correct the whole argument of the present work rests on a misconception. The revisers' translation is as follows:

'We being Jews by nature, and not sinners of the Gentiles, yet knowing that a man is not justified by the works of the law, save through faith in Jesus Christ, even we believed on Christ Jesus, that we might be justified by faith in Christ, and not by the



works of the law, because by the works of the law shall no flesh be justified.'

The main question to be answered is, Were the revisers justified in changing the original translation of *πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*, *πίστεως Χριστοῦ*, 'faith of Jesus Christ,' 'faith of Christ,' into 'faith in Jesus Christ,' 'faith in Christ'? Do not the words, 'we believed on Christ Jesus,' settle the point once for all?

The question to be determined here is the relation of the faith implied in the words translated 'we believed on Christ Jesus' (*εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν ἐπιστεύσαμεν*) to that described in the words translated by the revisers 'by faith in Christ' (*ἐκ πίστεως Χριστοῦ*). According to the revisers' rendering that relation appears to be one of identity, and there is perhaps a natural tendency to adopt an interpretation which seems to simplify matters by not insisting on a distinction which may appear at first sight to be over subtle. The truth is, however, that if we refuse to see this distinction we shall be compelled to face another which will prove quite as embarrassing. For the aorist *ἐπιστεύσαμεν* can only refer to a single definite act in the past. If the faith implied in that act be identical with that 'faith of Christ' which is the root and foundation of justification, then man's justification is grounded on that single act of his own. But St. Paul shortly afterwards speaks of a 'faith of the Son of God' in which he *continued to live*. This latter faith *must* be distinguished from the single act implied in *ἐπιστεύσαμεν*. We can only identify the latter with 'the faith of Christ' at the price of a distinction between 'the faith of Christ' and 'the

faith of the Son of God,' or, to use the revisers' version, between 'faith in Christ' and 'faith in the Son of God.'

So far the argument rests entirely on the force of the aorist ἐπιστεύσαμεν, and it may not seem conclusive. It may perhaps be thought that St. Paul in using that tense only meant to emphasize the beginning of what was to be an abiding spiritual activity. If so, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that he grounded his justification on his own act and his own persistence in that act. But it is time to consider more closely what is really involved in the whole expression εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν ἐπιστεύσαμεν, and more particularly as to the force of the preposition εἰς. Does this merely express the object of the faith, or does it retain something of its primary sense, implying entry into a new sphere?

If the latter suggestion seem violent to the English reader it is hardly possible that the feeling could have been shared by those to whom St. Paul wrote. It has already been remarked that we have in the New Testament two pairs of expressions which practically mean the same thing, 'to believe on (πιστεῦσαι εἰς) Jesus Christ' and 'to believe on His name,' and 'to be baptized into (βαπτισθῆναι εἰς) Jesus Christ' and 'to be baptized into His name.' It must now be further pointed out that there is a close connection not only between the two members of each pair, but between the pairs themselves. Not only do 'Jesus Christ' and 'His name' convey the same idea of a spiritual Presence and Power, but the expressions 'to believe on' (πιστεῦσαι εἰς) and 'to be baptized into' (βαπτισθῆναι εἰς) the spiritual Presence and Power

thus identified with both the Person and the Name, are themselves both used with reference to the same spiritual transaction. A study of the opening verses of Acts xix. would seem to shew not only that the word *πιστεῦσαι* was sometimes at any rate used with special reference to the profession of faith made at baptism, but that St. Luke actually attributes this use of the word to St. Paul. He represents the latter as asking certain disciples, 'Did ye receive the Holy Ghost when ye believed?' (*εἰ πνεῦμα ἅγιον ἐλάβετε πιστεύσαντες;*) and the reply, 'We did not so much as hear whether there be any Holy Ghost,' prompts the further question, 'Unto what then were ye baptized?' (*εἰς τί οὖν ἐβαπτίσθητε;* v. 3). Hearing that they had only been baptized 'unto John's baptism' (*εἰς τὸ Ἰωάννου βάπτισμα*) St. Paul urges that John himself had told the people to '*believe on him that was coming after him*' (*εἰς τὸν ἐρχόμενον μετ' αὐτὸν ἵνα πιστεύσωσι*), and they respond by *being baptized into the name of the Lord Jesus*' (*ἐβαπτίσθησαν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ Κυρίου Ἰησοῦ*). It is quite clear that the aorists *πιστεύσαντες* and *ἐβαπτίσθητε* in vv. 2 and 3 refer to one and the same occasion, and the subsequent narrative still further tends to connect the phrases *πιστεῦσαι εἰς* and *βαπτισθῆναι εἰς*. Now this close association would naturally tend to invest the preposition *εἰς* in the former phrase with a shade of meaning which no English expression can fully convey. Its use with *βαπτισθῆναι* certainly conveyed the notion of *entry into* and *union with*. It is not too much to assume that its closely associated use with *πιστεῦσαι* must have tended to convey a similar thought. A trans-

action which was certainly regarded as an entry into a new spiritual sphere would seem to have come to be referred to by either phrase according as it was looked at from the human or the divine point of view, as the *act* of the person entering, or as the *grace of admission* conferred. The preposition common to the two phrases naturally lent itself to either use, and almost necessarily retained something of its primary force in both.

The question now to be dealt with is this, Had the preposition *εἰς* the force of *entry into* in the phrase *εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν ἐπιστεύσαμεν* in Gal. ii. 16? What has already been advanced points to the fact that the definite act of faith to which the phrase *must* refer may naturally be taken to be the baptismal profession of faith, and that the phrase so applied would naturally convey the meaning here advocated. The considerations still to be urged will tend to establish this thought of *entry into Christ at the baptismal profession of faith* as the necessary and fundamental notion conveyed.

The words which follow almost immediately in v. 17, 'But if while seeking to be justified *in Christ*' (*εἰ δὲ ζητοῦντες δικαιωθῆναι ἐν Χριστῷ*) obviously support the present contention. St. Paul and the rest were 'seeking to be justified *in Christ*'; to that end they 'believed *into Christ*' (*εἰς Χριστόν*). The fact that the expression here used is not English is obviously irrelevant). And the reader hardly needs to be reminded that this justification *in Christ* accords far better with justification by the faith *of Christ*, the faith characteristic of *the life in Christ*, than with justification by faith *in Christ* as the Object. This

‘seeking to be justified in Christ’ is clearly another way of expressing the motive alleged in v. 16, ‘that we might be justified by the faith of Christ and not by the works of the law’ (*ἐκ πίστεως Χριστοῦ καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων νόμου*), and we now proceed to consider the meaning of this great antithesis.

Were this portion of the revisers’ rendering of the passage (‘by faith in Christ, and not by the works of the law’), to be considered by itself, its violence would probably condemn it in the judgment of every competent person. Its effect is practically to reduce what must strike every reader of the original as a pointed contrast to a mere deceptive jingle. It absolutely destroys the opposition of Christ and the law and renders that of faith and works far weaker than it would have been had St. Paul simply written, ‘that we might be justified by faith and not by works.’

Waiving then for the present the further consideration of the meaning of *εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν ἐπιστεύσαμεν*, and leaving out of sight the objection that might be urged on this ground, it will be conceded that from this point of view the full reality of the antithesis ought to be preserved in the translation, and this requires the two genitives *Χριστοῦ* and *νόμου* to be taken in the same way, either as both objective or both subjective. Now the English expression ‘works of the law’ is almost necessarily taken in the latter sense and would probably never suggest any other to an English reader; but the fact to be reckoned with is that no less a scholar than Dr. Ellicott actually maintains that the genitive *νόμου* as used here is objective. Here is his comment on the words *ἐργων νόμου* in v. 16.

‘*ἔργων νόμου*’] Gen. *objecti*: ‘deeds by which the requisitions of the law are fulfilled,’ ‘eorum præstationem quæ lex præcipit’ (Beza),—the מעשים התוריים of the Rabbinical writers, and the directly antithetical expression to *ἀμαρτήματα νόμου*, Wisdom ii. 12 (Mey.); see *exx* in Winer, Gr. § 30 I., p. 167.’

It is important to observe how the active sense here attributed to *ἔργων* by Dr. Ellicott entirely depends on the notion of *fulfilling* which he himself has introduced. His expression, ‘deeds by which the requisitions of the law are fulfilled,’ is really merely a periphrasis for ‘deeds which the law requires to be done,’ and the notion of those deeds *fulfilling* anything whatever is not really implied at all in the phrase *ἔργων νόμου*. Both he and Beza bear witness to the true relation of *ἔργα* and *νόμος*, the former by the word ‘*requisitions*,’ the latter by the phrase ‘*quæ lex præcipit*.’ Dr. Ellicott apparently regards the law merely as a bundle of requisitions. Granting for the sake of argument the sufficiency of this view and the possibility of the word *ἔργων* having an active force, still the *ἔργα νόμου* must be works which fulfil the *whole* bundle of requisitions. The plural must be used collectively, not distributively, for a single work might be *ἔργον δικαιώματος τινος νόμου*, but could not possibly be *ἔργον νόμου* in this sense. And here it may be remarked in passing that it is otherwise with the expression *ἀμαρτήματα νόμου* quoted by Dr. Ellicott from Wisdom ii. 12. The failure to fulfil a single requisition of the law constitutes a delinquency with reference to the *whole* law, whereas the fulfilment of a single requisition does not constitute a fulfilment of the law. Accord-



ingly the plural in *ἀμαρτήματα νόμου* can be, and is, used distributively; but the phrase itself cannot possibly be directly antithetical to *ἔργα νόμου* in the sense in which Dr. Ellicott's interpretation requires *ἔργα* to be taken. Even if the further extreme concession be made that the plural *ἔργα νόμου* *might* be used collectively for the works which in their sum and entirety fulfil the whole body of requisitions which make up the law it would still be difficult to reconcile this meaning with St. Paul's use of the phrase. The inclusion of 'all those who are of the works of the law (*ὅσοι ἐξ ἔργων νόμου*)' in the curse pronounced against 'every one that continueth not in all things which are written in the book of the law to do them' (Gal. iii. 10) distinctly points to an *incomplete* list of works, to say nothing of the fact that the statement in the verse under discussion (Gal. ii. 16), which is repeated in Rom. iii. 20, 'By the works of the law (*ἐξ ἔργων νόμου*) shall no flesh be justified' would thus be an apparent contradiction of St. Paul's own assertion, 'The doers of the law shall be justified' (Rom. ii. 13). The reason why no one can thus be justified is that the list of works never is complete and therefore never constitutes 'works of the law' in the sense required by *νόμου* as the objective genitive.

If this point may seem to have been unduly elaborated Dr. Ellicott's name must furnish the necessary apology. Probably it will be generally conceded that in the expression *ἔργα νόμου* the genitive is subjective, and that a corresponding interpretation of the genitive *Χριστοῦ* in v. 16 gives a force to the antithesis which is wholly wanting in the



revisers' translation. This consideration, however, would not outweigh the fact, if fact it were, that the *πίστις Χριστοῦ* here spoken of is the same as that described in the words *εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν ἐπιστεύσαμεν*. To this point a return will shortly be made. At present we are rather concerned with what appears to be the natural force of the antithesis apart from this consideration.

At the risk of undue repetition it must here be reaffirmed that for St. Paul the law is something more than a bundle of 'requisitions.' Men cannot be said to *be* in a bundle of requisitions (Rom. iii. 19), to *sin* in a bundle of requisitions (Rom. ii. 12), or to be justified in a bundle of requisitions (Gal. iii. 11, v. 4). The expressions just referred to point to a conception of the law as a sphere, or at least a sort of spiritual environment, *in* which men lived. And the words of Gal. v. 4 are so remarkable as to merit more than a passing notice. The text runs in the original, *κατηργήθητε ἀπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ οὔτινες ἐν νόμῳ δικαιοῦσθε· τῆς χάριτος ἐξεπέσατε*. It is difficult to give the force of the first clause in an English rendering. The version of 1611, 'Christ is become of no effect unto you,' is a paraphrase rather than a translation, but certainly conveys more of the sense than the revisers' rendering, 'ye are severed from Christ.' The idea is of course the rendering null and void of the spiritual union with Christ. But in order to see the full meaning of the whole verse it is desirable to compare the close parallel in Rom. vii. 6. We there read, *νυνὶ δὲ κατηργήθημεν ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου, ἀποθανόντες ἐν ᾧ κατειχόμεθα*, where the revisers render *κατηργήθημεν* 'we have been dis-

charged.' The two verses describe two contrary spiritual developments. In the epistle to the Romans it is the normal progress from the law to Christ, where the entry into the new spiritual relation involved the *annulling* of the old bondage under the law. This is expressed by *κατηργήθημεν ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου*. In the epistle to the Galatians what is described is an abnormal retrogression from Christ to the law, a return to the old bondage involving the *annulling* of the spiritual union with Christ; and this is expressed by *κατηργήθητε ἀπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ*. The Galatians were going back to their old status. Now mark how that status is described in the verse in Romans. Our relation to the law has been cancelled, we 'having died to that *wherein we were held* (*ἐν ᾧ κατειχόμεθα*). The law is clearly viewed here as a sphere *in* which men were held in bondage, just as Christ is the spiritual sphere *in* which they find their freedom. When St. Paul describes the opposite change in such strikingly similar language in the epistle to the Galatians, *κατηργήθητε ἀπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ οἵτινες ἐν νόμῳ δικαιούσθε*, there ought surely to be no reasonable doubt as to the translation of *ἐν νόμῳ*. To translate it 'by the law,' as in both English versions, is to miss the sense altogether. The words express exactly the same *spiritual sphere* referred to in Rom. vii. 6 as *ἐν ᾧ κατειχόμεθα*. The Galatians were going back from Christ, *the sphere of grace*, (*cf.* the two phrases, *κατηργήθητε ἀπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ, τῆς χάριτος ἐξεπέσατε*), to the law, the sphere of works as opposed to grace. They were seeking in the latter sphere the justification which was only to be found in the former.

Clearly this conception of Christ and the law as two opposed spiritual spheres is one which was present to St. Paul's mind throughout, and it finds its clearest expression in this epistle to the Galatians. It was necessarily present to his mind when he described the passing over from the one sphere to the other of himself, St. Peter, and the rest, when they abandoned the old legal standpoint, 'seeking to be justified *in Christ*' (Gal. ii. 17). It would thus appear to be the soul of the intensely real antithesis in the words which immediately precede the mention of that quest, 'that we might be justified by the faith of Christ and not by the works of the law.' The works of the law were the works that characterized the one sphere; the faith of Christ is that which characterizes the other. The *κατάργησις* of this antithesis by the revisers, unless it can be supported by very weighty reasons, is not to be tolerated for a moment.

The interpretation of the two verses under discussion which is here advocated may be briefly expressed as follows:

'We who are Jews by nature and not sinners of the Gentiles, yet knowing that man is not justified by the works that belong to the law, but only by the faith that is to be found in Jesus Christ, even we abandoned the old legal standpoint and with our baptismal profession of faith entered into communion with Christ Jesus, that we might be justified by the faith that characterizes the life in Him, and not by the works that characterized our old life in the law.'

Here the matter must be left for the present. The further vindication of the sense here attached to

the words *εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν ἐπιστεύσαμεν* may be more profitably undertaken after the consideration of vv. 19, 20. And as the question of the exact sequence of thought in vv. 17, 18 hardly bears on our subject it is to the consideration of those two all-important verses which follow that we now proceed. They may be rendered in English as follows:

‘For I through the law died to the law that I might live unto God. I am crucified with Christ, and it is no longer I that live, but Christ liveth in me; and the life which I now live in the flesh I live in faith—the faith of the Son of God who loved me and gave himself for me.’

It may be remarked in passing that the words *νόμῳ ἀπέθανον* in v. 19 are merely a shorter description of the fact more fully set forth in the words already cited from Rom. vii. 6, *κατηργήθημεν ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου ἀποθανόντες ἐν ᾧ κατειχόμεθα*. The antithesis of *νόμῳ* and *θεῷ* bears witness to that quasi-personification of the law in St. Paul’s conception which comes out again in the metaphor of the *παιδαγωγὸς* in iii. 24. What is thus contrasted with God as an object of life is not a mere set of precepts, but a dominating spiritual influence.

But the main question which we have to face is the persistent one as to the translation of the genitive after *πίστις*. Were the revisers right in altering ‘the faith *of* the Son of God’ into ‘faith *in* the Son of God’? Now in this passage it is not too much to say that everything points to the opposite conclusion if we except the alternative reading *θεοῦ καὶ Χριστοῦ* for *υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ*, a reading apparently rejected unanimously, or almost unanimously, by the

revisers themselves. This reading may perhaps be regarded as a gloss by someone who took the revisers' view as to the genitive and sought to meet the obvious objection immediately to be urged by a closer identification of *God* and *Christ*. For it is extremely important to notice the expression in v. 19, 'that I might live unto *God*.' It is this living unto *God* which is described in the remarkable words that follow, 'I am crucified with Christ, and it is no longer I that live, but Christ liveth in me, and the life which I now live in the flesh I live in faith,—the faith of the Son of God who loved me and gave himself for me.' The new life which had swallowed up the old one, and which had its source in Christ living *in* St. Paul, was a living *unto God*, and the principle of that life was 'the faith of the Son of God.' How can the Object of the life and the Object of the faith in which the life is lived be different? If St. Paul meant what the revisers have made him say; if the new life in the fulness of which the old life was lost had been represented by him as a life lived in faith *in* the Son of God, would he not almost certainly have said in v. 19, 'I through the law died to the law that I might live unto *Christ*'? That he did not say so is the more remarkable that the thought in itself would have been perfectly natural to him. It occurs in II. Cor. v. 15. 'He died for all that they who live should no longer live unto themselves but unto him that died for them and rose again.' But the expression 'that I might live unto God' reveals a difference in the thought underlying the present passage, the true parallel to which is not II. Cor. v. 14-17, closely related as that passage is, but rather Rom. vi. 3-11. The dominant

thought in the passage in Corinthians is that of '*God in Christ reconciling* the world unto himself' (v. 19). Here it is rather that of *man in Christ reconciled* to God. The words immediately following, 'I am crucified with Christ, &c.,' shew conclusively that St. Paul is here speaking not so much of living *unto* Christ as of dying and living *with* Him. They recall Rom. vi. 6, 'Our old man was crucified with him.' The Christ *with* Whom St. Paul was crucified was the Christ Who 'died unto sin once for all' and 'liveth unto God' (Rom. vi. 10). Accordingly here, as in the passage in Romans, he regards himself as 'living unto God in Christ Jesus' (Rom. vi. 11). It was not St. Paul's own faith in which he thus lived, but the faith of the Son of God *in* him. This is in fact the real force of the expression *ἐν πίστει ζῶ τῇ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ*. It is as if he had said, 'I live in faith,—not my own, but that of the Son of God.'

This interpretation of the passage is considerably strengthened by a comparison of the statement in iii. 26, 'Ye are all sons of God (*υἱοὶ θεοῦ*) by faith in Christ Jesus.' It will probably not be disputed (and the point will therefore not be argued), that the meaning is 'Ye are all sons of God in Christ Jesus by faith.' Ye are all sons in *the* Son, and the faith by which ye are sons is surely the faith *of* the Son. For this sonship *in* Christ is immediately grounded on baptism *into* Christ. '*For* as many of you as were baptized into Christ put on Christ' (v. 27). What need for this if the faith by which they were sons was simply their own? In that case neither baptism availeth anything nor the absence of baptism. It is no answer to this to urge that they were sons by



their own faith because it was by their own faith that they laid hold on the baptismal grace of sonship. St. Paul does not say, 'Ye *became* sons by faith,' but 'ye *are* (ἐστε) sons by faith.' The faith was still the principle and cause of their sonship. Wherefore then serveth baptism? Is there any other answer than this, that the faith by which they were sons of God *in* Christ was the faith *of* Christ *the* Son, a grace *in* Christ on which they could lay hold in virtue of their baptism *into* Christ?

This thought of faith as a *grace in Christ* is certainly one which comes into prominence in this epistle. In v. 6 we read, 'In Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything (τι ἰσχύει) nor uncircumcision, but faith working by love.' Faith then is a power *working in Christ*, not merely a human faculty *exercised towards Christ*, and a comparison of vi. 15 would seem to shew that St. Paul almost identified this power of 'faith working by love' with that 'new creation' (καὶνὴ κτίσις) which he elsewhere (II. Cor. v. 17) associates with that passing away of old things for those 'in Christ' of which he gives such a forcible illustration in his own case. What is that 'faith of the Son of God who loved me and gave himself for me' but that very *power in Christ*, that power of 'faith working by love,' in which St. Paul now lived as in a new spiritual atmosphere? Now that he no longer lived, but Christ lived in him, the principle of that new life was not his own faith or anything else of his own. It was not something which he brought to Christ, but something which Christ brought to him.

It is now time to compare this whole passage (Gal.



ii. 15-20) with that which has already been indicated as its true parallel,—Rom. vi. 3-11. Not only is there identity in the fundamental thought of both passages, the thought of dying *with* Christ and living to God *in* Him, but some of the expressions are strikingly similar. Compare for instance, ‘Our old man was crucified with him (*συνεσταυρώθη*, Rom. vi. 6), with ‘I am crucified with (*συνεσταύρωμαι*) Christ’ (Gal. ii. 20); ‘the life that he liveth’ (*ὁ δὲ ζῇ*, Rom. vi. 10) with ‘the life which I now live’ (*ὁ δὲ νῦν ζῶ*, Gal. ii. 20); ‘he liveth unto God,’ ‘living unto God’ (*ζῇ τῷ θεῷ, ζῶντας . . . τῷ θεῷ*, Rom. vi. 10, 11) with ‘that I might live unto God’ (*ἵνα θεῷ ζήσω*, Gal. ii. 19).

If the resemblance between the two passages is striking the points of contrast are not less so. One of these indeed is comparatively unimportant. The more explicit reference to *sin* in the epistle to the Romans is explained by the immediate purpose of the argument, which was to combat the objection, ‘Are we to continue in sin that grace may abound?’ But there is a double contrast between the two passages which claims more attention. In the passage in Galatians faith is emphasized while there is no mention of baptism; in the passage in the Romans baptism is emphasized while there is no mention of faith. The omission in the Romans is the more remarkable that there *is* mention of justification in v. 7. Now how are we to explain the fact that in dealing with what is obviously the same subject, the sharing of the life and death of Christ, St. Paul in one case lays such emphasis on faith while in the other he never mentions it? Obviously because in writing

to the Galatians St. Paul's object was to bring out the truth as to justification, whereas in the passage in Romans, though justification is actually mentioned. the main purpose is to urge a consistent attitude towards sin. This accounts for the difference of *expression*, but the unity of the thought shews this difference to be merely external. Was it possible that when St. Paul mentioned justification in Rom. vi. 7 the *thought* of faith was absent from his mind? To anyone who has read the preceding portion of the epistle such an idea must seem absurd. The reason why the reference to faith is explicit in the one passage and not in the other is that the main subject of the one is the 'death unto sin' in its bearing on justification, while in the other it is the same death in its bearing on Christian practice. But the passage in the epistle to the Galatians conclusively shews that St. Paul's conception of justifying faith was inseparably bound up with that of the mystical death and life which is shared with the crucified and risen Christ. It was quite impossible that the thought of that justifying faith could have been absent when he mentioned justification *in the same connection* in the epistle to the Romans.

It is this express mention of justification in Rom. vi. 7, unfortunately suppressed in the version of 1611, which will perhaps appear to some to give special cogency to the above reasoning. The careful student of St. Paul will probably admit that the case is sufficiently strong independently of this point. And the reason why such stress has been here laid on the latent thought of faith in Rom. vi. 3-11 is that a precisely analogous reasoning will tend to establish

the thought of baptism as underlying the passage in Galatians. If the passage in Romans shews, as it does shew, that the mystical life and death in union with Christ which is the subject of both passages was bound up in St. Paul's mind with the fact of baptism, can we possibly say that the thought of that fact was absent when he penned the passage in Galatians? Both passages start from *a definite fact* in the past, expressed by the Greek aorist. In the Romans it is, 'All we who were baptized into Christ Jesus (ὅσοι ἐβαπτίσθημεν εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν) were baptized into his death.' In the Galatians it is, 'Even we believed on Christ Jesus (καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν ἐπιστεύσαμεν).' In both passages it is the fact thus mentioned that bears the weight of the whole reasoning. This is almost as obvious in Gal. ii. 15-20 as in Rom. vi. 3-11. It is here that St. Paul identifies himself with St. Peter and all others with whom he is arguing. If it is in his own case that he draws out the full meaning of the death and life shared with Christ he certainly assumes the applicability of the same truth to them, and the words εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν ἐπιστεύσαμεν mark the entry into that mystical life and death as certainly as, though less explicitly than, the words ἐβαπτίσθημεν εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν in Rom. vi. 3. The inference would seem to be irresistible that in both expressions the fact referred to is the same, and that in both the phrase εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν has the same meaning, implying an *entry* into a new spiritual sphere.

The difference of expression in the two cases is no more than might naturally have been expected. What St. Paul is urging on the Romans is the in-

consistency of a certain attitude toward sin with baptismal grace; what he is urging on St. Peter and the Galatians is the inconsistency of a certain attitude toward the law with their own baptismal act. And there is this further important difference between the two cases that the one attitude had been actually assumed by St. Peter and the Galatians, whereas the other was purely hypothetical. In bringing a charge of inconsistency against St. Peter and through him against the Galatians St. Paul naturally lays stress on their own action. In writing to the Romans he is merely meeting a possible objection to his own reasoning. An *argumentum ad hominem* would accordingly have been out of place in the latter case. It was natural and sufficient to insist on what was involved in the spiritual *status* of the Romans as baptized Christians without any reference to their own act in seeking that *status*.

But there is, of course, another and a deeper reason why St. Paul in Gal. ii. 16 should have used the word *ἐπιστεύσαμεν* rather than *ἐβαπτίσθημεν*. For though the preliminary act of faith which is, as it were, the *human contribution* to baptism is to be distinguished from that justifying faith of Christ which is bound up with the *grace* of baptism, the two are very closely related. As has been already remarked in connection with Rom. iii. 21, *seq.*, 'the righteousness of God' which was 'by the faith of Jesus Christ' came 'unto all that believe' to fill up their *shortcoming*. For that very reason it could come *only* on them that believed. Though in itself 'a new creation' (Gal. vi. 15), its effect was to quicken and revive a life already existing. True St.

Paul uses language which seems to imply that previously to the reception of Christian grace man's condition is one of absolute death. But the metaphor, for after all it is only a metaphor, cannot be pressed. The life of the wild olive is a very different thing from death, and only the *living* shoot can be grafted into the true olive (*cf.* Rom. xi. 17 *seq.*). Nay, unless the life of the wild olive were not merely life, but life closely related to that of the true, the grafting would be impossible. The first Adam is described as a 'son of God' (St. Luke iii. 38), and that sonship is man's true nature which Christ came to restore. But so far as man was a son it could only have been by faith, and the restoration of the sonship was by the quickening of the faith. Here the law holds, 'To him that hath shall be given.' Whether any human being is or ever was *absolutely* devoid of that faith which is necessary for the reception of divine grace is a question which may be mooted, but which certainly cannot be answered.

The effect of the revelation of the perfect faith of Christ was to draw to itself all the aspiring imperfect faith of mankind. In it the seeker after righteousness found that fulness which was beyond his own reach. To it he brought his own imperfect faith to be grafted into the one stock capable of supplying that fulness of life that could assimilate and perfect all its good. Thus his own baptismal act of faith was the natural and necessary prelude to his taking his stand on the faith of Another.

Thus the phrase *πιστεῦσαι εἰς* implies a faith which has found its true source of life in union with the faith of Christ and enters upon its true sphere *in* Him.

The phrase βαπτισθῆναι εἰς involves the same thing, but less explicitly. Its reference to the sphere entered upon is general, whereas the phrase πιστεῦσαι εἰς refers to that sphere specially as the sphere of faith. Thus in Rom. vi. 3, where the thought of faith is not prominent, St. Paul naturally uses the word ἐβαπτίσθημεν. In Gal. ii. 15, where faith is strongly emphasized, he as naturally uses ἐπιστεύσαμεν. But in neither passage is the sequence of thought really intelligible if the preposition εἰς be not given its full meaning. The subject of both is the new life entered upon in baptism. In both that life is described not as lived *to* Christ, but rather as lived *with* Him and *in* Him to God. The faith which characterizes it is accordingly not so much faith *in* Jesus Christ as 'the faith *of* Jesus Christ,' the faith which the man Jesus first brought to perfection, and which abides as a regenerating source of life in His mystical body, the *Christ*; in short, the faith of Jesus fulfilling itself as the faith of Christ.

Another passage which presents a very striking parallel to the closing verses of Gal. ii., and which it will consequently be convenient to consider here, is Phil. iii. 8-11. Here again we have the thought of the righteousness 'which is by the faith of Christ' (τὴν διὰ πίστεως Χριστοῦ, v. 9) coupled with the thought of being 'found *in Him*' (v. 9), and of 'being conformed to his death' (συμμορφιζόμενος τῷ θανάτῳ αὐτοῦ, v. 10). The treatment of v. 9 by the revisers is remarkable, and deserves the closest attention. The reading in the text is, 'and be found in him, not having a righteousness of mine own, even that which is of the law, but that which is



through faith in Christ, the righteousness which is of God by faith.' Here it is pleasant to be able to recognise one decided improvement on the version of 1611. 'A righteousness of mine own' is a far truer rendering of ἐμὴν δικαιοσύνην than 'mine own righteousness.' As Lightfoot well points out, the effect of the absence of the article is that the actual existence of any such righteousness is not postulated. Unfortunately their rendering of the rest of the verse is far worse than that of the earlier version, though the latter is bad enough. But before examining it, it will be well to notice one of the notes in the margin. Instead of 'not having a righteousness of mine own, even that which is of the law,' a minority of the revisers suggest 'not having *as* my righteousness that which is of the law.' Probably the first thought which occurs to anyone on reading this rendering is, 'What can possibly have suggested anything so awkward?' Yet the reply is obvious,—the change of the words 'through the faith of Christ' into 'through faith in Christ.' For the latter translation renders that of ἐμὴν δικαιοσύνην in the text impossible. If the righteousness which St. Paul sought was through *his own faith*, why was it not a righteousness of his own just as truly as if it had been through *his own works*? The extraordinary rendering in the margin is apparently due to a perception of this difficulty. If τὴν διὰ πίστεως Χριστοῦ is antithetical to ἐμὴν it cannot possibly mean that which is by *my* faith. So the authors of the marginal rendering resorted to the desperate expedient of abolishing the antithesis altogether by an obviously strained translation.



The truth or falsehood of Lightfoot's view, that 'διὰ πίστεως Χριστοῦ' is opposed to ἐκ νόμου, and τὴν ἐκ θεοῦ to ἐμήν, of the preceding clause,' does not in any way affect the force of what is here urged. Unless we accept the marginal rendering in the revised version, which is surely a desperate expedient, we are really faced with a single antithesis. St. Paul is contrasting two different kinds of righteousness which are mutually exclusive. The one is ἐμήν, τὴν ἐκ νόμου, the other τὴν διὰ πίστεως Χριστοῦ, τὴν ἐκ θεοῦ, and ἐμήν is clearly meant to be as inconsistent with τὴν διὰ πίστεως Χριστοῦ as with τὴν ἐκ θεοῦ. The righteousness which is 'through the faith of Christ' is altogether independent of St. Paul's faith and of everything else that belonged to St. Paul, and a return to the old rendering of the genitive Χριστοῦ is simply a return to common sense.

A word must be added on the translation of ἐπὶ τῇ πίστει. That given by Lightfoot, 'on the condition of faith,' seems strangely out of keeping with the perfervid tone of the whole passage. In representing to himself the final attainment of the prize for which he had suffered the loss of all things St. Paul must needs specify the condition on which he is to receive it! Surely Dr. Lightfoot is here unconsciously transferring something of his own mentality to the apostle! Apparently the incongruity of this theological commonplace with the rest of the passage was too much even for the great 'galaxy of scholars.' In spite of the little pedantic advantage it had over their own rendering in conforming to the ordinary rules of Greek they do not

even accord it a place in the margin. They simply retain the old translation of ἐπὶ with the dative,—*by*, though they insert in the margin the little note ‘Gr. upon.’ Apparently the bold plunge taken in dealing with Acts iii. 16 had not sufficed altogether to efface the grammatical scruples of some at least among them. And indeed the repetition of such violence on the present occasion was even less excusable than the previous cutting of the knot. In dealing with Acts iii. 16 they were at least face to face with a great difficulty, though that fact furnishes no sufficient excuse for the course they took. The far less formidable difficulty of the present verse consists less in apprehending the meaning than in expressing it in suitable English. The marginal note, ‘Gr. upon,’ gives the very translation of ἐπὶ which roughly conveys the sense. The whole passage with the context bears witness to the fact that what St. Paul is here figuring to himself is a righteousness as yet unattained. It is that righteousness of which he speaks in Gal. v. 5. ‘We . . . are waiting for *the hope of righteousness*.’ The actual righteousness of the faith which St. Paul already had was merely a stage in the development of the righteousness of the faith of Christ in him. As in the Master so in the disciple that faith had to march through suffering to *perfection*. The final perfect righteousness was as it were the crown or finial of the whole building. It was something to be superadded at last when faith had triumphed, just as the resurrection from the dead was to follow on conformity to Christ’s death (vv. 10, 11). It was, in fact, that ‘crown of righteousness’ to be bestowed hereafter on St. Paul and on

all who like him have fought the good fight and *kept* the faith (II. Tim. iv. 7, 8).

It is not necessary to discuss the rest of this passage at length, or to go into the vexed question of the grammatical connection of v. 10 with what precedes. Whatever view be taken on the latter point, the close connection in thought between the righteousness which is 'by the faith of Christ' and the sharing of Christ's sufferings and 'being conformed to his death' would seem to be indisputable. The passage accordingly presents a striking parallel to Gal. ii. 20, and both point to the fact that the phrase 'justification by death,' so evidently suggested by Rom. vi. 7, conveys an aspect of St. Paul's teaching which is essential to the full understanding of it. And this naturally leads us back to the passage which is our main subject.

In considering Gal. ii. 21 it is not to the purpose to argue at length as to the exact meaning of ἀθετῶ. What renders this verse so extremely important in its bearing on the present discussion is that it marks the transition in St. Paul's mind from the contemplation of the death of Christ as a present spiritual power to what for want of a better word may perhaps be called a more objective view of it as an historical event. Notwithstanding this changed point of view, which continues to reveal itself in the opening of the third chapter, the death of Christ is still clearly regarded as the source of grace rather than as the object of faith. This is abundantly clear not only from the verse itself, but from a comparison of it with the statement in iii. 21, 'For if there had been given a law that could quicken verily the righteous-

ness should have been by the law (*ἐκ νόμου*).’ In spite of the variation of the preposition with *νόμου* the parallelism of the two verses will be generally admitted; and it points to the fact that in the former the conception of Christ’s death which was present to St. Paul’s mind was that of a great quickening power. It was in that death that ‘the law of the Spirit of life in’ Him reached its full development, as attested by His resurrection, the revelation of what the death really was. Accordingly here, as in Rom. viii. 2, 3, where the failure of the law and the achievement of Christ are similarly contrasted, the death is regarded as primarily a work *in* man, not merely a work afterwards brought to bear on man, still less a work merely done *for* man, and on which man’s faith was to look *back*.

The mention of Christ’s death as an historical fact naturally leads St. Paul to speak of his own previous announcement of that fact to the Galatians. Hence the outburst with which the third chapter opens, ‘O foolish Galatians, who bewitched you, before whose eyes Jesus Christ was visibly set forth crucified?’ Here we are at once faced by the question, What was the nature of that previous announcement of Christ Crucified? What did St. Paul expect his written words to recall? The mere mention of the fact in itself conveys no spiritual truth whatever. In what *light* did St. Paul place it before his hearers? Was his oral treatment of it at all akin to what he had just been writing, or was it something totally different?

Probably few English readers, even if they read the two chapters consecutively, see any marked connec-

tion of this first verse either with what precedes or with what follows. The reason of this is that they have come to regard Christ Crucified too exclusively from one point of view, and that point of view is not the prevailing one in St. Paul. They see there the great Object on which their faith is to rest, and so long as that Object is Christ Crucified, and not merely Christ's death on the cross, no fault need be found with their view. Yet that conception of Christ's death as an atoning sacrifice which has so largely prevailed in post-apostolic times, true as it is in its due correlation with the whole Christian scheme, becomes misleading when viewed as commensurate with the fact. The death of Christ cannot be brought under a single theological formula; it was only an atoning sacrifice by being much more. And to drag in the conception of faith in an atoning sacrifice wherever that death is mentioned in connection with faith is to apply an utterly wrong principle of interpretation. Not only was St. Paul's view of Christ Crucified not limited by any such conception, but the idea of faith in an atoning sacrifice viewed merely as the *act* of the Priest and Victim is hardly consonant with his thought. With him faith is almost invariably faith in a Person, and in the only passage where the Object of justifying faith is *unequivocally* mentioned that Person is the Father (Rom. iv. 24).

The thought of Christ Crucified as the sacrificial Object of faith in the verse we are considering is thus not only incongruous as regards what has immediately preceded, but it introduces a conception which is not explicitly to be met with anywhere in St. Paul's writings. The conception which really underlies the

whole of the present passage is not that of an atoning sacrifice at all, but of a death which lives on, working in man a life inseparable from itself. And the principle of that death and life both in Christ and in His members is 'the faith of the Son of God.' Can we possibly imagine that St. Paul's original preaching of Christ Crucified conveyed nothing of his own deep experimental knowledge of the close spiritual relation of the fact to man's inner life not merely as the Object, but as the *principle* of his faith? On the other hand, what reason have we for supposing that he set forth Christ Crucified to the Galatians as the external sacrificial Object on which their faith was to rest? Where do we find 'Christ Crucified' thus set forth either in St. Paul's writings or in his recorded preaching? And why should there be here a covert allusion to a wholly different train of thought which finds no place either in what precedes or in what follows? The conception of Christ Crucified which is required by the latter part of this third chapter as well as by the conclusion of the second is not that of an Object of faith at all, but rather that of the great Embodiment and living Source of a human faith that won its final triumph on the cross and became a quickening power in the resurrection. In support of this statement it is not necessary at present to do more than refer to the 23rd verse, which speaks of faith as *coming* and *being revealed*. This cannot possibly be twisted into meaning the coming and revelation of a new *Object* of faith on which the old faith of Abraham and his spiritual children was to fasten. What was new was not the Object, but the faith itself. And it is only the view of Christ Cruci-



fied which sees there the revelation of faith as a new spiritual power which makes the transition from the first to the second verse of the third chapter easy and natural.

'This only would I learn from you; received ye the Spirit by the works of the law? or by the message of faith?' The rendering of the concluding words of this verse must now occupy our attention for some time.

That the majority of the revisers should retain the rendering of ἀκοή by *hearing* is not surprising considering that they actually do the same in Rom. x. 17, where the sequence of thought absolutely demands the sense *report* or *message*. Their authority cannot weigh much against the sound reasoning of Dr. Elliott, nor can it profit much by the unsound dogmatic statements of Dr. Lightfoot. The latter ingeniously prefaces his comment by a paraphrase in which he inserts the word *willing* before hearing, ('the willing hearing which comes of faith'), a sense which he could hardly have found in the word, though he desires his readers to see it there. Without this preparation it is difficult to see how any one could accept his mere assertion that the parallelism of Rom. x. 17, where the order required by his interpretation is inverted, is only apparent; to say nothing of the fact that the only actual parallel he can suggest is the use of a quite different word, ὑπακοή, a word which always in the New Testament conveys that notion of *obedient* hearing which is never to be found there in the word ἀκοή. The only plausible reason given by him, perhaps the only plausible reason that *can* be given for attributing an active sense to ἀκοή is that the render-



ing *hearing* presents 'a better contrast to ἔργων which requires some word expressing the part taken by the Galatians themselves.'

Now here we come to the crucial question, Is St. Paul really appealing to any 'part taken by the Galatians themselves' at all? Is he really asking converted heathen whether they trace the gift of the Spirit to *their own* 'works of the law' or to *their own* 'willing hearing which comes of faith'? That he should put such a question is surely improbable in the extreme. They had never done any works of the law, and a faith of their own which was logically anterior to 'willing hearing' could only be such a rudimentary faith as that which he had discerned in the cripple of Lystra. According to this interpretation St. Paul's question really comes to this, Did you receive the Spirit by works of the law which you never did, or by that listening to which you were prompted by your own better nature? We may be sure that the question put by St. Paul had a more pointed reference than this to the Galatians' actual experience.

A comparison of v. 5 ought to be sufficient to shew that St. Paul is not referring to any activity of the Galatians themselves either in the ἔργα νόμου or in the ἀκοὴ πίστεως. He is not asking them how they managed to get the gift, but how God brought it to them. St. Paul no more thought of their looking to themselves or their own activities for the explanation of the supply of the Spirit to them than for that of the miracles wrought among them. What he asks is, Whence came God's gift of the Spirit to you? And as it certainly came through St. Paul's own

ministration the question really amounts to this, Do you trace the gift of the Spirit which I was the means of conferring to works of the law which you saw me do, or to that message of faith which you heard me deliver? Thus ἀκοή has the same passive sense here that it always has elsewhere in the New Testament.

That St. Paul should describe that 'gospel of the uncircumcision' with which he claimed to be entrusted as a 'message of faith' is surely perfectly natural. Such an interpretation is distinctly favoured by the words which follow almost immediately in v. 8, 'The scripture, foreseeing that God justifieth the nations by faith, preached the gospel before to Abraham, In thee shall all the nations be blessed.' For St. Paul the blessing of Abraham was justification by faith, and the message of that blessing was the gospel.

A brief reference to a passage in an earlier epistle may serve to bring out the true connection between the open setting forth of Christ Crucified mentioned in Gal. iii. 1 and the 'message of faith' appealed to in the following verse. The subject of I. Cor. i. 18—ii. 5 is 'the word of the cross' (ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ σταυροῦ, i. 18), which is declared to be 'the power of God' to the σωζόμενοι, just as in Rom. i. 16 the gospel which St. Paul wished to preach to the Romans is described as 'the power of God unto salvation.' St. Paul's gospel to the Romans was certainly a 'message of faith.' What else was that 'word of the cross' which he preached to the Corinthians? Further on (vv. 21-24) this 'word of the cross' is described as the 'preaching' (κήρυγμα) the subject of which is 'Christ crucified . . . the power of God.'

And this power of Christ Crucified is set forth as a *destructive* power, bringing to naught and putting to shame the wisdom and might of the world, and leaving only Himself, in Whom is summed up 'wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption' (vv. 27-30). This tallies well with Gal. ii. 19, 20, where St. Paul virtually speaks of his old life as brought to naught and swallowed up in the life of the Crucified.

In I. Cor. ii. 2 St. Paul proceeds to say, 'I determined not to know anything among you save Jesus Christ and him crucified.' This self-imposed limitation certainly did not preclude the delivery of the 'message of faith,' which must therefore have been in some sense identical with the message of Christ Crucified. The only question is, How is that identity to be conceived? Is it to be explained by the fact that Christ Crucified, the Power of God, was set forth as the Object of man's faith? A very superficial view of vv. 4 and 5 might seem to favour such an interpretation. We there read, 'And my word and my message (κήρυγμα) was not in persuasive words of man's wisdom, but in demonstration of the Spirit and of power, that your faith might not be in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God.' The literal translation of ἥ which appears in the margin both of the authorized and revised versions is here given in order to give the most favourable expression possible to the view under discussion. But probably most people will admit that the translation in both English texts gives the real sense of the Greek, 'that your faith should not *stand* in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God.' The faith was *in* the Power

in the same sense that the message was '*in* demonstration of the Spirit and of power.' The '*power*' was present, and the whole spiritual transaction was instinct with it; for Christ Crucified, 'the power of God,' was not merely the κήρυγμα but the κήρυξ also (*cf.* Eph. ii. 17), present in power and preaching Himself. The power of the message was the generating power of the faith. The faith was ἐξ ἀκοῆς, it had its origin in the message, because the message itself was διὰ ῥήματος Χριστοῦ (Rom. x. 17), 'by the word of Christ.' The power that shewed itself in St. Paul's preaching was the same that shewed itself in the faith of his hearers. So he preached and so they believed. The faith was born of the message and was of the very substance of the message; the Power that lived in both was the Power of the Crucified, and the faith wrought by it was the faith of the Crucified, the faith that had overcome the world and was subduing all things unto itself.

Thus Christ Himself, placarded as it were before the eyes of the Galatians as the Crucified, *was* to them the great '*message of faith*'; not the message of a new Object on which the old faith was to rest, but the message of faith as a wholly new power won for man by Him Who alone had brought it to perfection and thus laid hold on the perfect and indefeasible righteousness of God.

The subject of Abraham's blessing, which begins to be prominent in vv. 6-9, demands very close attention. If we are to understand St. Paul's argument about it we must firmly grasp his way of conceiving it. And he expressly identifies it with two things.

(1) Viewed as the promised blessing to Abraham's seed, it is clearly identified in v. 14 with 'the promise of the Spirit.'

(2) Viewed as Abraham's *own* blessing, to be had *in* him (v. 8), and shared *with* him (v. 9), it is no less clearly identified with *justification by faith*. The blessing that came to him personally is that contained in the words, 'it was reckoned unto him for righteousness,' and accordingly St. Paul declares that in foretelling the bestowal of that blessing on the nations what the scripture foresaw was that God would justify them by faith (v. 8).

Now this double identification of the blessing of Abraham with 'the promise of the Spirit' and with *justification by faith* shews very clearly that the latter is still for St. Paul the same 'justification' in the 'Spirit of our God' which he had already announced to the Corinthians (I. Cor. vi. 11). Accordingly the essential element in this justification, the element which the law could not supply, is stated in v. 21 to be *quickenings power*. The 'justification of life' of Rom. v. 18 is no mere *obiter dictum*.

The reader will now perhaps be prepared to see a somewhat closer connection between vv. 5, 6 than lies on the surface. The *καθὼς* of the latter verse does not merely refer to the word *faith* immediately preceding. The spiritual events described in the two verses are strictly analogous. The blessing of justification, won by Abraham's faith, and won not merely for himself, but, in a sense, for his posterity, is the strict counterpart of the supply of the Spirit won by the faith of Christ and brought with the message of

that faith to those who are made 'heirs according to promise' in Him.

With regard to these four verses (6-9) it is necessary to draw attention to two points.

(1) As to οἱ ἐκ πίστεως, 'they of faith,' who are declared to be the true sons of Abraham (v. 7). It is important to bear in mind that St. Paul only recognised this sonship as being *in Christ* (v. 29; cf. v. 14). To be ἐκ πίστεως was the *characteristic* of this spiritual sonship, and was bestowed *with it*, not an antecedent cause of the sonship in the sense that any one could claim the sonship in virtue of *his own* faith. Though St. Paul in building up his argument starts with general language, still οἱ ἐκ πίστεως as he conceived them are the πιστοὶ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ (Eph. i. 1), the 'believing'<sup>17</sup> ones in Christ Jesus,' and they only. The faith by which they were sons (v. 26) was the faith which *came* to them and *was revealed* to them (vv. 23, 25). At the risk of wearisome iteration the truth must be repeated; it was not the faith which they brought to Christ, but the faith which Christ brought to them.

(2) The inference in v. 9 should be carefully noted. 'So then they that are of faith are blessed *with* believing Abraham.' This statement is grounded on the prophecy, 'In thee shall all the nations be blessed' (v. 8). As St. Paul is certainly in this passage leading up from Abraham to Christ, the true seed of Abraham, and as the spiritual headship of

<sup>17</sup> This word is used as being perhaps somewhat less misleading than the 'faithful' of the English version. The πιστοὶ are of course those who *have faith*, and this meaning has to be read into some English word at least as inadequate as πιστός itself.



Abraham as father of the believing ones is typical of the spiritual headship of Christ, the inference would seem to be warranted that those who are blessed *in* Christ are also blessed *with* Christ. In other words, the blessing of justification by faith which is only to be had *in* Christ, is also shared *with* Christ, to Whom it belongs in the first instance (*cf.* vv. 16, 19). The true ground of Christian justification is thus contained in the words of Rom. vi. 7 *as applied to Christ Himself*, 'He that died hath been justified from sin.'

To a clear apprehension of the meaning of the verses which follow (10-14) it is essential rightly to interpret the phrase *ἐν νόμῳ* in v. 11. The English translation, 'by the law,' lends itself to the view that there is here an implied contrast between *justification by the law* and *justification by faith*. To this view there are two fatal objections.

(1) St. Paul never elsewhere uses the preposition *ἐν* of the means of justification. He never speaks of being justified *ἐν πίστει*, but either *πίστει* simply (Rom. iii. 28) or *διὰ (τῆς) πίστεως*, or more commonly *ἐκ πίστεως*. And to justification *ἐκ πίστεως* he opposes justification *ἐξ ἔργων νόμου*, as in ii. 16. Accordingly had he meant to speak of justification by the law in the present passage he would almost certainly not have used the preposition *ἐν*, but either the simple dative, or *διὰ* (*cf.* ii. 21), or more probably *ἐκ*. For though he never speaks of being justified *ἐκ νόμου* he uses expressions strictly analogous, as in v. 21 of this chapter, 'verily the righteousness should have been 'of the law' (*ἐκ νόμου*); and with this may be compared Phil. iii. 9, 'a righteousness of mine own which is of the law' (*ἐμὴν δικαιοσύνην τὴν ἐκ*



νόμου). As to this last verse it is worth while to notice that only three verses before (v. 6) we actually have the expression *δικαιοσύνην τὴν ἐν νόμῳ*, and that the revisers have here retained the natural translation, 'the righteousness which is *in* the law,' the reason, no doubt, being that this expression does not necessarily involve that conception of the law as a spiritual sphere which was familiar to St. Paul, but apparently not to them.

(2) The reason St. Paul gives in verse 12 for his statement that no one is justified *ἐν νόμῳ* is that 'the law is not of faith.' Thus the implied contrast to *νόμῳ* in v. 11 is not faith itself, but that which is *of* faith, or characterized by faith. This is consistent with the theory that *νόμος* is here viewed as a hypothetical *sphere* of justification, but quite inconsistent with that which makes it a hypothetical *means*. The true means, according to St. Paul, is faith itself, not anything which is 'of faith.' His argument here is that there is no justification in the law because 'the just shall live by faith,' and the life *in* the law is not the life of faith.

Once let the true force of the negative statement in v. 11 be grasped, and the positive statement antithetical to it becomes obvious. It is that implied in v. 14, 'that the blessing of Abraham might come to the nations *in Christ Jesus*.' And the antithesis derives its full force from the identification of the blessing of Abraham with *justification* in v. 8. Thus *δικαιοῦνται* in v. 11 strongly implies *εὐλογεῖται*, and the whole passage is instinct with a single idea. The contrast between those 'blessed with believing Abraham' (v. 9) and those under the curse of the

law (v. 10) is the theme throughout. Those who are 'of the works of the law' (v. 10) are the same as 'those *in* the law' (τοῖς ἐν τῷ νόμῳ) of Rom. iii. 19. The law is thus the sphere of the curse in which the blessing is not to be found (οὐδεὶς δικαιούται, v. 11). St. Paul, having thus cleared the ground, proceeds to set forth Christ as the sphere of blessing (v. 14), leading up to this thought by first presenting Him as the Redeemer from the curse.

And this introduction of the thought of redemption is no mere embellishment. The very idea of redemption in St. Paul is the stooping to those in a lower sphere in order to raise them out of it. The being made a curse was essential to the work of redemption from the curse, just as the being made sin (II. Cor. v. 21) was essential to the work of redemption from sin. So He was 'made under the law, to redeem them that were under the law' (iv. 4, 5). The same thought is somewhat differently expressed in Heb. ii. 14-18, especially vv. 16-18. 'For verily he layeth not hold on angels, but he layeth hold on the seed of Abraham. *Wherefore* it behoved him in all things *to be made like unto* his brethren. . . . For in that he himself hath suffered being tempted he is able to succour them that are tempted.' Here we have clearly expressed what is only implied in St. Paul, that the power to help those in a lower sphere depends on the passing through that sphere; and the expression 'layeth hold' (ἐπιλαμβάνεται) is the exact interpretation of St. Paul's thought. The work of the Redeemer was thus not merely to win a new sphere of blessing for man, but first to attain that sphere from His brethren's lower standpoint, and then to

draw them after Him by spiritual contact. In the work of redemption He was first the Leader and, so to speak, the Explorer (*cf.* Heb. ix. 12, *αἰωνίαν λύτρωσιν εὐράμενος*, where it is perhaps not altogether fanciful to see a suggestion of this thought), then both the Goal and the attracting Force. St. Paul is not satisfied with presenting Christ merely as Him 'in Whom we have the redemption' (Eph. i. 7). He also declares that He '*was made* redemption.' (*ἐγενήθη ἀπολύτρωσις*, I. Cor. i. 30). And the same is true not merely of redemption, but of 'wisdom and righteousness and sanctification,' and, as St. Paul doubtless thought, of every grace in Him. For St. Paul the work and the Worker are One. All that Christ wrought for man is summed up in what He made out of man's nature in Himself. What man has *in* Christ, call it redemption, call it justification, or call it the faith which justifies, is simply the Life that Christ *is*; and the Life that He *is* is the Life that He *became* by taking human life in its sin and in its curse and raising it to its highest truth and blessedness by the power of an unfailing faith.

So He became the blessing by first becoming the curse. The curse of the law was bound up with His earthly life. He incurred it repeatedly in connection with the Sabbath, to say nothing of such matters as eating with unwashed hands. For the law under which he lived was the law as then interpreted. The only power that could break through that curse, backed as it was by the unanimous voice of the religious teaching of His time, was the faith which saw the Father where others saw only the taskmaster. That faith came to a climax where the curse came to

a climax, on the tree. There the curse was conquered and the full redemption from it effected. So He passed out of the sphere of cursing and became the sphere of blessing to man. So having been lifted up from the earth He leads and draws all men unto Himself.

And this brings us to the last point that needs to be noticed in this passage, the meaning of its concluding words *διὰ τῆς πίστεως* (v. 14). The importance of the definite article in this phrase can hardly be over-estimated. With the exception of i. 23, where *τὴν πίστιν* is followed by a relative, this is the first use of *πίστις* with the article in this epistle, but from this point we have it repeated again and again. (Cf. vv. 23, 25, 26.) Further, a comparison of v. 14 with v. 22 shews quite clearly that 'the faith' of the former is the same as *πίστις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ* of the latter. We are thus faced once more by the constantly recurring question as to the meaning of the genitive in the latter expression. Is it man's faith *in* Jesus Christ or is it the faith which *belongs to* Jesus Christ? What seems absolutely certain from a comparison of the two verses is that 'the faith' of v. 14 is either the one or the other; it cannot mean faith generally. Thus in v. 14 there are stated two conditions of the reception of the blessing: (1) It is to be had in Christ Jesus. (2) It is to be had either through man's faith in Jesus Christ or through Jesus Christ's faith, and it is necessary definitely to choose one of these alternatives. Let us first examine the view that St. Paul meant man's faith in Jesus Christ.

Now the *πίστις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ* of v. 22 is clearly the same, not only with 'the faith' of v. 14, but also

with '*the faith*' of the following verses, 23, 25 and 26. Accordingly it is a faith which *came* and *was revealed* (v. 23). On the hypothesis, then, under consideration man's faith in Jesus Christ must have been something previously unknown to him which came to him from without. But if the distinguishing characteristic of the faith of which St. Paul thus speaks merely consisted in its direction toward a new Object, his language is surely unnatural. The revelation of such a faith cannot be the revelation of anything already in man; the words therefore can only mean the revelation of Jesus Christ as the proper Object of man's faith. But such a revelation can no more fitly be described as the revelation of faith in Jesus Christ than can the revelation of God's will contained in the law be described as the revelation of obedience to God's will. The special characteristic of a faith which itself *comes* and *is revealed* must be something intrinsic. Most people will agree that the revelation of the faith that characterized the first Christians was the revelation of a new *power*. Did the new intensity spring from its own activity directed toward Christ, or was it not rather something with which Christ Himself had endowed it, and which came from Him to it?

Of the two conditions of the reception of the promise laid down in v. 14 the first, the being '*in Christ*' is the all-sufficient one. This is clear from v. 29 and is not likely to be called in question. But if this be so the other condition, '*through the faith,*' must necessarily be something involved in being '*in Christ.*' Unless therefore it is a faith characteristic of the life in Christ it must be the means of entry into

that life. In the latter case the words as they stand have something of the character of an anti-climax. Why should St. Paul end by bringing back his readers to a spiritual activity of their own?

Here we seem to be definitely faced with a choice between two alternatives. Is the being in Christ the logical antecedent of faith, or is faith the logical antecedent of being in Christ? The close connection between the two can hardly be explained on any third supposition. On this point it may here suffice to make two observations.

(1) The idea that spiritual union with a person can result in the imparting of that person's faith as his spiritual characteristic to one thus united to him is intelligible, whereas the idea that the mere believing in a person can result in spiritual union with him is not. The latter statement may sound harsh to some, and the inference that because unintelligible it is untrue may doubtless be questioned, but can the mere fact of its unintelligibility be questioned?

(2) St. Paul's constant association of the entry into union with Christ with the sacrament of baptism is hardly reconcileable with the idea that a mere act of faith is sufficient to effect that union, whereas it is perfectly consistent with the witness of other New Testament writers to a faith that is *by Christ* (Acts iii. 16, I. Pet. i. 21).

It is accordingly here maintained that the words 'through the faith' in v. 14 must naturally be taken to refer to a faith communicated by Christ to man rather than a faith directed by man toward Christ, and that consequently the 'faith of Jesus Christ' in v. 22, which is clearly the same, is the faith which is



the human characteristic of Jesus Christ and of the life imparted by Him. With this clearly agrees the statement in v. 24 that the law was our *‘παιδαγωγὸς* unto Christ that we might be justified by faith.’ The progress is not through faith to Christ, but through Christ to faith, and ‘the faith’ is ‘the faith which is by him’ of St. Peter. St. Paul’s meaning in v. 14 would therefore seem to be that in Christ we lay hold on justification because in Him we lay hold on the faith which justifies. In Him we receive the blessing through the faith which won it for us. What we have in Him we have by His faith, not by our own. Thus *διὰ τῆς πίστεως* in this verse exactly corresponds to *διὰ τῆς πίστεως αὐτοῦ* in Eph. iii. 12, ‘*in whom we have boldness and access in confidence by his faith.*’

The next six verses (15-20) contain one of the most difficult passages in St. Paul’s writings, and before dealing with it, it may be well to make perfectly clear what is here aimed at. The primary object of these pages is to answer the question, What is St. Paul’s teaching on sin and justification? The further question, Is that teaching true? though extremely important, is not here discussed. But in order to avoid possible misapprehension the point of view here adopted with regard to this latter question shall be simply stated without being argued. St. Paul’s christology, with which his doctrine of justification is closely bound up, is here regarded as absolutely true. By his christology is meant his theory of the living Christ in His living relation to man, but not his view of the relation of Christ to Old Testament history. If close attention is paid to St. Paul’s



reasoning from the Old Testament it is not because that reasoning is regarded as necessarily valid, but merely because of the light it throws on his *conception* of that Christ Who was to him a living spiritual reality.

The first point to be determined in the passage now to be considered is the sense in which St. Paul insists on the singular *σπέρματι* as applying to Christ in v. 16. Does he use the name *Christ* in its collective sense, as in I. Cor. xii. 12, or in its strictly personal sense, or in both? To argue, as Ellicott does, against the collective sense being included at all on the ground of the emphasis laid on the use of the singular does not seem altogether satisfactory. The unity of the Christian *body* is certainly a point which St. Paul did wish to emphasize in this very connection, as vv. 28, 29 plainly shew. What really makes it impossible to take the collective sense *as the primary* one in v. 16 is the reference to the *coming* of 'the seed to whom the promise hath been made' in v. 19. St. Paul is clearly insisting on a single person as the first recipient of the promise, and this brings us to the great difficulty of vv. 19, 20, for it is at this point that the argument about the *σπέρμα* is taken up again. The difficulty centres in the statement, *ὁ δὲ μεσίτης ἑνὸς οὐκ ἔστιν*, implying that there is no such thing as a mediator of *one*. Unless St. Paul is here merely uttering the platitude that a mediator implies two parties, which does not appear to contain the germ of an intelligible argument, it would seem to be necessary to take these words as indicating that a mediator is superfluous except in transactions which involve a multitude on both sides.

Accordingly the natural interpretation of the words as they stand seems to be this. The law was ordained by *angels* through the ministration of a mediator. The angels were the *actual* givers of it. Had it been *God's* gift, Who is *One*, the mediator would not have been necessary. In the absence of any other really intelligible explanation the writer must confess to having thought for a long time that this was actually St. Paul's meaning. But apart from the objection to this view which may be urged on the ground of the use of the preposition *διὰ* with *ἀγγέλων*, this way of decrying the law would seem to be quite inconsistent with St. Paul's attitude in the closely related epistle to the Romans, where he distinctly calls it 'the law of God' (Rom. vii. 22); and moreover in the present passage he seems to wish to exclude any inference really derogatory to the law and to insist on its divine purpose (vv. 19, 21). The reference to the angels in v. 19 does not therefore appear to be any more depreciatory than the similar reference in St. Stephen's speech (Acts vii. 53).

Accordingly another suggestion is here put forth for what it is worth. May not the words *ὁ δὲ θεὸς εἰς ἑστίν* be a very early marginal comment which has found its way into the text, and which originated with some one who took the view of the meaning propounded above? On this hypothesis St. Paul's argument ended with the statement that 'a mediator is not of one.' His commentator, misled by the mention of the angels, saw in this statement a reference to the unity of the *Giver* of the promise, whereas its real point lay in its application to the *Receiver*, the Seed Whose unity had before been so emphati-

cally asserted, and to Whose coming reference is made in the immediate context. What St. Paul in fact had in his mind was not *ὁ δὲ θεὸς εἰς ἐστίν*, but *τὸ δὲ σπέρμα ἐν ἐστίν*.

As the text stands the explanatory formula *τοῦτο δὲ λέγω* (v. 17) immediately following the emphatic assertion of the unity of the Seed, seems to promise a development of the thought for which we look in vain. The mere reference to the singular *σπέρματι*, strained as it is, is left as it were suspended in the air. St. Paul only develops the thought of v. 15 immediately preceding, and the reference to the unity of the Seed in v. 16 appears to be an unintelligible interruption in the train of thought. According to the proposed emendation the promised development of v. 16 is given in vv. 19, 20, just as that of v. 15 is given in v. 17. St. Paul leads back to the thought of the Seed as that to the coming of which the law looked forward, and the mediation involved in the giving of the law is asserted to be inconsistent with the unity of that Seed. It stamped the law with the character of a gift to many, whereas the promise was due to a single Seed. Thus the words *ὁ δὲ μεσίτης ἐνὸς οὐκ ἔστιν* would refer back to the expression *ὥς ἐφ' ἐνὸς* in v. 16.

If it be objected, Why should St. Paul take such a roundabout way of insisting on the obvious fact of the multiplicity of the recipients of the law? it may be replied that he wished to emphasize the contrast between the merely mediatorial reception of the law by Moses, and that reception of the promise by Christ which was more than mediatorial. St. Paul is leading up to the statement in v. 22, 'that the promise by

(ἐκ) the faith of Jesus Christ might be given to them that believe.' The use of the preposition ἐκ here is noteworthy. The full justification of man *originated* in the perfect faith of Jesus Christ, though it was also *through* (διὰ) that faith that we receive it (v. 14). It was something won by Him and received in His Own right, something bestowed *by* Him as His Own gift and not *merely* through Him, and His reception of the promise thus differs from that of the law by Moses, who merely received living oracles to give unto us (Acts vii. 38).

To this contrast between Moses and Christ that in Heb. iii. 2, 3 is to a certain extent parallel. The English translation, indeed, of v. 3, which takes τοῦ οἴκου as depending on the comparative πλείονα seems absolutely unintelligible. What the writer appears to have meant is that the house owed more honour to its founder than to one who was merely a servant in it, however faithful. To take τιμὴν τοῦ οἴκου as the honour rendered by the house may seem awkward, but it is surely better than to translate τοῦ οἴκου in a way which suggests the parallelism of the relation of the son to the servant with that of the builder to the house. And this contrast of the θεράπων and the κατασκευαστῆς is more or less latent in the passage in Galatians. Moses as mediator was dispensing what he had received to give. Christ bestows on His Own household the grace received by Him in His Own filial right, and which really constructs and furnishes (κατασκευάζει) the house.

It is not pretended that the explanation above suggested of Gal. iii. 19, 20 is satisfactory. What is claimed for it is merely (1) that it is intelligible, and

(2) that to a certain extent it supplies that development of the argument from the singular *σπέρματι* in v. 16 which is demanded alike by the bald and strained character of the statement and by the explanatory formula *τοῦτο δὲ λέγω* immediately following. But in passing from the consideration of the possible connection of St. Paul's thought to that of its actual significance we enter upon surer ground. If his argument for the unity of the recipient of the promise seem strained almost to the breaking point, this only serves to emphasize the importance which he evidently attached to the exclusive sense in which he regarded Christ as the receiver of the promise,—a promise which he clearly identified with justification by faith (v. 8). From this presentment of Christ as the single seed of Abraham two inferences are here drawn.

(1) Christ's reception of the blessing of justification by faith was not, according to St. Paul, purely mediatorial. This inference would of course be strengthened were the conjecture above given as to the interpretation of the whole passage to be accepted as correct. But it certainly does not depend on the truth of that conjecture. No possible interpretation of St. Paul's argument as to the nature of a mediator can allow of the supposition that Christ received the promise in a mediatorial capacity, even were it granted that such a supposition does not render nugatory the emphasis laid on the unity of the receiver. The blessing that Christ received He received primarily in His Own right, and if justification was His *right* it was also His *need*. To be justified from sin was *man's* need, and to exhibit that need supplied

in Himself was the object with which He submitted to human conditions and bore human sin.

(2) If St. Paul regarded Christ as *κατ' ἐξοχὴν* the seed of Abraham he must necessarily have regarded Him also as *κατ' ἐξοχὴν ὁ ἐκ πίστεως*. For it was certainly in the highest spiritual sense that he regarded Christ as the *one* seed that received the promise, and the spiritual characteristic of a son of Abraham is to be *ἐκ πίστεως* (v. 7). Thus faith is not merely the common characteristic of those who are 'sons of God in Christ' (v. 26), but is the personal characteristic of Christ Himself communicated to His members.

The parallel between Abraham and his seed as conceived by St. Paul has a most important bearing on the interpretation of the words *διὰ τῆς πίστεως* in v. 14. If the argument already adduced on this point seem too involved to be entirely satisfactory the conclusion reached can now be shewn to harmonize perfectly with St. Paul's view of the relation of Christ to Abraham. With the words of v. 16, 'To Abraham and his seed were the promises made,' compare those of Rom. iv. 13, 'For the promise, that he should be the heir of the world, was not to Abraham, or to his seed, through the law, but through the righteousness of faith.' Through the righteousness of *whose* faith? In the case of Abraham there can be but one answer. It was his own faith that won that justification which St. Paul identifies with the promised blessing (Gal. iii. 8). But by the righteousness of whose faith did the promise come to Abraham's seed, 'who is Christ?' Clearly either it came by the righteousness of *Christ's own*

faith, or the promise was won by the righteousness of Abraham's faith both for himself and for his seed. If the latter, then Abraham and not Christ is the real saviour of the world.

To this last statement some such reply as the following may be anticipated. 'The promise which came to Abraham through his faith was still only the free gift of God, not the reward of merit. The fact that God rewarded his faith with the free gift of the promise does not entitle him to be called the saviour.' Against this the following considerations may be urged.

(1) The argument proves too much. The point is that according to St. Paul's statement in Rom. iv. 13 the promise came both to Abraham and to his seed *through the same means*. Accordingly if the argument in question would invalidate Abraham's title to be called the saviour of the world it must also be held to invalidate that of Christ.

(2) St. Paul does not say that the promise came through *faith*, but through *the righteousness of faith*. Doubtless *for him* the two statements are identical, but this is only another way of saying that he identified faith and righteousness in a way in which his modern professed disciples refuse to identify them. According to St. Paul Abraham received the promise through his own *righteousness*, reckoned as such by God Himself. Would the modern protestant speak in this way?

The basis of the argument here controverted is the theological figment that faith is not meritorious. Let us weigh that figment against St. Paul's own words in the very beginning of his disquisition on



Abraham and his faith in Rom. iv. 'Now to him that worketh the reward (*μισθός*) is not reckoned by way of grace, but by way of debt. But to him that worketh not, but believeth on him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is reckoned for righteousness' (Rom. iv. 4, 5). Do not these words clearly indicate that *reward* (*μισθός*, not *merely δωρεά, free gift*) can be reckoned by way of grace as well as by way of debt, and that without ceasing to be *reward*? Of course the word *μισθός, pay*, is really much stronger than *reward*, though St. Paul does not hesitate to apply it to the reward of the Christian worker (I. Cor. iii. 14), and though the looking to this *μισθός* is reckoned by the author of the epistle to the Hebrews as a mark of faith (Heb. xi. 26 ἀπέβλεπε γὰρ εἰς τὴν μισθαποδοσίαν). What the word *reward* implies, and what the word *μισθός* implies more strongly, is that the free gift is not bestowed arbitrarily, but has a distinct reference to something in the recipient which the giver appreciates. If that which God appreciates is not meritorious in His sight on what grounds do we speak of the merits of Christ?

The conclusion to which all that has here been urged points is briefly this. St. Paul regarded the promise as coming both to Abraham and to his 'seed who is Christ' through the meritorious righteousness of faith. Accordingly unless he is to be taken as implying that the salvation of the world was really due to Abraham, the promise must in his view have been received by Christ through the meritorious righteousness of *His Own* faith. Therefore when he says in Gal. iii. 14, 'that the blessing of Abraham might come to the nations in Christ Jesus, that we

might receive the promise of the Spirit through the faith,' the last words 'through the faith' may naturally be taken to bear the meaning, 'through the meritorious righteousness of the faith of Christ.'

It is perhaps hardly necessary to point out that in St. Paul's view Christ must still be regarded as retaining in a sense His exclusive character as the receiver of the promise. He alone has received that full blessing of justification which is its absolute fulfilment. For those who are being 'made the righteousness of God in him' the promise remains a promise, though confirmed by the ἀρράβων of the Spirit. Hence St. Paul regards *our* complete justification as still a *hope* (Gal. v. 5, *cf.* Rom. viii. 24, 25).

It is not necessary to add anything here to what has already been said as to the translation of τῶν παραβάσεων χάριν in v. 19; but the latter part of the verse, 'until the seed should come to whom the promise hath been made' should be read in connection with v. 23. Both these verses treat the law as a preparatory dispensation looking forward to something else. In the one that something else is described as 'the faith to be revealed' (τὴν μέλλουσαν πίστιν ἀποκαλυφθῆναι). In the other it is the coming of 'the seed to whom the promise hath been made,' *i.e.* Christ in the most exclusive personal sense. St. Paul would thus appear to *identify* 'the faith' with the Person of Christ. The expression used by Ignatius (ad Smyrnæos X. ad fin.) ἡ τελεία πίστις, Ἰησοῦς Χριστός, though not apparently intended to convey this meaning, is one which might almost have been used in the highest sense by St. Paul himself.

On the remainder of this great passage (iii. 21—iv. 9) comparatively little need be said, its connection with what has preceded having necessitated a certain amount of anticipatory comment. The parallelism of v. 22 with Rom. iii. 22 may be noticed as tending to shew the impossibility of making any real distinction between the prepositions *ἐκ* and *διὰ* as used by St. Paul with *πίστεως*. At the same time if the genitive *Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ* be taken subjectively the theological objection to taking *ἐκ* as expressing *origin* vanishes.

The expression *ἐκ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ* is the last of a series of parallel expressions which have come under our notice. We have in the epistle to the Romans *διὰ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ* (iii. 22) and *ἐκ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ* (iii. 26). In this epistle to the Galatians we have *διὰ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ* and *ἐκ πίστεως Χριστοῦ* (ii. 16), *ἐν πίστει . . . τῇ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ* (ii. 20); as well as the present verse (iii. 22). In the epistle to the Ephesians we have *διὰ τῆς πίστεως αὐτοῦ* (iii. 12), and in that to the Philippians *διὰ πίστεως Χριστοῦ* (iii. 9). With the exception of Eph. iii. 12 all these occur in passages the bearing of which on *justification* is obvious. On the other hand we have *διὰ τῆς πίστεως ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ* in Gal. iii. 26, of which all that need be said is that it is *grammatically* possible to take the words together as meaning 'by faith in Jesus Christ,' though the context (vv. 27, 28) simply demands the taking of the words *ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ* as *co-ordinate* with *διὰ τῆς πίστεως*. Further we have *τῆς εἰς Χριστὸν πίστεως* in Col. ii. 5, where there is no reference whatever to justification. In all the above

passages which bear on justification reasons have been given for taking the genitive after *πίστις* as *subjective*. It only remains to notice the *cumulative* evidence of the passages to the truth of that interpretation. All the above expressions which occur in passages bearing on justification are instances of *πίστις with the genitive*. If St. Paul meant these genitives to be taken subjectively all is perfectly intelligible; he has used the only expression open to him. But if he really meant the genitive to be taken objectively we are compelled to ask, Why has he deliberately and persistently chosen that mode of expressing his meaning which most readily lent itself to an entirely different interpretation?

But it is the assertion in the former part of this 22nd verse which has the most important bearing on what follows. With the statement, 'The scripture shut up all under sin,' should be compared that in Rom. iii. 9, 'For we before laid to the charge of both Jews and Greeks that they are all under sin.' Gal. iii. 22 is in fact a concise summary of the whole passage, Rom. iii. 9-24. The underlying thought in both passages is that the real effect of the law was to place Gentile and Jew on the same level, not to exalt the one above the other. It accomplished this by making transgression to abound (Gal. iii. 19, *cf.* Rom. v. 20), *i.e.*, by bringing sin, the great levelling fact in human nature, into clear knowledge (*cf.* Rom. iii. 20). Accordingly St. Paul in what follows not only asserts the abolition of the racial distinction *in Christ* (v. 28), but clearly implies the practical identity of the spiritual status of Jew and Gentile *in pre-Christian times*. He clearly identifies his own

original condition with that of the heathen Galatians as one of 'bondage under the elements of the world' (iv. 3), and he accordingly distinctly treats Judaizing as a *going back* on their part to those 'weak and beggarly elements to which they desired to be *again* in bondage (iv. 8, 9). Judaism with its knowledge of sin is thus placed on precisely the same level as heathenism with its ignorance of God. (Cf. Rom. iii. 23, 'There is no difference, for *all sinned* and come short of the glory of God.') Both alike were the 'old things' that had passed away (II. Cor. v. 17). The Christian standpoint was so infinitely above both that viewed from it the distinction between them vanished.

The metaphor implied in *συνέκλεισεν* is strikingly pressed home in the following verse (23), which gives a vivid picture of the Jews under the law as waiting, shut up and under guard, for the faith that was to be revealed. The verse is important, not merely from its bearing on the present passage, but as suggesting the true interpretation of the allegory of the sheepfold in St. John x. 1-10, on which a digression at this point will perhaps be condoned.

The allegory in question must obviously not be confounded with that of the Good Shepherd immediately following. Our Lord is 'the *Door* of the sheep' (v. 9), and this principle of interpretation must be consistently carried out. The picture set before us is that of an enclosure with solid walls containing sheep belonging to different shepherds (v. 3), 'shut up' and guarded by a doorkeeper (*θυρωρός*, cf. *ἐφρουρούμεθα*, Gal. iii. 23). The subject of the allegory is simply the *leading out* of these sheep from

the fold to the pasture. The unfortunate expression 'shall go in and out' in the authorized version (v. 9) tends to obscure this fact and to suggest a *return* to the fold. The allegory, on the contrary, ends with the leading out and finding pasture.

With the key supplied by St. Paul the interpretation is fairly obvious. The sheep in the fold are the Jews under the law, kept together by the mere dead walls of the legal ordinances, in a condition of relative safety, but waiting to be led out to the pasture. Before the coming of Christ the door was not open and the way out was not revealed. A very unnecessary difficulty has been made about v. 8, 'All that came before me are thieves and robbers.' It obviously means all who came *to take the sheep out of the fold* (cf. v. 1) before the true way out was revealed. It refers to men like Antiochus Epiphanes, who sought to break down the barriers of the Jewish law and rob the nation of that *separateness* which was as yet their only true safety. Such came only to steal and kill and destroy. But the door having at last been revealed the true shepherds could enter in by it and each lead out the sheep he had the special power to lead. The ποιμήν of v. 2 is obviously not Christ Himself Who is the Door, but one who comes in the power of His Name and Spirit.

The only real difficulty in the interpretation is in the word σωθήσεται (v. 9). 'By me if any man enter in he shall be saved, and shall enter and come forth and find pasture.' The entering the fold, and the coming forth again (with the sheep) present no difficulty, but the expression 'shall be saved' seems to apply to the sheep rather than the shepherd.

We have, however, in I. Cor. iii. 12-15 precisely the same thought under quite different imagery. Ministerial success is there described as building with materials which will stand the test of fire, and ministerial failure as work which will not stand the same test. The difference between success and failure involves the receipt or loss of a reward, but in the case of the man who fails it is added, 'yet he himself shall be saved' (σωθήσεται, v. 15). Salvation is thus set forth by St. Paul as a sort of minimum reward of ministerial *work*. The reward of ministerial *success* is something over and above this. If this principle of interpretation may be applied to St. John x. 9 the words σωθήσεται καὶ εἰσελεύσεται, κ.τ.λ. will indicate a progressive scale of ministerial merit. The true shepherds who enter in by the door answer to those who build on the one foundation (I. Cor. iii. 11). This in itself involves salvation apart from all question of the success or failure of the work. On the other hand the thief who 'climbs up some other way' and who comes to destroy answers to the destroyer of God's temple whom God will destroy (I. Cor. iii. 17).

Whatever difficulty there may be in this interpretation the difficulty of applying the words εἰσελεύσεται, καὶ ἐξελεύσεται to any other than the shepherd seems far greater. To make them refer to anything else than vv. 2, 3, seems to destroy the whole connection of thought. Otherwise they might be held to convey two different aspects of the same act, the *going out* of the fold being an *entry into* Christ. In any case the idea of going 'in and out' of the fold must be rejected as nugatory.



The parallelism between the allegory in St. John and the metaphor in Gal. iii. 23 is further borne out by a consideration of the context of both passages. Thus with St. John x. 10, 'I came that they might have life,' may be compared Gal. iii. 21, 'For if a law had been given that could quicken, verily the righteousness should have been of the law,' words which immediately precede the introduction of the metaphor in *συνέκλεισεν*. Much more striking, however, is the reference to the 'other sheep who are not of this fold' and to the resulting *unity* when all have been brought out to form one flock (St. John x. 16). We have here exactly St. Paul's idea of Jew and gentile in their separation as equally imprisoned in folds, 'in bondage under the elements of the world,' tied down by the mere external restrictions of dead observances, and of Jew and Gentile alike becoming *one* in Christ, where 'there is neither Jew nor Greek, neither bond nor free, neither male nor female; for all . . . are one in Christ Jesus' (Gal. iii. 28). It is perhaps hardly necessary to refer to St. John xi. 51, 52, 'that Jesus should die for the nation, and not for the nation only, but that also he should gather together into one the children of God that were scattered abroad.' These words, however, referring as they do to the gentiles as 'the children of God,' not only recall the previous reference to the 'other sheep,' but answer to the thought of Gal. iv. 1-7, in which the condition of Jew and gentile alike is represented as that of a *son* who has not yet received the *υιοθεσία*, but 'differeth nothing from a slave' (iv. 1).

The great difference between the presentation of

the thought in St. Paul and in St. John is that in the former the revelation for which those imprisoned are waiting is that of 'the faith,' in the latter that of Christ Himself as the Door. But, as has already been pointed out, St. Paul practically identifies the *coming* of the faith with the *coming* of Christ (Gal. iii. 19, 23). In the conception of 'the faith' as the principle of the communicated life of Christ both presentations are harmonized.

It need hardly be added that the old falsification of St. John x. 16 contained in the words, 'There shall be one *fold* and one shepherd,' makes havoc of both the preceding allegories. The 'unum ovile' of the Vulgate is one of the most glaring frauds that has ever been perpetrated by a mistranslator.

It is significant that neither Ellicott nor Lightfoot comment on the strangeness, from their point of view, of the references to the *coming* and *revelation* of faith in vv. 23, 25. The explanation can hardly be that they saw no difficulty.

The revisers' translation of v. 28, 'There can be neither Jew nor Greek, &c.,' is a signal instance of the ineptitude of mere scholars. It probably commended itself to them as being grammatically unassailable, and at the same time what no ordinary person would be likely to think of. The translation skilfully conceals the plain and simple meaning of *ἐν* which the context makes so extremely prominent, *εἰς Χριστὸν ἐβαπτίσθητε, Χριστὸν ἐνεδύσασθε*, 'were baptized into Christ,' 'clothed yourselves in Christ' (v. 27), and again 'for ye are all one in Christ Jesus' (v. 28). How any one can help seeing that the verse means 'In Him there is neither Jew, &c.,' is some-

what difficult to understand. Yet Ellicott, who is compelled to see the literal force of *ἐν*, actually suggests, 'There is *among (such)*'; (the italics are mine). Of course, it is quite tenable and even probable that the word *ἐν* conveys the sense the revisers attach to it *in addition to* its plain literal meaning. Had they adopted Lightfoot's suggestion, 'There is no room for,' they might have conveyed this without altogether sacrificing the primary and obvious sense. But if it be impossible satisfactorily to give the full force of the word in English there ought to be no question as to what shade of meaning should be brought out. 'There is not in Him' is *certainly* the meaning; 'there cannot be in Him' is very likely the *full* meaning; 'there cannot be' is nonsense, unless indeed the word *there* be given an emphasis which the phrase does not naturally suggest.

The train of thought in iv. 1-7 is clearly supplementary to that in iii. 23-26. The point to which special attention must here be directed is the different way in which the emancipation of the infant heir is set forth in the two passages. In the former this is effected by *the coming of the faith*; in the latter, by the *sending of the Spirit of the Son* into the heart (iv. 6). These two things are clearly the same. The Spirit of His Son, 'crying Abba, Father,' is the 'Spirit of faith' of II. Cor. iv. 13, and the faith that came and was revealed is 'the faith of the Son of God' (ii. 20). The reference to *redemption* in vv. 4 and 5 makes this conclusion doubly sure. Just as the redemption was first effected by the Redeemer stooping to the condition of the redeemed, so it is ever fulfilling itself by the redeemed rising to the condi-

tion of the Redeemer. Now to set forth the Redeemer as the Object on Whom the faith of the redeemed is to fasten is to emphasize in the strongest possible manner the *distinction* between the two. Faith *in* the Son is not and cannot be *for* St. Paul the same thing as the Spirit of the Son. It can only become the same thing in the light of such expressions as 'I and my Father are one'; 'he that believeth on me believeth not on me but on him that sent me' (St. John x. 29; xii. 44). Now, however consistent St. Paul's statements are with these, they are altogether different in form and character. By him the unity of the Son with the 'many sons' (Heb. ii. 10) is far more strongly emphasized than that of the Son with the Father. For him the redeemed and the Redeemer are one; one in the conditions of human life; one in the 'fight of faith,' and one in the faith that wins it. To substitute for the living power of the Redeemer's faith a faith which merely rests on the Redeemer and His work is to make Our Lord's example an unreality and His work a mere enigma. What He won *for* man was what He won *in* man by the faith of man, and what man must win in Him by the same faith. To describe this faith as faith in Himself is to abandon St. Paul's point of view altogether. The cry of *His* Spirit is still 'Abba, Father.'

## CONCLUSION.

St. Paul's conception of 'justification of life' was probably the original germ of all his teaching on the subject, even of that view of sin as something anterior to, and deeper than, transgression which he uses to enforce it. And this conception is really inconsistent with any view of justification which makes it otherwise than logically separable from any other grace in Christ. For St. Paul Christ 'became (ἐγένηθη) to us wisdom, and righteousness, and sanctification, and redemption' (I. Cor. i. 30), and in His communicated life alone can we lay hold on 'the manifold grace of God.'

The aim of the present work has been to vindicate for his doctrine of justification its rightful character as the setting forth of a single aspect of that mystic life shared with Christ which is the central point of his teaching. In attempting to carry out this aim it has been necessary to run counter to certain views which have been sincerely held and deeply prized by many, and which accordingly none but the most superficial would dismiss offhand as mere falsehoods. And if the treatment accorded to such views in the foregoing pages may appear too hard and unsympathetic the only defence here urged is that, however sacred religious convictions may be, theological formulæ *must* be brought to the logical test. To say

that those who hold and prize them are in error is a one-sided statement. To say that error mingles with their truth is only to accuse them of being human. And if the views here enunciated should be found to be nearer to those which St. Paul held and tried to express than the views here opposed the hope may be entertained that the suggestion of a fuller truth may compensate for any excess of destructive criticism which may have marred its expression.

The main point toward which the argument has been directed being so simple, the summing up of the results need not be a long matter. Not the least important of these is that clear differentiation of *sin* and *transgression* which was rendered necessary alike by the deeper conception of man's spiritual need as something which could not be met by the mere remission of guilt, and by the logical objections to that view of justification which tends to resolve it into the balancing of an account. The distinction is one which probably for the most part escapes the English reader of St. Paul, and it may be doubted whether it has yet met with due consideration at the hands of the theologian. Certainly the tendency to look upon *sin* as little more than a generic name for infinitely variable acts of *transgression* is still widely prevalent, and such a view may involve the error of regarding sinful acts as isolated spiritual phenomena rather than as more or less grave symptoms of a single spiritual disease. On the other hand the fact that St. Paul's line of argument necessarily led him to suggest the comparative unimportance of transgression as a development of sin brought about through the revelation of a divine law ought not to

blind us to the fact, which he himself distinctly admits, that that development is itself divinely ordained. After all the deeper conception of sin can only come *through* that primary apprehension of it as transgression which is common to all, and it is better that the initial phase should be accentuated too much than too little. The minutiae of 'questions for self-examination' in some modern books of devotion may seem to savour too much of the old Jewish spirit, and yet they may conduce to a healthier and more promising state of mind than a mere vague conception of sin as a spiritual disease which is too weak to bring its concrete manifestations into distinct consciousness at all.

St. Paul's controversial presentment of this subject was necessarily, perhaps consciously, one-sided, and it may legitimately be doubted whether his own mind was entirely free from that tendency to an undue depreciation of the old standpoint which is so often apparent in those who have experienced in a far less degree the sudden collapse of the whole fabric of their religious convictions. To say this is not to call in question for one moment St. Paul's claim to a revelation, for the revelation claimed by him was entirely positive. He professed to be entrusted with 'the gospel of the uncircumcision' (Gal. ii. 7), and this was none other than that gospel of God's Son (Rom. i. 9), which he had preached from the first (Acts ix. 20), which he had received when God revealed his Son in him (Gal. i. 16), and which involved the truth of universal human sonship. That gospel in its exaltation of our common nature necessarily ran counter to Jewish exclusiveness, and he who was



entrusted with it and had experienced its power almost necessarily saw his old religion shrivel into comparative insignificance. Yet the insufficiency of Judaism was no part of the glad tidings revealed, and the light which illumined the new vista, while it threw into the shade the lesser glory of the past, warranted no denial or depreciation of that glory.

In the first chapter of this book an attempt has been made to shew that St. Paul probably started with a theory of ignorance of sin on the part of the gentiles which subsequent experience could not fail to modify. A natural accompaniment of such a modification would have been a fuller appreciation of the importance of a sense of *transgression*, and consequently of that law whose function it was to produce it. It may in fact be doubted whether 'Paul the aged' was altogether satisfied with his earlier setting forth of the parenthetical character of the law (Rom. v. 20). For it can hardly be questioned that that training of the law to which some of the Jewish converts unduly clung placed them as a whole in a position of spiritual advantage over their gentile brethren. It was surely the comparative absence of the sense of *transgression* which resulted in such disorders as marked the early growth of the church of Corinth.

When St. Paul first found his past swallowed up in the fulness of a new life, though he did not altogether fail to see that it was 'through the law' that he 'died to the law' (Gal. ii. 19), he probably regarded his present as more independent of his past than it actually was. And he was perhaps mistaken in regarding the complete spiritual freedom which he had suddenly realised as something which others might

equally well attain independently of *their* past. While it would be almost blasphemous to say that he pitched his teaching too high it would be an equally grave error to represent that teaching as something to the full height of which it is in the power of anyone to rise at once by merely accepting it. Though we cannot set limits to the power of the grace of God yet we may surely say that if that grace does suddenly raise the careless and the irreligious to a condition in which they can be said to be 'not under the law' St. Paul himself is not an instance of such a miracle. Without the law we should not have had St. Paul or the 51st psalm, and for the same reason. And while we cherish the lofty truth which he realised we may still recognise that what he could forget as 'the things that are behind' is not yet behind *us*, and that even in God's kingdom on earth the attainment of one is but the hope of another. The centuries that have passed since St. Paul have shewn that the law is still a necessary element in the Christian life, and that in multiplying transgressions it still fulfils a divine purpose.

But however onesided may be St. Paul's presentment of the truth this does not detract from the value of the truth itself, rather it may be said that it was the clearness and concentration of his vision that rendered it onesided. The truth to which he bears witness, though his readers often fail to see it, is that transgression, the form under which sin is first known, is itself utterly incommensurate with sin. The mis-translation of I. John iii. 4, ('Sin is the transgression of the law'), has perhaps tended to obscure this point, whereas the right translation rather tends to

bring it into relief. Sin as 'lawlessness' is essentially prior to law and to responsibility simply because the knowledge of law is not congenital. And if lawlessness in the man is something totally different from lawlessness in the infant it still has its roots in the infantile, if not in the fetal life, and this fact will always tend to vitiate human judgment, which cannot take account of those fundamental differences of character for which the individual is not answerable. The fact remains that man is not entirely responsible for the lawlessness that is in him, though he is responsible for his moral attitude towards it both in the present and the past. But the lawlessness dates from a period when no moral attitude was possible. This is true alike in the evolution of the race and in that of the individual. In both it is essentially the lawlessness of the brute, and this only becomes *sin* (*ἁμαρτία*) in the race with that supervening of the Spirit upon the flesh which first made a higher *aim* possible and in so doing created *man*. And this raising of the brute nature involved the *fall* of man. It was the commencement, probably as vaguely defined in the race as is the advent of conscious personality in the child, of that conflict between the flesh and the spirit which culminated in the death and resurrection of Christ. But it was the flesh that was first in possession and which consequently at first prevailed.

The precise way in which St. Paul represented to himself the fall of man is not easy to determine. In Rom. v. 14, he appears to regard Adam as an individual. At the same time as a Hebrew he was fully cognisant of the significance of the name, and in

I. Cor. xv. he seems to use *Adam* and *man* as synonyms (*cf.* vv. 45, 47, where ὁ ἕσχατος Ἀδὰμ corresponds to ὁ δεύτερος ἄνθρωπος). At any rate the personality of the first Adam was not an essential part of his theology, though the idea furnished him with a convenient analogy. Adam was for him nothing more than the head of the human race in its mere physical aspect, the ideal χοῖκὸς ἄνθρωπος. So far was he from indulging in any fancies about a highly spiritual 'state of man before the fall' that the only abnormal characteristic which he appeared to recognize in Adam was his transgression. As merely χοῖκὸς or ψυχικὸς he naturally shared the 'lawlessness' of the brute which became *sin* in his pre-Mosaic descendants, though the two things are logically indistinguishable. The fact that in Adam's case the lawlessness matured into the transgression of a divine command made no real difference to it as transmitted to his descendants, who did not sin after the similitude of that transgression, though the description of human lawlessness as *sin* dates from it as from an abnormal event. What St. Paul apparently failed to see was that the total ignorance of a higher law which made transgression impossible really would have reduced man to the status of the brute.

Yet the conceptions to which he gave somewhat crude expression would seem to have led him to a view of primitive man and of his relation to the brute creation greatly in advance of later theories. If he did not see that an absolute ignorance of *sin* was inconsistent with *human* nature, at least he does appear to have seen that the reign of *sin* in death to which he supposed man to have been at one time unconsciously

subject was a condition shared by the brute, and calling for a redemption which should include both. 'The earnest expectation of the creation waiteth for the revelation of the sons of God. For the creation was made subject to vanity, not willingly, but by reason of him who subjected it, in hope that the creation itself shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption unto the liberty of the glory of the children of God' (Rom. viii. 19-21). The 'bondage of corruption' which oppresses the whole creation touches even the spiritual man on the *body* side (*cf.* v. 23), and is identical with that reign of sin in death which is being brought to naught in him, and though not *called* sin in the case of the brute it sets up a cry there also for a gift of grace analogous to 'justification of life.' The triumph eternally won in man is not merely to embrace the many sons who are being brought to glory, but to spread beyond to those lower forms whose brotherhood was not discerned by St. Francis of Assisi alone, and without whose redemption the bringing to naught of 'the body of sin' would be incomplete. Thus St. Paul, like Isaiah before him, looked in the future for that which men have vainly imagined in the Eden of the past, an Eden which was to him 'of the earth, earthy.' With modern views of man's origin St. Paul would have found himself largely in sympathy if not in entire agreement; at any rate he would not have found them inconsistent with his own view of man's destiny.

Whether St. Paul's differentiation of sin and transgression be the cause or the effect of his doctrine of 'justification of life' the close connection of the two

would seem to be unquestionable. Logically, though probably not historically, the differentiation is the antecedent. So long as sin was identified with transgression it was only natural that the prevailing notion of justification should be forensic. The judicial absolution from guilt, whether apprehended as something to be won by man or as something to be freely bestowed by God, was regarded as the primary need even where a deeper spiritual insight pronounced it not to be the sole need. The petition 'Hide thy face from my sins, and blot out all mine iniquities' took precedence of the other, 'Make me a clean heart, O God, and renew a right spirit within me'; and it was the former that embodied the notion of justification. The craving for pardon as something apart from new life caused it to assume the character of justification of remission rather than 'justification of life.' But St. Paul's conception of sin as something deeper than and incommensurate with, transgression, necessitated a widening of the notion of justification itself. Justification from *sin* involved more than remission of guilt, because sin itself involved more than transgression. St. Paul, in fact, added something to the connotation of the word *justification*. As a grace in the living Christ, communicated with the life of Christ, it was necessarily inseparable in fact from other graces, and the deeper conception of *sin* as *including* transgression, tended to make justification, which had hitherto had a limited reference to the latter, include the larger spiritual need which had been somewhat less closely associated with it. What St. Paul, in fact, included in justification was *redemption* in that partial, inchoate sense in which

the latter is said to be a present possession of the sons of God. Justification is identified by him with 'the promise of the Spirit' (Gal. iii. 8, 14). It is thus inseparable from that *νιοθεσία* which consisted in the sending forth of the Spirit of the Son into our hearts (Gal. iv. 5, 6); and by comparing the use of *νιοθεσία* in Rom. viii. 23 we see that for St. Paul this was the initial stage of the work of *redemption*. Accordingly in Rom. viii. 29, 30 there is no intermediate step between justification and glorification, and the close of Rom. v. strongly suggests that the complete redemption spoken of in Rom. viii. 19-23 is the outcome of 'justification of life.'

It would appear from the foregoing considerations that the sharp distinction sometimes drawn between justification and sanctification would not have been recognized by St. Paul. It belongs, in fact, to what may perhaps be called the Old Testament view of justification as a divine transaction having in itself only an external reference to the person justified. From this point of view pardon and cleansing are two absolutely separable divine acts, and owing to the attributing to St. Paul of a conception of justification which made it consist merely in the non-imputation of sin, this view has persisted. For St. Paul the distinction would be one of those things that are 'done away in Christ.' For him all divine gifts are summed up in the living Christ and are inseparable there. The failure to realize this has resulted not merely in the mapping out, as it were, of 'the manifold grace of God,' but in regarding the several stages of that work of redemption which won it rather as so many separate acts complete in themselves than as develop-



ments in a life which sums up their results in itself. And this has shewn itself more especially in an undue isolation of that great central fact of our religion, the death of Christ.

Once regard the death of Christ as a fact apart from the resurrection and it becomes merely a past event and consequently wholly external. Like other past events it may mediate affect our present, but apart from its influence on those directly concerned in it its immediate and abiding effect could only be in God. Accordingly its result as an isolated fact has been represented as a change in God's attitude toward man. It secured God's pardon, a pardon recorded, as it were, in a book kept by Him, which no doubt opened the way to our receiving further spiritual benefits from Him, but in itself was a transaction wholly external to us. In itself it was a work *for* man, and it led up to a possible work *in* man. For St. Paul, on the other hand, the death of Christ was a work *in* man essentially and from the very first. For him there could be no separation of God's work *for* man from His work *in* man, because for him God's work *for* man was summed up in a life which was His gift *to* man, and it was the life that embodied and carried on the virtue of the death.

The dwelling too exclusively on the death of Christ as something apart from His life has been a fruitful source of error, and one which a study of St. Paul ought to render impossible. Whereas in apostolic times men contemplated the death and resurrection together, and in the light of the whole transaction their faith went straight through Christ to God (I. Peter i. 18-21), in modern times they have often

so fixed their view on the death as something apart by itself that their faith has tended to rest wholly there, sometimes without getting as far even as the living Crucified. And the poverty of such a faith is reflected in the conception formed of the death itself and of the benefit derived from it. In its extreme form this error becomes the doctrine of substitution, according to which the death of Christ was a penalty endured in our stead, and the benefit derived from it is the bare remission of that penalty. The work accomplished was merely *for* man, and its immediate effect was in *God* rather than *in* man. Nothing is here intended to be said of the *actual* faith of those who may hold, or think they hold, this doctrine; but its *logical* result is a faith that does not reach as far as God grasping at a grace that does not reach as far as man. What is important to observe is that the doctrine of substitution is absolutely inconsistent with St. Paul's teaching.

For St. Paul the death of Christ is inseparable from His life, and both are mystically shared by the redeemed. This is abundantly clear from such passages as Rom. vi. 3-11, Gal. ii. 20, the former passage containing a generalization of the personal statement in the latter. How people have imagined that they found the doctrine of substitution in his writings is not so clear. The statement in II. Cor. v. 14, 'If one died for all then all died,' taken apart from its context might suggest it to a superficial reader; but what that text, interpreted with St. Paul's other utterances, really affirms is that Christ is the *Representative* of all and not their substitute. As such His analogue is the first Adam in whom all die

(I. Cor. xv. 22), and as the representative character of the latter is bound up with the fact that he is regarded as transmitting his spiritual status to his descendants, so the representative character of Christ becomes effectual by the power of spiritual generation inherent in His life, or, to use a metaphor equally warranted by scripture, by that power of assimilation which is to accomplish the full work of redemption (*cf.* Phil. iii. 21). It was certainly as such an effectual representative that St. Paul conceived the perfected Christ, and the conception is inconsistent with the notion of substitution. Even the passage quoted (II. Cor. v. 14, 15) bears witness to the close connection of the work *for* man with the work *in* man; 'he died for all, that they which live should not henceforth live unto themselves, but unto him which died for them, and rose again.'

The fact remains that St. Paul did regard Our Lord as a propitiation set forth as such by God (Rom. iii. 25), and his statement on that subject contains the germ of all the sacrificial teaching in the epistle to the Hebrews. Now it is unquestionably possible, taking the two verses Rom. iii. 25, 26 by themselves to read into them the notion of a substituted sin-offering satisfying the requirements of divine justice. But such an interpretation ill accords with the previous description of the righteousness of God therein set forth as something extending 'to all (*εἰς πάντας*) that believe' (v. 22). It makes the sense of the concluding words (v. 26) to be that God is just and yet justifying. His righteousness is exhibited in *exact-ing* the penalty; it has nothing to do with any righteousness *conferred*. The righteousness and the

justification are two opposing principles which the theory of substitution brings into a sort of accord; but the justification so rendered possible is merely the condoning of *transgression*; it is not that 'justification of life' which can alone meet the spiritual requirements of those 'under *sin*.' Probably every one would admit that the more natural interpretation of the words 'just and justifying (*δίκαιον καὶ δικαιοῦντα*)' taken by themselves as applied to God is that which makes Him the Source and Giver of righteousness.

The strong point of the interpretation here combated lies almost entirely in the reference to 'the passing over of sins done before in the forbearance of God' in v. 25, a passing over which is regarded as looking forward to the eventual shewing forth of God's righteousness. It is unquestionably natural to read into this the idea of a sword of Damocles which was eventually to fall, and there is truth in the representation. The all-important question is, Did the sword fall on Our Lord as the substitute or as the representative? And the answer may be given in St. Paul's words, 'God sending his own son in the likeness of the flesh of sin and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh: that the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit' (Rom. viii. 3, 4). Only by giving a false sense to the word *likeness* (*ὁμοιώματι*) can this text be twisted into any sort of conformity with the theory of substitution, and this at the cost of making the whole transaction unreal and theatrical. And even so the theory does not tally with the expressed purpose. If the work done *for* us led up to

a work done *in* us, He *in* Whom the work was done first was not a substitute but a representative, a representative in the first place by being made in our likeness, in 'the flesh of sin,' and in the second place by bringing us into conformity with His likeness by bestowing the life that embodies the death 'unto sin once for all.' (*Cf.* the still stronger statement in II. Cor. v. 21). If the shewing forth of God's righteousness involved a condemnation, that condemnation fell not on our substitute, but on that 'sin in the flesh' which was ours and which He bore, that He might bring it to naught *for* us and then *in* us.

The error of the substitution theory lies to a great extent in viewing the sacrificial aspect of Our Lord's death too exclusively in the light of the sin-offering. In that form of sacrifice the idea of substitution is prominent and is carried out consistently. It is remarkable that it is on this very point that the writer of the epistle to the Hebrews emphasizes the difference between it and the sacrifice of Christ. 'We have an altar whereof they have no right to eat which serve the tabernacle. For the bodies of those beasts whose blood is brought into the sanctuary by the high priest for sin, are burned without the camp' (Heb. xiii. 10, 11). To eat the sin-offering would have been to partake afresh of the sin that had been laid on it. The eating the flesh and the drinking the blood of the Victim are thus a perpetual protest against the notion that He died as our substitute. His death combined the Passover with the sin-offering; it effected redemption and not merely remission; and in its sacrificial aspect it only finds its full expression in the Holy Eucharist.

And it is in the fulness of its sacrificial aspect that Our Lord's death is a *propitiation*. Its propitiatory character lies in the fact that God saw in it not the satisfaction of His justice by the punishment of man's *transgression*, but the complete attainment of His new creation by the condemnation and bringing to naught of *sin*. Here was the complete triumph of the Spirit over the flesh, and by that triumph the second Adam had become a *quicken*ing Spirit; the completed work became a fresh starting-point; it was as a *promise* that the propitiation became available for us. In it Christ became the representative of man at his highest, and His representation was effectual; by stooping to bear the sin that oppressed the race He had gained the power to free the race and raise it to the height of His Own glory. The life that He had gained could subdue all things to Itself. In Him man is reconciled to God, because in Him God sees man triumphant over sin, and the triumph of the Head is the pledge of that of the Body.

Closely connected with this conception of the crucified and risen Christ as a propitiation is that of the divine *imputation* of His merits. It is a mere travesty of the idea to suppose merely that God imputes to man that which man has not in virtue of a wholly extraneous transaction. God only imputes to man what is *in* man, if not actually at least virtually. Where He imputes there is *promise*, and the promise is not merely in the Giver, but in the receiver. Bound up with the insufficiency of that view of our Lord's death which sums up its effect in the mere averting of condemnation is the insufficiency of that view of justification which represents it as merely the non-

imputation of sin. Justification according to St. Paul is the positive imputation of righteousness, and of a righteousness actually existent at least in the germ. This comes out most clearly in his treatment of its typical example Abraham, where the idea of non-imputation of sin is absolutely excluded both by its incongruity with his description of Abraham's faith and by his own express statement as to the *universal* non-imputation of sin in the period in which Abraham lived. And because faith, the only spring of human action which does not involve sin (Rom. xiv. 23), is regarded by St. Paul as the one root of human righteousness, man is said from the first to have been justified by faith. But St. Paul knew that in thus imputing the faith of sinful man as righteousness God was imputing a potentiality which could only attain complete actuality by an intervention. To teach man this truth by bringing sin into knowledge and thus *multiplying transgression*, of which there had hitherto been but a single instance in Adam, and so to lead to the hope of a divine righteousness to be manifested in the future, was the office of the law.

The crudity of St. Paul's historical conception of the state of mankind 'from Adam to Moses,' on which he pictured the law as suddenly supervening with its revelation of a hitherto unknown and unrecognized sin, ought never to be lost sight of in considering his doctrine of justifying faith. For the failure to grasp it has made it possible to attribute to him the notion that God's imputation of righteousness to Abraham was the mere non-imputation of sin, and thus to involve in a thick mist his clear presentation of Abraham's faith as something meritorious in



itself. And the consequent cloud of errors on the subject of justifying faith has disastrously obscured the true character of the divine propitiation as 'a propitiation through faith.'

The idea that justification by faith means a non-imputation of sin secured by our own faith in virtue of a propitiation wholly external to us is hopelessly unintelligible. This, of course, does not mean that those who hold it have altogether missed the truth; but the fact that people have rested and found comfort in it does not necessarily prove more than that their instinctive apprehension of the truth of the propitiation has prevented them from questioning an illogical attempt at expressing it which they wrongly believed to be scriptural. The truth according to St. Paul would seem to be that both justification and propitiation are united in Christ and are both through *His* faith. It was because His faith alone attained the perfection of that human righteousness of which faith is the germ, and attained it fully only in His death, that He alone was fully and absolutely justified by that faith and by that death (Rom. vi. 7). And it was because that triumphant faith became a quickening power working in the many sons the glory of the One that that complete justification by faith was also 'a propitiation by faith.' In it God's redemptive work was virtually accomplished. *In* Christ human nature was completely justified from sin. *From* Him the Spirit that had finally triumphed over the flesh was to go forth and subdue all to itself; and therefore *in* Him God saw the whole work accomplished. 'Whom he called them he also justified, and whom he justified them he also glorified.' Just

as God saw in primitive human faith a promise, though an incomplete one, of human righteousness, so He saw in the fully accomplished human righteousness of Christ a sure promise of the complete reign of righteousness in *man*. Thus the whole work of God was in the first instance accomplished in Christ for man; but it was *for* man only as a gift proffered *to* man, and to be wrought *in* man. Now to make the propitiation one condition fulfilled in Christ, and faith a wholly different condition fulfilled in ourselves, really tends to rob salvation of that very character, as the full and free gift of God, which the doctrine is supposed to safeguard. If the merits which won that salvation are absolutely and entirely Christ's, if the whole work was done by Him for us, where is there room for a contributing factor *of a wholly different order* in ourselves? And if it be replied that our faith is not really a contributing factor, but only a condition required by God, then how are we to believe that God restricts the operation of the propitiation by imposing a condition which *ex hypothesi* has no merit whatever in His sight? If the propitiation is arbitrarily available for one set of people who are no better than those who are arbitrarily excluded it is difficult to see how it coincides with the revelation of 'the righteousness of God' (Rom. iii. 21, 25).

One root of the error here combated is the refusal to recognize any real human merit. Such a principle is certainly not derived from St. Paul, whose teaching on the faith of Abraham almost irresistibly suggests that he saw in that faith something *obviously* meritorious (Rom. iv. 18-22). Accord-

ingly before the revelation of the righteousness of God in Christ there was already a true, though imperfect, human righteousness, which, being held on the tenure of faith, was in no way opposed to that righteousness. The work accomplished by Christ was the perfecting of a human righteousness which had hitherto been debarred from perfection by sin. His grace did not come to fill an absolute void, but rather to make up a deficiency. Before His coming there was a grace of God, a spiritual life in man, the root of which was faith; and the perfect righteousness of His perfect faith brought healing and vital energy to that life. The faith of man was necessary for the reception of the benefit, neither because it was a condition arbitrarily ordained by God, nor because by it man had power to lay hold on the propitiation, but because it was the essential condition of the propitiation laying hold on him. There was spiritual generation before regeneration, and there was real sonship before the *υιοθεσία*. The sons in bondage differed nothing from slaves, but it was because they *were* sons that the Spirit of the Son was sent forth into their hearts (Gal. iv. 6). Their very slavery, in fact, was the stamp of infant sonship; the brutes were comparatively free; for it was the bondage of the heathen and Jewish religions of which St. Paul speaks, and it is obvious that he regarded both alike as preparatory dispensations (*cf.* Gal. iv. 1-3, 8-10). And in this state of bondage, whether in the Jewish or the heathen world, faith was the spiritual factor which marked off those capable of receiving spiritual benefits. St. Paul discerned it in the cripple of Lystra, as did Our Lord Himself in

the Syro-Phœnician woman. It was doubtless the characteristic not only of the *σωζόμενοι* of Acts ii. 47, but of the *τεταγμένοι εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον* of Acts xiii. 48. The act of faith by which men received the gospel was but the exercise of a pre-existent spiritual faculty quickened by the spiritual power accompanying the message. It was on this pre-existent faith that the assimilating power of the triumphant 'faith of the Son of God' fastened, according to the operation of the law announced by Him, 'To him that hath shall be given.'

If there be truth in this presentation of the matter it would seem to be necessary to define more distinctly what we mean by attributing to Christ the *whole* work of man's justification. What the propitiation which is exclusively *His* work actually wrought and still works is that quickening and completion of human faith without which man's complete justification was impossible, but which presupposes a faith which was not the special work of the *Incarnate* Son. But that very quickening and completion of an imperfect human faith involved the assimilation and swallowing up of that faith in the fulness of the supervening grace, so that those who 'by Him believe' must take their stand wholly on 'the faith that is by Him.' It is thus absolutely true that their salvation is to be attributed to the grace of Christ alone.

The emphasis laid by St. Paul on faith is the natural outcome of the special revelation claimed by him, the revelation of *God's Son in him* (Gal. i. 15). His was the first recorded apostolic preaching of Jesus as the Son of God (Acts ix. 20), and it followed

immediately on his conversion. His gospel was the gospel of God's Son (Rom. i. 9), and that which made it a gospel was the conception of His Sonship as a grace imparted. It was 'the gospel of the grace of God' (Acts xx. 24) because it was the gospel of 'Christ in you, the hope of glory' (Col. i. 27).

This revelation of Christ as the indwelling Son constituted a great theological advance in early christology. Hitherto the prevailing conception of Our Lord's Person would seem to have been that of the *παῖς θεοῦ* of the later Isaiah. On this point the language of the church's prayer in Acts iv. 27, 30 is perhaps a stronger testimony even than that of her preaching through St. Peter (Acts iii. 13, 26). This presentation had its special force in her dealings with the literal Israel; the revelation to the apostle of the gentiles was the foundation of 'the gospel of the uncircumcision.' The Hellenistic movement in the church which had been the means of rousing his persecuting zeal had already prepared the way for a widening of the range of her message. The utter collapse in him of the narrow pharisaic position of privilege constrained him to interpret the revelation of the indwelling Son as a call to preach Him among the gentiles (Gal. i. 16). The Son revealed in *him* could only mean the potential sonship of *man*, since what had seemed to raise him above his fellows had vanished in the brightness of His glory. For him the gospel of God's indwelling Son was also the gospel of man's sonship to be realized in Him, and from that gospel follows naturally all his teaching, including that on justification. As the message of

an ideal human life still realising itself it covered the whole field of practical religion.

But the life of sonship had one pre-eminent characteristic; it was essentially the life of faith, the great filial virtue. Accordingly the sonship of man must be wrought out by faith, and the communicated life of the Son was the life of faith. His work on earth was to bring that life to perfection, and His work in the church is to propagate it in His members. By that communicated life of faith they are sons of God in Him (Gal. iii. 26), just as that life in St. Paul's own case was lived 'in the faith of the Son of God' (Gal. ii. 20). Hence justification in Christ is necessarily both 'justification of life' (Rom. v. 18) and justification by faith. And the faith which justifies being *His* faith is properly faith in the Father, though it is also faith in the Son as the perfect Image of the Father, and as the Former of that Image in man.

The preaching of Jesus as the Son of God unquestionably originated with Himself, but it does not follow from this that the truth of His Sonship was from the first a possession of His church. It is necessary to bear in mind that the revelation to St. Paul was prior to the writings of the New Testament and that its influence on them cannot possibly have been confined to his own epistles. To say that the four gospels themselves are instinct with that revelation might seem at first sight seriously to call in question their plain historical character; but a little consideration will shew that this is not so; indeed, it is not necessary to go beyond the limits of the gospels themselves for the suggestion of a sounder

view. We read in St. John xiv. 26, 'He (the Paraclete) shall teach you all things, and shall bring all things to your remembrance which I said unto you.' Now the first thing implied here is that much of Christ's teaching would be forgotten by those who first received it. And this was only natural, since the records bear witness that much of it was not understood at the time. Now it is certainly not necessary to suppose that all the lost teaching was suddenly flashed back upon the apostles on the day of Pentecost. Rather we should expect that the guiding into all truth would be gradual and adapted to the receptive faculty of the hearers. The direct teaching of the Holy Spirit ministering the grace and truth in Christ according to the need which the work of evangelization from time to time disclosed preceded and occasioned the bringing into remembrance the forgotten words. Not only is this the order suggested by the text already quoted (St. John xiv. 26), but it is the order which on reflection will probably commend itself to most people as the natural one.

It would seem to follow that the apostles themselves were not necessarily from the first in full possession of the truth as to Our Lord's Person. As the full defining of that truth only became necessary in the face of error, so a merely partial apprehension of it, provided it was untainted by the spirit of negation, was sufficient for the earlier needs of the church. The aspect under which the risen Christ had first to be announced to the chosen people was that of an Apostle of God (Acts iii. 26, *cf.* Heb. iii. 1, St. John xx. 21) mystically present in power in His



church. The power was the essential characteristic of the Kingdom (St. Mark ix. 1, *cf.* I. Cor. iv. 20), and its immediate witness was to the presence of Him Who had received it. It was sufficient for the time that He should be set forth as the *παῖς* of Isaiah, Who had passed through suffering to glory and had come with a blessing to His people. Such a conception left fully open, and even prepared, the way for the inclusion of the gentiles in the church; but it too readily lent itself to the notion that they were to be gathered into the literal Israel as the essential condition of receiving the blessing. The gospel of the Son on the other hand revealed that essential condition as something broadly human. The power of 'the faith that is by Him' revealed an element in human nature generally on which it could lay hold. As the faith of the Incarnate Son of God it could quicken the dormant faith in the Father of *man*.

And there is surely no incongruity in supposing that it was through St. Paul and the revelation to him that the Paraclete fulfilled His office by bringing to the remembrance of the older apostles Our Lord's teaching as to His Sonship. In those first days when they were absorbed in the work of bearing witness with power to the resurrection of Christ they do not appear to have associated that truth with the fact. It is St. Paul whom we first find applying in this connection the words of the second psalm, 'Thou art my son, this day have I begotten thee' (Acts xiii. 33). The truth could lie hid as it were in their memories because their work with the Jews did not call for it in the same way as did St. Paul's work with the gentiles. It may well have been the

growing needs of the church revealed in St. Paul's work that brought back into clear consciousness teaching the full bearing of which had not been perceived when it was first uttered.

One might even hazard the conjecture, though it may seem to savour of the fanciful, that the visit to Jerusalem mentioned in Gal. ii. 1-10 was the occasion of the revival through St. Paul's instrumentality in the minds of St. Peter and the rest of divine teaching that had long slumbered there. The whole passage is remarkable. St. Paul expressly says that he went to Jerusalem by revelation; and though he strongly claims independent authority for the gospel committed to him, yet it is clear that in referring it to them he was seeking some sort of independent confirmation of it (v. 2). Now if that 'gospel of the uncircumcision' which he then communicated was essentially the gospel of *the Son*, the interview may well have awakened memories of forgotten words of Christ, and thus supplied the very confirmation sought. And thus, though they may not have imparted new truth to St. Paul (v. 6), and though he may only have revived slumbering memories in them, the mutual benefit secured, and the doctrinal gain to the whole church, may have been such as fully to account for the special revelation that prompted the visit.

Be that as it may, the *original* revelation of the Son claimed by St. Paul is a fact which certainly seems to call for explanation. The facts connected with Our Lord's death and resurrection, as well as the institution of the Holy Eucharist, he had been content to receive from others (*παρέλαβον*, I. Cor.

xi. 23, xv. 3). If the words which Christ had spoken about His Own Sonship were being consciously cherished and formed part of the living message of the church of Jerusalem, why could not St. Paul have received that truth also 'from man'? If on the other hand those words of Christ had their special bearing on that enlargement of the scope of the gospel message which was to be the special vocation of St. Paul, and had not the same bearing on the immediate work of the original apostles, then it is only natural that the quickening of their memory should be brought about through the instrumentality of him to whom the truth was imparted as a necessary equipment for his appointed task. Truth which has not yet found its expression in act is always more or less dormant. For the doing of the Will is vouchsafed the knowledge of the doctrine (St. John vii. 17).

Thus the memory of those with whom originated the first records that developed into our gospels may well have already received through St. Paul the stimulus necessary for the completion of their witness. And still the revelation of the Son of God may have been in a peculiar sense a gift to the apostle of the gentiles. And here the matter might be left but for a single passage in the gospel according to St. Matthew in which we read of this very revelation of Our Lord's Sonship as specially made to St. Peter (St. Mat. xvi. 16-18). According to the view taken of this passage it will be found to furnish either a complete refutation of the view just advanced or a striking confirmation of it.

The question that has to be answered is, Does the passage in question record an historical event? If

so, the special revelation of Our Lord as the Son of God to St. Peter would seem to render the priority of St. Paul's teaching on the subject incredible. But there are strong reasons for viewing the passage in question with the utmost suspicion.

(1) In the first place both St. Mark (viii. 29), whose evidence is specially important where St. Peter is concerned, and St. Luke (ix. 20) make St. Peter confess simply that Our Lord is 'the Christ,' without any mention of 'the Son,' and neither of them record the words attributed to Our Lord in St. Mat. xvi. 17, 18.

(2) The word *ἐκκλησία* in v. 18 tends to throw doubt on the whole passage. The only other verse in the gospels in which the word occurs is St. Mat. xviii. 17, a passage which similarly has only the authority of the first gospel. If Our Lord ever spoke of the church it is at least remarkable that the evidence for the fact should be so slender.

(3) The principal objection to the passage is the close resemblance between St. Mat. xvi. 17 and Gal. i. 15, 16.

(a) Both passages are concerned with a special revelation to an individual.

(b) In both the revelation is of Our Lord as the Son of God.

(c) Both mention 'flesh and blood' as something of which the revelation was altogether independent. And all these three points occur only in the account of the transaction contained in our first gospel. The conclusion here drawn is that the two passages

are not independent, and that the words of St. Mat. xvi. 17 are derived from those of St. Paul.

But if this be so the unconscious testimony of the spurious passage becomes important. From the earliest times there was a tendency in some quarters to exalt the authority of St. Peter at the expense of that of St. Paul. The Cephas party at Corinth would seem to furnish an instance (I. Cor. i. 12 ; *cf.* ix. 5). and it is natural to suppose that the passage in question owed its origin to this party rivalry. It was an attempt to give St. Peter some sort of equivalent for the revelation claimed by St. Paul. But this would hardly have been necessary unless the partisans of St. Paul had strongly claimed for him the credit of the original revelation and preaching of the Sonship of Christ, and unless those of St. Peter had recognized the formidable strength of the claim so advanced. It is perhaps hardly necessary to add that the false reading in St. John vi. 69 is probably derived from the spurious passage in St. Matthew.

To sum up all that has here been urged. St. Paul's gospel is *the gospel of the Son*, and it is only a *gospel* because it is the message of a Son Who communicates His Sonship with His Life. In that communicated Life is summed up the whole gift of God to man, it includes in a living union every Christian grace, whether pardon or cleansing, justification or sanctification. The historic life on earth, the very death on the cross, are nothing apart from the Life that still lives and quickens. That Life has fulfilled man's destiny, which is the complete triumph over sin and death, and in It alone is the remedy for that sin which is the lower brute-life asserting itself in

the breach of God's higher law. And the essential principle of this Life of the Son is that faith in the Father which looks confidently to Him for all good whether of soul or body. Thus it is 'the faith which is by Him' that justifies, even as that faith is the means by which God purifies the heart (Acts xv. 9). And St. Paul's whole doctrine finds its complete expression in the Johannine declaration, 'God hath given unto us eternal life, and this life is in his Son. He that hath the Son hath the life, and he that hath not the Son hath not the life' (I. John v. 11, 12).

## APPENDIX I.

ON THE PAULINE CONCEPTION OF FAITH IN CERTAIN  
PASSAGES NOT DIRECTLY BEARING ON JUSTIFICATION.

The principal aim of the preceding pages has been to shew that where St. Paul is dealing with the subject of justification he conceives faith rather as a grace coming from Christ to the believer than as a faculty exercised by the believer toward Christ. But if this is the true Pauline conception of the faith which justifies we might naturally expect to meet with it in other passages of his writings where faith has no such special reference to justification. It is the object of the present note to point out one or two instances in which the application of this principle may have an important bearing on exegesis.

And it will be well to begin with a verse which requires a somewhat fuller consideration than the rest, not only by reason of its intrinsic importance, but because its discussion will tend to throw light on the general tendency of commentators to take the genitive after *πίστις* as objective. The verse in question, Col. ii. 12, runs as follows: 'Buried with him in baptism, wherein also ye were raised with him through the faith of the operation of God, who raised him from the dead'; and the main question with regard to it concerns the genitive *τῆς ἐνεργείας*. Is the meaning 'faith in the working of God,' as the



revisers give it, or is it 'the faith of God's working,' 'the faith which God operates'?

Before attempting an answer to this question it will be instructive to consider what has been said on the passage by the two eminent commentators Elliccott and Lightfoot. The former comments thus on the words *τῆς ἐνεργείας τοῦ θεοῦ*. 'Not gen. of the *agent* or *causa efficiens* (De Wette, al), but more simply and intelligibly the gen. *objecti*; . . . as in all cases where *πίστις* is thus associated with a gen. *rei*, the gen. appears to denote the object of the faith; comp. Acts iii. 16, Phil. i. 27, II. Thess. ii. 13.' Dr. Lightfoot's commentary is as follows: '*Διὰ τῆς πίστεως κ.τ.λ.*] "through your faith in the operation" *ἐνεργείας* being the objective genitive, . . . . Others take *τῆς ἐνεργείας* as the subjective genitive, "faith which comes from the operation," etc., arguing from a mistaken interpretation of the parallel passage Eph. i. 19 (where *κατὰ τὴν ἐνεργείαν* should be connected, not with *τοὺς πιστεύοντας*, but with *τὸ τὸ ὑπερβάλλον μέγεθος, κ.τ.λ.*). The former explanation, however, yields a better sense, and the genitive after *πίστις* far more commonly describes the object than the source of the faith, *e.g.* Rom. iii. 22, 26, Gal. iii. 22, Eph. iii. 12, Phil. i. 27, iii. 9, II. Thess. ii. 13.'

The first thing to be observed here is that neither commentator gives any *exegetical* reason whatever for the interpretation which both adopt. Lightfoot merely asserts that it 'yields a better sense,' while Elliccott says that the words are so taken 'more simply and intelligibly.' It will be sufficient to meet these assertions by adducing reasons for the con-

trary view. But before doing so it will be well to deal with the *critical* reasons which both commentators give for taking τῆς ἐνεργείας as the genitive *objecti*, among which need not be included the unsoundness of the argument on the other side referred to by Dr. Lightfoot, since that argument will certainly not be advanced here.

It will be convenient first to consider the passages adduced by Lightfoot *alone* in support of the contention that 'the genitive after πίστις far more commonly describes the object than the source of the faith.' These are Rom. iii. 22, 26, Gal. iii. 22, Eph. iii. 12, and Phil. iii. 9. As to these passages it will suffice to urge the following two considerations.

(1) In the case of all these instances, with the exception of Eph. iii. 12, which will shortly be considered, reasons have already been given for taking the genitive after πίστις as subjective.

(2) Even if they were instances of the *objective* genitive they would present no real parallel to Col. ii. 12. For they are all cases of the genitive *personæ*. Lightfoot would have done well here to follow Ellicott's lead more closely. Ellicott rests his argument, such as it is, on cases of the genitive *rei* after πίστις, and on such cases only. True he can only muster three such cases in the New Testament, and in none of them is it by any means certain that the genitive is objective. But this fact vindicates his superior critical acumen in placing instances of the genitive *rei* after πίστις in a class by themselves. For in the great majority of cases, if not in all, the object of faith in the New Testament is a *person*. The fact that *we* can speak of faith even in

quack remedies certainly does not warrant our attributing any such use of the word *faith* in writers like St. Paul. And such an expression as *πίστις τῆς ἐνεργείας* can no more be illustrated by *πίστις Ἰησοῦ* (Rom. iii. 26) than by *πίστις Ἀβραὰμ* (Rom. iv. 16).

It remains to consider Dr. Ellicott's contention more in detail. The three instances adduced by him of the genitive *rei* after *πίστις* are Acts iii. 16, Phil. i. 27, and II. Thess. ii. 13, the two latter of which are also cited by Lightfoot as instances of the objective genitive. As to II. Thess. ii. 13, it may be conceded at once that the most natural translation of *πίστει ἀληθείας* seems to be 'by faith in the truth,' though even here the expression *ὁσιότητι τῆς ἀληθείας* in Eph. iv. 24 suggests the possibility of another interpretation which is further strengthened by the subjective genitive in the co-ordinate clause *ἐν ἁγιασμῷ πνεύματος*. As to Acts iii. 16, it must suffice to refer to the reasons already given in Chapter IV. for taking *τοῦ ὀνόματος* as the *subjective* genitive after *πίστει*. There remains Phil. i. 27, *συναθλοῦντες τῇ πίστει τοῦ εὐαγγελίου*.

In his commentary on this verse Ellicott gives no reason whatever for taking *εὐαγγελίου* as the objective genitive, while his translation, 'for the faith of the gospel,' rather lends itself to the contrary view. And this view of the genitive as subjective certainly seems also to underlie Lightfoot's comment,—'*ἡ πίστις* is here objective, "the faith," "the teaching of the gospel."' How can this objective faith, which he further describes as 'personified and regarded as a moral agent,' be identical with a subjective faith in the gospel? It is certainly strange that after com-

menting thus Lightfoot should subsequently adduce this passage as an instance of the objective genitive after *πίστις*, and that without retracting his former view. It looks as if he had merely copied the reference from Ellicott's note without verifying it. On the whole his own note on the passage will probably strike most people as more satisfactory than Ellicott's, though 'the faith of the gospel,' which both admit to be the meaning, and which Lightfoot seems rightly to regard as personified, does not mean 'the teaching' of the gospel, a use of *πίστις* which is to say the least doubtful in the New Testament, but rather that power of faith proceeding from the risen Christ to which witness is borne in Acts iii. 16, which is much more naturally regarded as a spiritual *agent*, and which is here maintained to be the *subject* of St. Paul's gospel. Compare what has been already said in Chapter V. on ἀκοή πίστεως (Gal. iii. 2).

To return to Col. ii. 12. The sum of the matter seems to be that while no exegetical reasons have been given for regarding τῆς ἐνεργείας as the objective genitive there is absolutely no force in the critical reasons adduced in support of that view. Even if Acts iii. 16 and Phil. i. 27 were both undoubted instances of an objective genitive *rei* after *πίστις*, (and Ellicott gives no reason for regarding either of them as such), these two instances combined with II. Thess. ii. 13 would be an absurdly slender basis on which to found a rule. If, as is here maintained, the genitive is subjective in both cases, the whole critical case collapses. We are thus thrown back in either case on purely exegetical considerations.

‘Buried with him (συνταφέντες αὐτῷ) in baptism, in which also ye were raised with him (συνηγέρθητε) through the faith of the operation of God who raised him from the dead.’ Here there is no mistaking the force of the preposition *συν*. The resurrection of the Colossians is represented as a work of God of the same spiritual order as the resurrection of Christ. What can be more hopelessly incompatible with such a view than the introduction of the idea of human co-operation? If the Colossians were raised by means of their own ‘faith in the working of God,’ their resurrection seems to stand in marked *contrast* to that of Christ. That resurrection is certainly never represented by St. Paul as a work in which He Himself co-operated, and the parallel passage in Eph. i. 19, 20 is hardly consistent with such a view. We there read of ‘the exceeding greatness of his power toward us that believe, according to the working (κατὰ τὴν ἐνεργείαν) of the strength of his might which he wrought in Christ (ἐνέργησεν ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ) in raising him from the dead.’ Does this magnificent description of the greatness of divine power shewn in the raising of Christ admit for one moment of the idea of co-operation on the part of the Person raised? And if it is ‘according to’ this working that God shews His power ‘toward us that believe,’ how could St. Paul possibly have made the Colossians’ own faith in that working the instrumental cause of *their* resurrection? The instrument of that mighty working of God was necessarily an instrument in the hand of the living God, not in that of the dead and buried Colossians. Such an instrument is the triumphant

spirit of faith going forth from Christ to reproduce that risen life which was its reward, and in which were summed up the gifts that He received for, and gave to, men. By that faith, as a grace *in* Christ, those who entered into fellowship with Him in baptism were raised with Him. True only believers could come to that baptism. But if the faith they had already was the means of their resurrection why come to baptism at all? They came that they 'might be justified by the faith of Christ' (Gal. ii. 16), by the faith that had triumphed. And by the imparting of that 'spirit of faith' they shared His risen life. Thus 'the faith of God's working' is His work alone. It is His gift *in* Christ which man's weak faith receives and by which it is quickened.

If this passage may seem to have been treated at somewhat excessive length, the fault, if fault there be, is due to a conviction of its crucial importance. It is hoped that the view here taken of it may commend itself to the reader. What is definitely claimed to have been established is that the argument based on the genitive after *πίστις* in other passages has no weight, and that the question is purely exegetical. As such it cannot be judged altogether apart from the larger question which has had to be faced again and again in the preceding pages, the question whether St. Paul generally conceived of Christian faith as a grace received from Christ or from God through Him, or merely as a human faculty exercised toward Christ or toward some other object, personal or otherwise.

The other passage which chiefly concerns us here is Eph. iii. 11, 12. 'According to the eternal pur-

pose which he purposed in Christ Jesus our Lord, in whom we have boldness and access in confidence by his faith (*διὰ τῆς πίστεως αὐτοῦ*).

There can be no question as to the way in which any one who came to this passage entirely free from all theological bias would translate the last four words. This does not prove that the translation given above, 'by his faith,' is the correct one. But it does prove that the English reader is entitled to have it placed distinctly before him at least as an alternative. What the revisers have done here is instructive. In the text they have translated *τῆς πίστεως αὐτοῦ* by 'our faith in him.' In the margin they have given as an alternative 'the faith of him.' Now there are only two alternatives here. Either the words mean 'faith in him' or they mean 'his faith.' And according to their own principle enunciated in their preface they ought to have inserted one of these in the text and the other in the margin. Apparently they felt that the translation in the text was so unnatural that an alternative ought to be given, but they were so averse to the real alternative that they could only bring themselves to substitute for it the old equivocal rendering of 1611. This is very like moral cowardice, but it is only too characteristic of the revisers' work.<sup>18</sup>

On purely exegetical grounds it is certainly not difficult to maintain that what is unquestionably the natural translation of the words gives a far better sense than the text of the revised version. The passage speaks of a purpose of God purposed *in* Christ, and of a bold and confident access on our

<sup>18</sup> Cf. what has been said above on Gal. iii. 19.



part also *in* Him. It seems most natural to suppose that the faith by which we have that access *in* Him is also something which we have and hold *in* Him and in Him alone. A faith of our own which we exercise *toward* Him as its Object seems to be an element foreign to the main thought of the passage. If this faith of ours is the real means by which we have the approach, why is the approach itself necessarily *in* Him? For it cannot be too strongly insisted on that to have faith in Christ as the Object, and to *be* in Christ as in a spiritual sphere of life, are two fundamentally distinct conceptions, and that there is a logical gulf between the two which no theology can ever bridge.<sup>19</sup> If our faith in Christ is sufficient to give us the access spoken of, then that access is not necessarily *in* Him at all. If it is the human condition on which alone that access is available for us, its introduction at the close of such a passage is very like a bathos. To come down in this way from God's eternal purpose to some human agency of ours on which that purpose is made practically to depend for its accomplishment is a descent which we should hardly expect from St. Paul. Moreover the very hypothesis of such a condition implies that to be in Christ is in itself insufficient. What God purposed is not enough; we ourselves have to supply something more. Though we be in

<sup>19</sup> To avoid misconception it may be well to emphasize the fact that the gulf here spoken of is *only* logical, and as such may be, and no doubt is, bridged by the grace of God. The case of Cornelius shews that the baptismal gift may precede baptism, and what may precede may conceivably supersede. Truly to believe in Christ may be *actually* inseparable from *being* in Christ, and yet the logical priority of the latter may be all-important from the doctrinal point of view.

Christ we have not everything there; for faith we must depend on the little stock we bring with us. And the same reasoning would seem to apply to that 'boldness to enter into the holiest in the blood of Jesus' spoken of in the strikingly parallel passage in Heb. x. 19. If to be in Christ is not sufficient to give 'boldness and access with confidence' neither is 'the blood of Jesus.' Surely the faith by which God purposed that we should have access in Him was an essential part of the purpose in Him. It is that triumphant faith of 'the forerunner' which won for us the entrance into the holiest, the faith which is a grace in Him and in Him alone and only to be laid hold on there, the faith in virtue of which the Ephesians themselves are addressed as 'believing in Christ Jesus (*πιστοῖς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ*,' Eph. i. 1).

The expression 'that Christ may dwell in your hearts by faith' (Eph. iii. 17) similarly occurs in a passage which hardly admits of any reference to our own subjective activity. It speaks of a gift of God 'according to the riches of his glory,' a gift which involves being strengthened with might by His Spirit. To interpret it as meaning that Christ dwells in our hearts by our own faith is to make the gift according to the riches of that faith rather than those of God's glory. The faith by which Christ dwells is the faith which is the principle of His communicated life; it is the faith which He brings, not any faith which may be supposed to bring Him.

And the close of this epistle to the Ephesians furnishes another strong testimony to that view of faith which seems to run through the whole. In vi. 23 St. Paul prays for peace and love 'with faith from

God the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ.' Here he evidently regards faith as something proceeding as a spiritual gift from Christ to man, and the conjunction of faith with love seems to throw light on the similar juxtaposition in I. Tim. i. 14; II. Tim. i. 13. In spite of the singular article after *ἀγάπη* in both these verses both faith and love appear to be regarded as equally graces *in* Christ rather than human activities directed toward Him.

One word may perhaps be allowed in conclusion concerning a passage which is not by St. Paul at all. In the recorded speech of St. Peter at the council of Jerusalem, he speaks of God having cleansed the hearts of the gentiles by faith (*τῇ πίστει καθάρσας τὰς καρδίας αὐτῶν*, Acts xv. 9). Whatever may be thought of the historical value of this record it unquestionably bears witness to a very early Christian view of faith as an instrument in God's hands rather than man's, and is in entire accord with the view taken above of 'the faith of the operation of God' in Col. ii. 12.

## APPENDIX II.

## ON THE REVISED VERSION OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.

It is not the aim of the present note to supply anything like an adequate criticism from the author's point of view of the revised version of the New Testament. Its object is two-fold; (1) to combat what seems to him to be a somewhat irrational prejudice in favour of this version; (2) to justify the hostile attitude taken towards it in the foregoing chapters by exposing a single fault which appears to him to mar the whole work.

Since the revised version first appeared there has grown up a younger generation who quite naturally adopt a different attitude towards it from that of those who looked forward to its publication. The latter were already conscious of many serious defects in the version of 1611, and were hoping for their correction. The benefit it was to bring was, as it were, discounted before its appearance. And probably in the case of many of them the prevailing feeling on a first perusal of it was one of disgust at the many unnecessary alterations which marred what ought to have been a wholly useful work. The younger generation, on the other hand, come to their first study of the Greek Testament with the revised version in their hands, and are naturally struck with

the great improvement in the sense effected by those necessary alterations which their seniors in *their* first perusal took as a matter of course. The latter accordingly may often find their juniors somewhat excessive in their praise of its virtues and a little blind to its faults.

Further there is very widely spread, also perhaps principally among the younger generation, what may be called the *scholarship* prejudice. A good many years ago the company of the revisers was described (I think by one who has now reached episcopal rank) as a 'galaxy of scholars.' It would be unfair to press the metaphor, as a galaxy consists of a multitude of very small stars which in combination give a misty sort of light. And yet there may be something more in this somewhat brutal criticism than appears at first sight. For even if it be granted that the revisers were a constellation of stars of the first magnitude in respect of scholarship, even so, if there be not absolute unanimity, the test of numbers on either side has but a slight value. It appears from the preface that the minority against any particular alteration in the text might amount to one-third. What is the value of a mere two-thirds majority when we know neither of whom it consisted nor the reasons adduced on either side? To take a single instance. In II. Tim. ii. 26 the revisers have made an alteration to which further reference will have to be made shortly. All that need be said with regard to it at present is that the minority on this occasion almost certainly included Bishop Ellicott, who gives in his commentary very strong reasons against the translation in the revised text. Now if Ellicott with his

reasons had stood alone, those reasons would still weigh more than the mere numbers on the other side.

But the fallacy with regard to the significance of mere numbers is not the main objection to the undue appreciation implied in the description of the revisers as a galaxy of scholars. There is the further question, How far does scholarship qualify for the task of revision? Probably in the majority of cases where there is a question as to a rendering, scholarship has absolutely nothing to do with its determination. Such a verse as St. John v. 39 is only one of a large class. And the solution of the question whether 'Search' or 'Ye search' is the right translation of *ἐρευνᾶτε* is a matter with which scholarship has nothing to do, and which depends on an insight into the mind of the writer which does not necessarily go with scholarship at all. Accordingly scholarship is only a small portion of the necessary equipment of a company of revisers. The great scholar may be of less value than the man who has exegetical insight, though the latter must of course possess that minimum of scholarship which would save him from translating (with Irving) '*χρόνος οὐκέτι ἔσται*' (Rev. x. 6) by 'the time shall not be yet,' or (with McCaul) '*διὰ παθημάτων*' (Heb. ii. 10) by 'on account of his sufferings.' Whether the great scholars of the revision had this greater qualification of insight is a matter far more open to question than their scholarship.

It is not necessary to say more as to the somewhat irrational prejudice prevailing in certain quarters as to the authority of the revised version. The principal object of the present note is to criticize one of the

avowed principles on which the revisers proceeded and their consistency in carrying it out.

In their preface (iii. 2) occurs the following sentence, 'It has been our principle not to leave any translation, or any arrangement of words, which could adapt itself to one or other of two interpretations, but rather to express as plainly as was possible that interpretation which seemed best to deserve a place in the text, and to put the other in the margin.' Now this principle obviously requires certain limitations. For instance, when the ambiguity is only in the English it may be very necessary to give the right meaning clearly, but it would be palpably absurd to put the wrong one in the margin. I. St. John iii. 3 ('every man that hath this hope in him') is a case in point. The text has sometimes been read as if it referred to a hope which a man possesses somewhere in his inside. Greater clearness of expression was here no doubt desirable, though the very drastic alteration in the revised text seems a terrible price to pay for it. But we may be thankful that the revisers did not 'put the other interpretation in the margin.'

One necessary qualification, then, of the revisers' principle is that the marginal alternative must only be given where the ambiguity is in the Greek as well as in the English. But then immediately arises the question, How about those ambiguities in the Greek which are *not* retained in the English? If the revisers' principle is to be interpreted rationally it must be admitted that in this case it is quite as necessary, if not more so, to place both possible interpretations clearly before the English reader. Thus the principle requires to be extended beyond the enunciation of it



in the revisers' preface if it is to be free from the risk of closing to the English reader lines of thought which must remain open to the reader of the original.

But the rigorous application of the principle so extended would involve, in those cases where the ambiguity of the original cannot be retained in the translation, the insertion either in the text or in the margin of every rendering of the Greek which is grammatically possible, and this would sometimes involve an absurdity. For instance, the order of the words in Rom. xi. 31 would favour the translation, 'So also these now disobeyed your mercy in order that they too may obtain mercy.' The principle then obviously requires limitation, and the limitation must be left to the discretion of the translators. And in fact it is quite clear that the revisers never really meant to carry out strictly the procedure indicated in the sentence above quoted from their preface. Later on (iii. 4) occurs the following sentence, 'We have therefore placed before the reader in the margin other renderings than those which were adopted in the text; *wherever such renderings seemed to deserve consideration.*' (The italics are mine). It would have been more satisfactory if the important limitation involved in this last clause had occurred in closer juxtaposition with the passage previously quoted. It would altogether have robbed that passage of its apparent plausibility. If the revisers really claim, as they could not help claiming in some cases, the right to withhold from the English reader a possible rendering on the ground that it does not seem to them to deserve consideration, most people will admit that that right should have been exercised as sparingly as

possible and that their translation would accordingly have been more faithful had it retained at least as far as possible in the English ambiguities corresponding to those in the original, instead of substituting for them that translation which is really their own interpretation of a doubtful passage. They could not get rid of the freedom allowed to readers of the original; what right had they so far to indulge their passion for interpreting as deliberately and unnecessarily to close to readers of the English a line of thought which will always remain open to a reader of the Greek? Even if they were unanimously of opinion that this line of thought did not 'deserve consideration' their action in closing it unnecessarily seems to indicate a somewhat presumptuous estimate of their own collective wisdom.

It may be interesting here to consider an instance in which the revisers have, perhaps inadvertently, by translating accurately been led in exactly the opposite direction to that which they chose for themselves. In St. Mat. vi. 23 they have translated τὸ σκότος πόσον by 'how great is the darkness!' The version of 1611 had 'How great is that darkness,' and by taking this little liberty with the definite article it had shut the door to another possible interpretation. That other interpretation had struck Luther, and he succeeded in making it the only possible one for *his* readers. He translated τὸ σκότος by 'die Finsterniss selber' (the italics are mine), thus giving a totally different turn to the whole sentence; 'if the *light* that is in thee be only darkness, what must the *darkness* that is in thee be!' Now these two interpretations are mutually exclusive. The English reader

could never get at Luther's, nor could the German reader get at that of the translators of 1611. No doubt the latter might have said that Luther's did not 'deserve consideration,' and Luther might have returned the compliment. The revised version leaves the English reader free, if he can divest himself of the prejudice created by the old version, to see and to weigh the meaning expressed by Luther. And it has effected this improvement by suppressing 'that interpretation which seemed' to the translators of 1611 'best to deserve a place in the text' and by substituting for it a 'translation . . . which could adapt itself to one or other of two interpretations.'

Of course the above is a case in which neither of the two different interpretations can be distinctly expressed in a *correct* translation, and it consequently differs from those cases in which the revisers' interpretations have not involved any tampering with the original. But it does serve to illustrate the advantage of retaining in the translation where possible ambiguities which exist in the Greek, and thus to impugn the principle on which the revisers have acted. By their first statement of that principle they succeeded in investing it with a plausibility which does not really belong to it. They in fact promised that where two interpretations were possible they would not only give their own but the other as well; but they could not redeem that promise, and they afterwards so whittled it down as to leave themselves a discretion to suppress interpretations which they did not think deserving of notice. Had their real principle been plainly stated at the first every one would have seen its inferiority to what is here maintained to

be the true principle,—that of rendering ambiguities in the original as far as possible by corresponding ambiguities in the translation.

In the light of the revisers' practice it is almost amusing to read their own justification of their rejection of one of the rules laid down by the committee of Convocation for their guidance. They say (Preface II.), 'the revision of the headings of chapters and pages would have involved so much of indirect, and indeed frequently of direct interpretation, that we judged it best to omit them altogether.' A very sound decision; but unfortunately as soon as this unexceptionable statement had served its turn, and the revisers had no longer any committee of Convocation to oppose, they proceeded to indulge to the utmost their passion for interpreting. And this vicious tendency reaches a climax in their treatment of a passage already referred to, II. Tim. ii. 26, where they actually go the length of substituting 'the Lord's servant' for *αὐτοῦ*, and 'of God' for *ἐκείνου*. This unwarrantable suppression of pronouns is in no way justified by the mere insertion of marginal notes which cannot possibly convey to the English reader the almost insuperable objections to the referring of *αὐτοῦ* to 'the Lord's servant.' And when the text of this version is read without these notes, as it unfortunately is in many churches, those responsible for such reading are foisting upon the congregation an impudent falsification of the text of Holy Scripture.

It is not necessary to give further illustrations of the application by the revisers of their own principle as finally laid down. Instances of it have constantly occurred in the body of this work in connection with

the genitive after *πίστις*, and it seemed desirable to further justify the objections constantly urged against them by pointing out the unsoundness of the tendency in which those instances originate. And before leaving the subject it may be well to lay a little more stress on a point which has already been touched on above.

A translation is for those who hear as well as for those who read. Doubtless it is to be wished that every one did both; but as a matter of fact many people only hear, and for such marginal notes are useless. It is far better for the latter class to hear a version which has the same power of striking the same person differently at different times as the original has, rather than to have perpetually dinned into their ears what is after all only the meaning which a limited number of scholars in the nineteenth century not always unanimously preferred. Though no version can really take the place of the original in this respect, it is at least desirable to avoid one made by a committee whose object was something very like 'taking God's word under wise protection' to 'correct its tendency to diffusiveness.'

It is to be hoped that when a new revision is undertaken, which is much to be wished, there will be no repetition of the great mistake of committing the work to a 'galaxy of scholars.' Apart from the very important question whether scholarship is in itself a sufficient qualification for the task there is the further objection that a work so executed is almost certain to be marked by inconsistencies. The majority must rule, and there will be different majorities on different occasions; consequently the whole work will not

represent the judgment of a single body. The result would be far more likely to be satisfactory if the task were committed to a single person who should have the benefit of the advice of at least three strong committees; one of experts in New Testament Greek; another of experts in literary English; and a third of eminent exegetes. It is the last committee that would be the most difficult to choose. It would also be the largest, and would have the most work to do. It would be composed of people whose qualifications did not necessarily extend to the whole field covered by the work. Some would be specially useful for some of the various books and some for others. It would be the body that would take the work in hand in the first instance, and its function would be simply to express in its own language what it conceived to be the meaning, or in case of differences of view to state clearly the different possible interpretations with the reasons urged for and against each. Only in certain cases would the committee of Greek experts have to be consulted at all, and they might be called in either by this committee itself or by the head of the commission on receiving its report. By this means the latter functionary, who must not be wholly deficient in any of the qualifications required for the work, and whose special endowment should be that of a judicial mind, would be enabled to make his decision as to the sense; and with the advice of the English experts he would endeavour to give it suitable expression. With him would rest the final responsibility for the work. He would be scholar enough not to be led by the nose by the scholars, and his judgment would be proof against mere fads whether of the English experts or

the exegetes. Above all he would keep the true aim steadily in view; and that aim is to place the English reader as far as possible in the same position as the reader of the Greek; not, like the revisers of 1880, to give special prominence to his own view of doubtful passages. And he would execute that final revision of the work which would make it a consistent whole, and not a patchwork produced by varying combinations of scholarly minds.

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